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1 Introduction 
 
Ever since the development of modern human capital theory by Becker (1962, 1964), 
Mincer (1958, 1974) and Schulz (1961) countless studies have tried to explain what 
impacts individuals’ salary. Most of them rely on the enclosure of traditional human 
capital predictors like workers tenure, education and social background and are able to 
explain a sizeable amount of salary differences. Only recently, studies have started to 
include personality traits into the salary determination, even though it is common 
knowledge that cognition and personality are related to labor market participation, as 
stated by Heineck and Anger (2009). This lack of empirical evidence has earlier been 
mentioned by Bowles, Gintis and Osborne (2001a). In their opinion, the scarcity of cor-
responding research is mainly based on the fact that economic theory simply does not 
predict which personality traits influence earnings. Additionally, the authors suggest a 
dependency between the job in itself and the influence of certain personality traits. They 
claim that the desired personality is subject to the according job, as for example the per-
sonality requirements for a salesperson differ vastly from those for a police officer. Lee 
(2006) supports this view, as in his opinion jobs themselves hold demand on personality 
traits, which leads to personality being rewarded differently in different workplace situ-
ations. Having mentioned these specifics of evaluation, the question remains in which 
way personality influences salary - given individuals’ human capital, cognitive ability 
and job performance. The main goal of the following research is to explain prior unex-
plained components of salary by personality traits - a task given twenty years ago by 
Earl (1990). In order to be able to relate the following work to previous studies, a short 
overview of the already existing literature appears to be appropriate.1 
 
Recent research focuses on the impact of personality traits on individuals’ salary as they 
describe the individual’s emotional, interpersonal, experimental, attitudinal and motiva-
tional styles. To classify personality traits into categories, the so-called big five factors 
of personality, also known as the Five Factor Model, have been introduced by Digman 
                                                 
1 Exploring the impact of personality on salary may also help to explain salary discrimination against 
woman. Men and woman rather work in certain jobs, which reward or punish sets of personality traits 
differently. For studies on this subject see Filer (1981), Nyhus and Pons (2005) and Fietze, Holst and 
Tobsch (2009). 
2 
 
(1990). Namely they are referred to “extraversion”, “agreeableness”, “conscientious-
ness”, “emotional stability” and “autonomy”.2 Increasing consensus developed during 
the last years on these five personality factors, as reported by Nyhus and Pons (2005). In 
order to collect evaluation data about ones personality traits, which are typically self-
reported, studies refer to test procedures like the five-factor inventory developed by 
Hendriks, Hofstee, De Raad und Angleitner (1999). This query contains 20 statements 
for each of the five personality traits, of which half are phrased positively and half are 
phrased negatively, as respondents select answers out of five-level Likert scales. The 
Five Factor Model helps to understand the relationship between personality and job 
criteria, as certain personality traits appear to be valid predictors of job performance. 
Studies usually control for job occupation, since different jobs set unique requirements 
to employees. In addition, cultural differences lead to varying exigencies on employees, 
as pointed out by Schmidt, Ones and Hunter (1992). To understand the denotation of the 
five previously named categories, a short explanation follows for each of them, all re-
lating to the definitions provided by Nyhus and Pons (2004). 
 
• Extraversion is related to ones preference for human contact, attention and the 
wish to inspire people. It describes people’s gregariousness and assertiveness to 
illustrate how outgoing people are. 
• Agreeableness describes to which degree people are willing to help others and 
cooperate with them. It furthermore shows how individuals act consistent to oth-
ers peoples interest. 
• Conscientiousness displays the preference for following rules and schedules, 
working hard and being organized. 
• Emotional stability shows if people are self-confident, calm and cool. 
• Autonomy illustrates individuals’ penchant to make one’s own decisions. 
Besides it describes to which degree an individual takes initiative and control. 
 
Summing up results of previous research, there is to mention that results vary consider-
ably across studies, rarely exhibiting constant results concerning the impact of the 
                                                 
2 Other studies show minor differences in the category labels with basically the same meaning. See for 
example Costa and McCrea (1985, 1992), who determine the categories of personality traits as 
“extraversion”, “agreeableness”, “conscientiousness”, “neuroticism” and “openness to experience”. 
3 
 
described personality traits on salary. Meta-studies by Salgado (1997) for Europe as 
well as by Barrick and Mount (1991) and Tett, Jackson and Rothstein (1991) for North 
America find a coincident result in a way that conscientiousness is the only personality 
trait which serves as a valid predictor of job performance in all three analyses. A more 
recent study by Bondreau, Boswell and Judge (1999) which analyzes career success of 
executives in North America and Europe, supports this finding. All other personality 
traits prove to be valid predictors for only some job criteria and some occupational 
groups. Problematic in this regard might the broad range of jobs included as well as the 
self-reported evaluations of the respondents, which are nearly impossible to verify if 
being correct. To account for these problems the following work concentrates on clearly 
identified markets and includes objective and measurable indicators for individuals’ 
personality. 
 
In contrast to research on the influence of personality on salary, research that deals with 
the development of personality traits throughout the life course offers coincident results. 
Literature shows consensus that personality is developed at young age and remains very 
stable throughout life.3 Costa and McCrae (1988, 1994, 1997) claim that personality 
remains consistent and if it actually does change, it changes at a very slow pace. They 
suggest that personality traits stop changing at the age of 30, a finding which is sup-
ported in a further study by Brandstätter (1999). Nevertheless, it should be considered 
that interaction with others as well as the surroundings of an individual lead to, even 
though small, changes of personality over time. In this context, Srivastave, John, Gosl-
ing and Potter (2003) show that an individual’s social and job environment affects per-
sonality traits in early and middle adulthood, a finding which is also pointed out by 
Borghans, Duckworth, Heckman and Ter Weel (2008).4 Using the German Socio-Eco-
nomic Panel, Flossmann, Piatek, Wichert and August (2007) examine the role of perso-
nality traits for labor market success. Their findings suggest that personality matters 
even when controlling for different aspects such as education and professional expe-
rience. They conclude that labor market success is influenced by early childhood since 
                                                 
3 Jang, Livesley and Vernon (1996) show positive correlations of personality traits between generations, 
as their finding support the theory that they are heritable. 
4  In line with this result, Caspi (1998) mentions that interaction between individuals affects personality 
over time. 
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the formation of personality occurs during the first years of life under the influence of 
the parents and the educational system. 
 
To empirically test the following research questions, which mainly address the influ-
ence of personality on earnings, I use different data sets from professional sports, espe-
cially from the National Basketball Association, the National Hockey League and the 
German Bundesliga, whose characteristics are being described in detail in the respective 
chapters. Next to providing detailed information on individuals’ performance and sal-
ary, the team sports industry itself is an expanding market with team values growing on 
a yearly basis and reaching considerable magnitudes. Especially for the US team sports 
industry information about team values is very well kept by Forbes Magazine.5 For the 
leagues considered in this work, the National Basketball Association displays the high-
est average team value with 367.0 million US-Dollars for the league consisting of 30 
teams. Team values in the National Hockey League are comparably lower, as the league 
which also consists of 30 teams exhibits an average team value of 222.6 million US-
Dollars. For the German Bundesliga which is 18 teams strong, individual team values 
are only reported for the six most valuable teams. One observes team values to be way 
less equally distributed across the teams as Bayern Munich is the most valuable team 
with 1.11 billion US-Dollars, while the sixth most valuable team is VfB Stuttgart with 
264 million US-Dollars.6 As teams generate increasing revenues, individual player sala-
ries also rise. Data on this is provided in the following chapters, also including informa-
tion on salary history. As one can see, from an economic standpoint professional sports 
surely display an industry analyzing worthwhile. 
 
The next two chapters of the following work deal with a personality trait which some 
individuals are asked to show in team sports as well as in other group productions. Of 
the five personality traits presented above, leadership skills are best fitting with extra-
version, as Heineck and Anger (2009) state that extraverts show a higher probability of 
                                                 
5 Yearly information on team values is provided on the magazines official website at 
http://www.forbes.com/business/sportsmoney. All following information is from the year 2009. 
6 The Los Angeles Lakers are the most valuable team in the National Basketball Association with 607 
million US-Dollars, while the Toronto Maple Leafs is the most valuable team in the National Hockey 
League with 470 million US-Dollars. 
5 
 
taking leadership roles.7 Leadership skills are assumed to be compensated monetarily, 
nevertheless there is a lack of empirical evidence for this common thesis. Since in pro-
fessional sports the team captains are expected to possess these leadership skills, the 
next two chapters will explore the impact of this ability on salary. The second chapter is 
a joint work with Bernd Frick about the monetary impact of leadership skills in profes-
sional soccer. Using data of 13 consecutive seasons from the German Bundesliga, we 
show that team captains receive a wage premium between 25 and 67 percent, dependent 
on the model specification.8 In chapter three a similar research question is applied, this 
time using data of four years from the National Hockey League. Again controlling for 
individual player characteristics and performance indicators I show that leadership abil-
ity is rewarded pecuniary by a premium between 21 and 35 percent.9 
 
Following in chapter four I turn to an analysis on the returns to mental toughness in 
professional basketball and present a joint work with Bernd Frick and Joachim Prinz. 
We classify mental toughness to the personality trait of emotional stability, as it depicts 
individuals’ self-confidence and tendency to be calm. Since many team sporting events 
are decided during the last seconds of the game, the question arises if players, who are 
able to maintain their performance during crucial game situations, are rewarded pecu-
niary. While looking at the performance of players from the National Basketball Asso-
ciation for a time period of four consecutive years our data suggests that individuals get 
monetarily rewarded for exhibiting mental toughness. Furthermore, we show that expe-
rience does not improve the ability to maintain the individual performance level during 
crucial game situations. This implies that mental toughness is a congenital skill, a result 
which goes in line with the mentioned findings that personality traits stay consistent 
throughout a lifespan. 
 
                                                 
7 The relationship between conscientiousness and leadership, which is of highly interest in the work to 
follow, is unclear. Tagger, Hackett and Saha (1999) find that leadership is most strongly associated 
with cognitive ability, followed by the personality trait conscientiousness. By contrast, Judge and 
Bono (2000) find conscientiousness to be unrelated to leadership, as they relate the five traits to 
transformational leadership. For a survey article concerning different approaches to relate personality 
to effectiveness see Andersen (2006). 
8 Chapter two is the only one written in German. For the sake of clarity, I retain English chapter headings 
and legends. 
9 Based on this chapter the article “The Payoff to Leadership in Teams“, has been published in the Journal 
of Sports Economics (Deutscher (2009)). 
6 
 
Chapter five is closely related as it analyses the influence of the audience on the per-
formance from the free throw line in professional basketball. I distinguish between the 
performance in friendly and hostile environments as in home and away games. Since 
past research neglects the impact of a change of the audience, professional sports appear 
to be a fitting natural experiment as players change teams between seasons to face a 
new home crowd after a team switch. The results show that players who sign a contract 
with a new team show comparably worse performance in front of the new supportive 
audience compared to players who either do not change teams or get traded to a new 
team. I conclude that signing with a new team during the offseason puts additional pres-
sure on the player during home games in the following season, while it does not impact 
performance during away games. Performing quantile regressions shows that especially 
bad free throw shooters performance suffers from signing with a new team. 
 
For the last three chapters I broaden my focus to other fields of research. Chapter six is 
concerned with the impact of the implementation of cut-off dates on success in profes-
sional German soccer. Cut-off dates lead to groupings of children with regard to their 
birthdays. Especially at young age this leads to big differences in relative age between 
members of the same cohort, which in turn might lead to a selection bias. Older children 
of the cohort might be labeled as being more talented, simply due to their physical 
advantage over their younger counterparts. This actually causes an overrepresentation of 
German players who were born shortly after the cut-off date in the Bundesliga for a 
sample of 13 seasons. Prior studies find a wage premium for young players who make it 
to the professional level despite their age disadvantage. I also analyze this for my data 
set to find no support for this result, as the birth date does not affect the income. This 
makes sense in the way that only performance enhancing factors should result in a wage 
premium and the birth date itself should not impact the performance. In addition, hazard 
rates for players should be independent of the date of birth as, again, the birth date 
should not impact players’ performance. For the aforementioned data set on the Bun-
desliga this claim is supported. 
 
Following in chapter seven is a joint work with Bernd Frick, Oliver Gürtler and Joachim 
Prinz. We address the problem of sabotage in tournaments, when contestants are hetero-
7 
 
geneous in ability. Our theoretical model states that favorites exert higher legal effort 
while underdogs are more tempted to engage in sabotage actions, since favorites are 
assumed to be more productive with respect to legal effort and both types of effort are 
substitutes. In a second step, we use data from German professional soccer to test this 
prediction empirically. In line with the theoretical model, we find that favorite teams 
win more tackles in a fair way, while underdog teams commit more fouls.10 
 
In chapter eight I once again broaden my focus to another field of research, as the 
chapter provides insights on the economics of the FIFA World Cup, which is the most-
viewed sporting event on earth and generates billions in revenues. In a joint work with 
Rob Simmons we present a general review of the literature on financial impact of the 
World Cup for the hosting country. We provide an extension to the existing literature by 
analyzing the remuneration of participating in the World Cup as a player. Using data 
from the German Bundesliga we find support for a World Cup shop window effect. 
Participating in the World Cup raises players’ salary and increases their chance to move 
to stronger teams within Europe. Finally, chapter nine concludes the dissertation by 
summarizing the results and providing a short outlook for ulterior research. 
                                                 
10 Based on this chapter the article “Sabotage in Heterogeneous Tournaments: A Field Study“, has been 
sent to the Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economy (status: revise and resubmit). 
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2 Rewarding Leadership Skills in Professional Team Sports – 
Empirical Evidence from the German Bundesliga 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Unabhängig davon, ob man nationale Ligaspiele oder internationale Ländervergleiche 
von Sportmannschaften betrachtet: Immer wieder fordern sowohl Trainer, als auch 
Medien von den beteiligten Mannschaftskapitänen Führungsqualitäten unter Beweis zu 
stellen. Unklar ist bislang, inwieweit diese Führungsqualitäten, welche die Kapitäne 
vorweisen sollten, unter Berücksichtigung weiterer individueller Charakteristika sowie 
beobachtbarer Leistungsdaten, zu einem höheren Lohn für die jeweiligen Spieler, wel-
che mit den Kapitänsaufgaben betraut werden, führen. 
 
Die bestehende Literatur analysiert zumeist die Entlohnung von Führungsqualitäten auf 
Managementebene in Unternehmen. Diese Führungsqualitäten werden im Allgemeinen 
als “soft skill“ angesehen, deren Bedeutung bei der Rekrutierung von Personal immer 
weiter an Bedeutung gewinnt.11 In ihrer, die bestehende Literatur prägenden, Arbeit 
gehen Kuhn und Weinberger (2005) der Frage nach, inwieweit die Übernahme von 
Positionen als Kapitän einer Schulsportmannschaft oder als Präsident einer schulischen 
Organisation Einfluss auf die spätere Gehaltshöhe nimmt. Die beiden Autoren argu-
mentieren hierbei, dass die Übernahme dieser Positionen für den späteren Karrierever-
lauf relevante Führungsqualitäten fördert. Die der Arbeit zugrunde liegenden Datensätze 
lassen die Autoren zu dem Ergebnis kommen das Männer, welche eine der beiden oben 
genannten Positionen während ihrer Schulzeit besetzen, eine Dekade später im Durch-
schnitt ein zwischen 4 und 24 Prozent höheres Gehalt beziehen. Eine Reihe weiterer 
Publikationen beschäftigen sich mit dem Einkommenseffekt der Partizipation an außer-
schulischen Aktivitäten. So zeigen Barron, Ewing und Waddell (2000), dass Schüler, 
die am Sportprogramm ihrer High-Schools teilnehmen, im Beruf ein zwischen 4 und 15 
Prozent höheres Gehalt beziehen als Schüler, die an anderen schulisch organisierten 
Freizeitgestaltungen teilnehmen. In ihrer empirischen Untersuchung zeigen Cornelißen 
und Pfeifer (2007) für deutsche Schüler einen signifikant positiven Zusammenhang 
                                                 
11 Vergleiche Moss und Tilly (2001). 
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zwischen der Partizipation an außerschulischen Sportaktivitäten und dem höchsten 
erreichten Bildungsabschluss. 
 
Unter Berücksichtigung dieser Erkenntnisse ergibt sich die Frage, welche Einfluss-
faktoren für die Entwicklung von Führungscharakteren von Bedeutung sind. Die Lite-
ratur bietet eine Reihe von Arbeiten, welche die Fähigkeit, Führungsrollen zu überneh-
men mit dem Alter von Individuen zu Beginn ihrer schulischen Laufbahn in Verbin-
dung bringen. Sie argumentieren in ähnlicher Weise, dass in Bundesstaaten, in denen 
ein Stichtag für die Einschulung von Kindern besteht, der relative Altersunterschied 
zwischen den Ältesten und den Jüngsten in der Klasse bis zu zwanzig Prozent beträgt. 
Auf diese Feststellung aufbauend formulieren sie die Hypothese, dass diejenigen Kin-
der, die kurz nach dem Stichtag Geburtstag haben aufgrund ihrer fortgeschrittenen phy-
sischen und geistigen Entwicklung die Führung im Klassenverband übernehmen. Diese 
Führungsqualitäten bleiben aufgrund der Erfahrung auf der Führungsposition auch in 
späteren Jahren erhalten. Dhuey und Lipscomb (2008) zeigen, dass Schüler aus dem 
ältesten Quantil eines Jahrgangs mit vier bis elf Prozent höherer Wahrscheinlichkeit die 
Position als Mannschaftskapitän im Sport übernehmen als die jüngsten Schüler eines 
Jahrgangs. Auch in der Selbsteinschätzung bezüglich Führungsqualitäten weisen ältere 
Schüler signifikant höhere Werte auf. Allen und Barnsley (1993) kommen bei ihren 
Untersuchungen von schulischen Leistungen sowohl in Kanada, wie auch in Groß-
britannien zu vergleichbaren Ergebnissen: Die ältesten Schüler eines Jahrgangs gehören 
mit signifikant höherer Wahrscheinlichkeit zu den Besten.12 Zudem zeigen die Autoren, 
dass in kanadischen Eishockeyligen Spieler aus dem ältesten Quantil eines Jahrgangs 
bis zu viermal mehr vertreten sind als Spieler, die zu den Jüngsten des Jahrgangs gehö-
ren. Im Bezug auf die Fußballbundesliga unterscheiden Ashworth und Heyndels (2007) 
in ihrer Untersuchung der Bundesligagehälter von zwei Saisons zwischen zwei ver-
schiedenen diskriminierenden Effekten des Geburtsdatums von Spielern: Zum einen 
ermitteln sie eine Diskriminierung von Spielern, welche in großem Abstand zum Stich-
tag (1. August) für die Zuordnung von Jugendlichen in eine Altersklasse geboren wur-
                                                 
12 Bedard und Dhuey (2006) kommen in ihrer Untersuchung verschiedener OECD-Länder ebenfalls zu 
der Erkenntnis, dass die Jahrgangältesten bessere schulische Leistungen vorweisen als die jüngeren 
Mitschüler. Obwohl der relative Altersunterschied mit zunehmendem Alter geringer wird, beobachten 
die Autoren einen persistenten Leistungsunterschied. 
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den. Diese werden im Jugendalter „übersehen“ und sind folglich in der Bundesliga 
unterrepräsentiert. Des Weiteren kommen die Autoren zu der Erkenntnis, dass Spieler, 
die trotz ihres Altersnachteils die Fußballbundesliga erreichen, höher entlohnt werden.13 
 
Während die Literatur also belegen kann, dass Individuen in der Wirtschaft für ihre 
Führungsqualitäten entlohnt werden und zudem Erklärungsansätze für die unterschied-
liche Ausprägung dieser Fähigkeit liefert, herrscht bisher noch keine Erkenntnis darü-
ber, inwieweit Führungsqualitäten im professionellen Mannschaftssport zu einem höhe-
ren Gehalt führen. Die vorliegende Arbeit geht dieser Fragestellung anhand der deut-
schen Fußballbundesliga nach. Gerade vom Kapitän wird gefordert, seine Mannschaft 
zu führen und als “rechte Hand“ des Trainers zu agieren. Unsere Haupthypothese lautet 
demnach, dass von Knappheit der Führungspersönlichkeiten auf dem „Arbeitsmarkt 
Bundesliga“ die Kapitäne zusätzlich monetär vergütet werden. Wir gehen nun mit Hilfe 
eines Datensatzes von 13 Saisons der ersten deutschen Bundesliga der Frage nach, 
inwieweit diese Führungsrolle monetär entlohnt wird. Es zeigt sich das, für individuelle 
Performance und Spielermerkmale kontrollierend, der Kapitän für seine 
Führungsqualitäten mit einem Lohnaufschlag zwischen 25 und 66 Prozent vergütet 
wird. 
 
Die vorliegende Arbeit ist wie folgt aufgebaut: Im nächsten Abschnitt wird der Daten-
satz systematisch dargestellt. Im dritten Abschnitt werden die Modellschätzungen prä-
sentiert, während im vierten Abschnitt abschließend die Befunde unserer Untersuchung 
diskutiert und mögliche Erweiterungen unserer Arbeit angesprochen werden. 
 
2.2 Data Set and Descriptive Statistics 
Die zentrale Fragestellung, der folgend nachgegangen wird, ist, ob und inwieweit die 
Führungsposition des Mannschaftskapitäns zusätzlich monetär entlohnt wird. Zwecks 
dieser Untersuchung verwenden wir einen Datensatz der deutschen ersten Fußballbun-
desliga. Dieser umfasst Leistungsdaten sowie individuelle Charakteristika der 
Bundesligaspieler aus den Saisons 1995/96 bis 2007/08 und umfasst 1993 verschiedene 
                                                 
13 Eine eigene Untersuchung zu diesem Thema findet sich im sechsten Kapitel der vorliegenden Arbeit. 
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Spieler und eine Gesamtzahl von 6147 Spieler-Jahresbeobachtungen. Die Leistungs-
daten der Bundesligaspieler wurden aus den jährlichen Sonderausgaben des Sport-
magazins „Kicker“ entnommen, während Informationen bezüglich der Mannschafts-
kapitäne aus Artikeln des zweimal wöchentlich erscheinenden „Kicker- Sportmagazins“ 
zusammengetragen wurden. Nachfolgend wird derjenige als Kapitän einer Mannschaft 
betrachtet, der zu Beginn einer jeweiligen Saison dieses Amt übertragen bekommt. Bei 
einem Beobachtungszeitraum von 13 Saisons und einer konstanten Anzahl von 18 Ver-
einen ergibt sich somit eine Gesamtzahl von 234 Kapitänsjahren. Wie bereits 
angesprochen, wird vom Kapitän, welcher durch das Tragen einer Oberarmbinde 
optisch von seinen Mitspielern zu unterscheiden ist, die Übernahme von 
Führungsausgaben erwartet. Während ihm aufgrund seiner Position nicht mehr Rechte 
zustehen, so ist er dennoch mit mehr Pflichten betreut. So obliegt ihm beispielsweise die 
Pflicht, als Ansprechpartner des Schiedsrichters eventuelles Fehlverhalten seiner 
Mannschaft abzustellen. Im Beobachtungszeitraum waren 123 verschiedene Spieler 
Kapitän einer Mannschaft, was einer durchschnittlichen Amtsdauer von 1,90 Saisons 
entspricht. Hierbei ist eine rechtsschiefe Verteilung der Amtsdauer zu beobachten, da 70 
Kapitäne ihr Amt für lediglich eine Saison ausübten. Mit Stefan Effenberg gibt es auch 
einen Spieler in der Bundesliga, der im relevanten Zeitraum bei zwei verschiedenen 
Vereinen Kapitän war, und zwar bei Borussia Mönchengladbach und bei Bayern 
München. Insgesamt können 14 Spieler eine Amtsdauer von mehr als drei Saisons 
verzeichnen, wobei es keine „Mindestzugehörigkeit“ zum Verein zu scheinen gibt. Alle 
diese Spieler können zum Zeitpunkt ihrer Berufung jedoch eine Mindesterfahrung von 
vier Saisons im deutschen Profifußball aufweisen. Eine Übersicht der Kapitäne mit den 
längsten Amtsdauern im Beobachtungszeitraum bietet Table 2-1. 
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Name  Verein  Kapitän 
ab 
Jahre 
Kapitän 
Jahre im 
Verein bei 
Erstberufung 
Profisaisons 
bei 
Erstberufung
Frank Baumann  Werder Bremen  1999  8  1  2 
Jens Nowotny  Bayer Leverkusen  1996  8  0  5 
Oliver Kahn  Bayern München  2001  7  7  13 
Stefan Reuter  Borussia Dortmund  1997  6  5  13 
Zvonimir Soldo  VFB Stuttgart  2000  6  4  4 
Tomasz Waldoch  Schalke 04  1999  5  0  5 
Dariusz Wosz  VFL Bochum  2002  5  1  12 
Arne Friedrich  Hertha BSC Berlin  2004  4  2  5 
Marco Kurz  1860 München  1998  4  0  9 
Altin Lala  Hannover 96  2003  4  5  5 
Michael Preetz  Hertha BSC Berlin  1998  4  2  12 
Olaf Thon  Schalke 04  1995  4  1  12 
Thorsten Wohlert  MSV Duisburg  1996  4  3  9 
Christian Wörns  Borussia Dortmund  2004  4  5  15 
Table 2-1: Captains in the German Bundesliga with Three or more Seasons of Experience 
 
Neben der, für die vorliegende Untersuchung entscheidenden, Variablen des Kapitäns-
amtes hängen die Spielergehälter erwartungsgemäß auch von einer Reihe weiterer 
Einflussfaktoren und Spielercharakteristika ab (siehe Table 2-2). Im Hinblick auf die 
Humankapitaltheorie wird im Folgenden zwischen drei verschiedenen 
Spielermerkmalen unterschieden, welche eine Differenzierung hinsichtlich der 
Erfahrung der Individuen ermöglichen. Zunächst bildet das Alter der Spieler zu 
Saisonbeginn einen Indikator für die Erfahrung. Zu erwarten sind - neben dem positiven 
Einfluss von dem Alter auf das Gehalt – negative Grenzerträge des Alters aufgrund 
nachlassender Leistungsfähigkeit. Aus diesem Grund wird auch das quadrierte Alter der 
Individuen ermittelt und der Einfluss auf das Spielergehalt untersucht. 
 
Als zwei weitere Indikatoren von Erfahrung werden zudem die vor Saisonbeginn absol-
vierten Spiele in der ersten Fußballbundesliga, sowie die A-Länderspiele für das jewei-
lige Herkunftsland der Spieler betrachtet.14 Die Unterscheidung ist bedeutsam, da sie 
                                                 
14 Vergleiche Lucifora und Simmons (2003), sowie Frick (2007b). 
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eine Differenzierung zwischen nationaler und internationaler Erfahrung ermöglicht. 
Analog zu dem Alter-Gehalts-Profil sind auch hier jeweils umgekehrt U-förmige Ver-
läufe des Bundesligaspiel-Gehalts-Profils und des Länderspiel-Gehalts-Profils zu er-
warten. 
 
Neben diesen, die Erfahrung eines Spielers abbildenden, Variablen wird mit den in der 
Bundesliga erzielten Toren auch eine bedeutende Leistungsvariable berücksichtigt. 
Hierbei sind die während der bisherigen Karriere erzielten Bundesligatore als Indikator 
für die Offensivfähigkeiten der Spieler zu sehen. Da die in einem Spiel erzielten Tore 
letztendlich den Ausgang des Spiels bestimmen, würde man einen positiven Einfluss 
der individuell erzielten Tore in der ersten Fußballbundesliga auf das Spielergehalt er-
warten. Nicht unerwähnt bleiben sollte der Fakt, dass Tore vorwiegend von Stürmern 
und Mittelfeldspielern erzielt werden. 
 
Abgesehen von den obigen Erfahrungs- und Leistungsdaten kann auch die Spieler-
position, auf der die Spieler eingesetzt werden, Einfluss auf die Gehaltshöhe nehmen. 
Daher wird zwischen den Positionen Torwart, Abwehr, Mittelfeld und Sturm unter-
schieden. Jede dieser Positionen stellt spezifische Anforderungen an die Bundesliga-
spieler und ein Wechsel zwischen verschiedenen Positionen innerhalb der Karriere ist 
daher unüblich. Ein Wechsel von oder auf die Torwartposition war nicht zu beobachten; 
bedingt durch das sich stark unterscheidende Anforderungsprofil an diese Position. In 
dem untersuchten Zeitraum wechselten 241 Feldspieler die Positionen. Auf den Einfluss 
von höherer Flexibilität auf das Spielergehalt wird zu einem späteren Zeitpunkt 
einzugegangen. 
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Variable  Operationalisierung  Mean  Min.  Max. 
Alter  Alter zu Saisonbeginn  26,39  17  41 
Alter²  Quadriertes Alter zu Saisonbeginn  714,75  289  1681 
BLS  Bundesligaspiele vor Saisonbeginn  55,81  0  540 
BLS²  Quadrierte Bundesligaspiele vor Saisonbeginn  9611,22  0  291600
GP INT  Länderspiele vor Saisonbeginn  7,54  0  130 
GP INT²  Quadrierte Länderspiele vor Saisonbeginn  331,00  0  16900
Tore  Bundesligatore vor Saisonbeginn  6,34  0  171 
Torwart  Torwart (Dummy; 1 = ja)  0,11  0  1 
Abwehr  Abwehrspieler (Dummy; 1 = ja)  0,28  0  1 
Mittelfeld  Mittelfeldspieler (Dummy; 1 = ja)  0,39  0  1 
Position  Spieler wechselte im Karriereverlauf die Position 
Sturm  Stürmer (Dummy; 1 = ja)  0,22  0  1 
Kapitän (t)  Spieler in der aktuellen Saison Kapitän (Dummy; 1 =ja)  0,04  0  1 
Kapitän (t‐1)  Spieler in der letzen Saison Kapitän (Dummy; 1 =ja)  0,03  0  1 
Deutschland  Spieler ist deutscher Nationalität (Dummy; 1 =ja)  0,58  0  1 
Südamerika  Spieler stammt aus Südamerika (Dummy; 1 =ja)  0,05  0  1 
Nordamerika  Spieler stammt aus Nordamerika (Dummy; 1 =ja)  0,01  0  1 
Osteuropa  Spieler stammt aus Osteuropa (Dummy; 1 =ja)  0,16  0  1 
Westeuropa  Spieler stammt aus Westeuropa (Dummy; 1 =ja)  0,13  0  1 
Afrika  Spieler stammt aus Afrika (Dummy; 1 =ja)  0,05  0  1 
Asien/Austr.  Spieler stammt aus Asien/Australien (Dummy; 1 =ja)  0,02  0  1 
Table 2-2: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Die abhängige Variable der vorliegenden Untersuchung, das individuelle Spielergehalt, 
wird über die Marktwerte der Bundesligaspieler aus dem „Kicker Managerspiel“ appro-
ximiert. Bei diesem Managerspiel weist das Magazin jedem Spieler vor Beginn der 
Bundesligasaison einen Marktwert zu. Die Nutzer des Spiels stehen vor der Aufgabe 
unter gegebener Budgetrestriktion aus dem Pool aller Bundesligaspieler eine möglichst 
gute Mannschaft zusammenzustellen, wobei die erreichte Punktzahl der eigenen Mann-
schaft von der Leistung der gewählten Spieler in der Fußballbundesliga abhängt. Das 
approximierte Spielergehalt in der Saison t ermittelt sich wie folgt: 
 
ܵ݌݈݅݁݁ݎ݄݈݃݁ܽݐ ሺݐሻ ൌ
ܭ݅ܿ݇݁ݎ ܯܽݎ݇ݐݓ݁ݎݐ ሺݐሻ
1,5
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Es zeigt sich, im Abgleich mit den Informationen aus den Lizensierungsverfahren des 
Deutschen Fußball Bundes beziehungsweise der Deutschen Fußball Liga, dass diese 
Approximation hoch mit den öffentlich bekannten Gehältern korreliert und die durch-
schnittlichen Gehaltsaufwendungen der Bundesligisten gut abbildet. Nach der Darstel-
lung des der Regressionsanalyse zugrunde liegenden Datensatzes gilt es, im Rahmen 
der folgenden Untersuchung der monetären Entlohnung des Kapitänsamtes nachzu-
gehen. 
 
2.3 Empirical Results 
Zunächst einmal wird auf die Verteilung der Gehälter in der ersten Fußballbundesliga 
eingegangen, bevor die Einflussnahme der Kapitänsrolle auf das Spielergehalt analysiert 
wird. Bei einer Gehaltsspanne zwischen 17.043 und 10.000.000 Euro pro Spielzeit ist 
eine rechtsschiefe Verteilung der Gehälter zu beobachten (siehe Figure 2-1). Während 
das Durchschnittsgehalt pro Saison bei 909.014 Euro liegt, lässt sich ein Mediangehalt 
von 666.667 Euro ermitteln. Diese Einkommensverteilung lässt sich mittels Rosens 
(1981, 1983) „Theorie der Superstars“ erklären, nach der schon geringe Talentunter-
schiede zu erheblichen Einkommensunterschieden führen.15 
                                                 
15 In ihrer Untersuchung zeigen Lehmann und Schulze (2008), dass die Medienpräsenz von deutschen 
Fußballprofis einem statistisch signifikant positiven Einfluss auf Spielerhälter nimmt, allerdings mit 
abnehmendem Grenznutzen. Es scheint schwer, dieses Ergebnis mit der “Theorie der Superstars” von 
Rosen in Einklang zu bringen. 
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Figure 2-1: Kernel Density Estimation of the Salary in the German Bundesliga 
 
Nach dieser sehr allgemeinen Analyse der Verteilung der Spielergehälter werden nun 
die vermuteten Einkommensdeterminanten der individuellen Spielergehälter untersucht. 
Mit Hilfe verschiedener Regressionsverfahren wird hierfür im Folgenden versucht, die 
Varianz der Gehälter zu erklären. Ziel des Hauptteils der vorliegenden Untersuchung ist 
es der Frage nachzugehen, welchen pekuniären Einfluss die Führungsqualitäten der 
Bundesligafußballer, abgebildet durch das Besetzen des Kapitänsamtes, haben. Dies 
erfolgt durch eine Schätzung der Einkommensfunktion nach Mincer (1974). Aufgrund 
des Panelcharakters der vorliegenden Daten führen wir neben der OLS-Schätzung auch 
eine Random Effects-Schätzung durch, welche die Inkludierung von zeitunabhängigen 
Variablen erlaubt. Zudem berücksichtigt letztere Schätzung, dass die gegebenen indivi-
duellen Effekte auch auf einer Vielzahl zusätzlicher, nicht beobachtbarer oder zufälliger 
Variablen beruhen können.16 Die Verwendung von einer Fixed Effects-Schätzung 
                                                 
16 Vergleiche Mátyás und Sevestre (1996, S. 94). 
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scheint im vorliegenden Kontext wenig angebracht, da beispielsweise die erklärenden 
Variablen der regionalen Herkunft zeitinvariant sind.17 
 
Unter der Annahme, dass sich das Gehalt aus verschiedenen Faktoren multiplikativ 
zusammensetzt, führt ein Logarithmieren - unter Berücksichtigung der vermuteten 
Einkommensfaktoren des Gehaltes – für die folgende Modellschätzung zu der allgemei-
nen Form: 
 
lnሺܩ݄݈݁ܽݐሻ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߙଵܣ݈ݐ݁ݎ ൅ ߙଶܣ݈ݐ݁ݎଶ ൅ ߙଷܤܮܵ ൅ ߙସܤܮܵଶ ൅ ߙହܮܵ ൅ ߙ଺ܮܵଶ
൅ ߙ଻ܶ݋ݎ݁ ൅ ߙ଼ܶ݋ݎݓܽݎݐ ൅ ߙଽܣܾݓ݄݁ݎ ൅ ߙଵ଴ܯ݅ݐݐ݈݂݈݁݁݀ ൅ ߙଵଵܵݐݑݎ݉
൅ ߙଵଶܭܽ݌݅ݐä݊ ൅ ߙଵଷܶܦ ൅ ߙଵସܵܦ ൅ ߙଵହܪܦ ൅ ߝ 
 
Als Gehalt wird hierbei der aus dem Managerspiel approximierte Wert verwendet. Das 
Alter der Spieler wird zu Saisonbeginn in Jahren gemessen, während bei den absol-
vierten Bundesligaspielen (BLS) und Länderspielen (LS), sowie den erzielten Bundes-
ligatoren (Tore) jeweils auf die ausgewiesenen Karriereleistungen vor Beginn des ersten 
Spieltages der jeweiligen Saison verwiesen wird. Um weitere mögliche Einflussfaktoren 
bei der Gehaltsdeterminierung abzubilden, werden Dummy-Variablen für die verschie-
denen Vereine, die Saisons und die Herkunft der Spieler inkludiert. Die Vereins-
dummies (TD) bildet hierbei die, persistent vorherrschenden, unterschiedlichen finan-
ziellen Möglichkeiten ab, welche auch Auswirkungen auf die gezahlten Gehälter bei 
den verschiedenen Vereinen haben dürften. Mit Hilfe der Saisondummies (SD) wird 
versucht, die allgemeine Gehaltsentwicklung in der Fußballbundesliga über die 
verschiedenen Spielzeiten abzubilden. Vergleicht man das Durchschnittsgehalt der Sai-
son 1995/1996 (565.681 Euro) mit dem der Saison 2007/2008 (1.288.702 Euro), so lässt 
sich ein starker Anstieg der Entlohnung von Bundesligaprofis erkennen, welcher die 
Verwendung eines Saison-Dummies in die Modellschätzung rechtfertigt. Eine grafische 
Darstellung der Gehaltsentwicklung unter Berücksichtigung der Position auf dem Spiel-
feld bietet Figure 2-2. Hier lässt sich eine positive Gehaltsentwicklung, unabhängig von 
                                                 
17 Zudem sind die Koeffizienten des Fixed-Effects Modells, insbesondere die der Kapitänsvariablen, sehr 
ähnlich, sodass uns die Verwendung des Random Effects-Modells vertretbar erscheint. 
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der Position erkennen. Über den gesamten Beobachtungszeitraum hinweg werden 
Spieler umso besser bezahlt, je offensiver ihre Position auf dem Spielfeld ist. 
 
 
Figure 2-2: Salary History of Players in the Bundesliga Subject to the Positions on the Field 
 
Durch das Einschließen von Informationen über die Herkunft der Spieler (HD) wird 
eine mögliche Diskriminierung im Sinne von geringeren Lohnzahlungen berücksichtigt. 
Nach der Liberalisierung des Spielermarktes im Profifußball im Rahmen des „Bosman-
Urteils“ aus dem Jahr 1995 gilt es zu prüfen, welchen Einfluss die Nationalität auf das 
Gehalt nimmt.18 Bei der Modellschätzung wird daher nach Herkunft der Spieler zwi-
schen Deutschland, Westeuropa, Osteuropa, Afrika, Südamerika, Nordamerika und 
Australien bzw. Asien unterschieden.19 
 
Ein möglicherweise vorliegendes Kausalitätsproblem bezüglich der Kapitänsvariablen 
und den Spielergehältern ist nicht zu vernachlässigen. Es wäre zu befürchten, dass die 
Gehaltshöhe die Wahrscheinlichkeit der Übernahme des Kapitänsamtes beeinflusst und 
bevorzugt besser verdienende Spieler zum Kapitän berufen werden. Um dieser Proble-
                                                 
18 Vergleiche Antonioni und Cubbin (2000), Frick und Wagner (1996) und Frick (2008, 2009). 
19 Einen Überblick über die Literatur bezüglich der ethnischen Diskriminierung von Profisportlern bietet 
Kahn (1991). Darüber hinaus liefert Kalter (1999) Befunde für die deutsche Fußballbundesliga. 
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matik zu begegnen, wird die Schätzung des Lohns in Modell 2 nicht unter Berück-
sichtigung der aktuellen Besetzung (Saison t) des Kapitänspostens durchgeführt, son-
dern unter der Fragestellung, ob der Spieler in der vorherigen Spielzeit (Saison t-1) 
Kapitän war. Hierdurch verringert sich die Anzahl der Spieler mit dem Merkmal Kapi-
tän von 234 auf 169. Diese Reduktion lässt sich dadurch erklären, dass im vorliegenden 
Datensatz 65 Bundesligakapitäne der Vorsaison entweder in einer unterklassigen deut-
schen Liga oder im Ausland gespielt haben. 
 
   Modell 1  Modell 2 
   Koeffizienten  Koeffizienten 
Variable  OLS  RE  OLS  RE 
Alter  0,659 (24,77)***  0,690 (25,09)***  0,657 (24,55)***  0,729 (28,81)***
Alter²  ‐0,012 (‐27,49)*** ‐0,013 (‐27,20)*** ‐0,012 (‐27,19)***  ‐0,013 (‐27,02)***
BLS  0,004 (11,67)***  0,002 (4,60)***  0,004 (11,63)***  0,002 (4,85)*** 
BLS²  ‐0,000 (‐8,63)***  ‐0,000 (‐4,01)*** ‐0,000 (‐8,46)***  ‐0,000 (‐4,06)***
GP INT  0,017 (11,44)***  0,012 (6,59)***  0,018 (11,86)***  0,012 (6,92)*** 
GP INT²  ‐0,000 (‐6,93)***  ‐0,000 (‐4,11)*** ‐0,000 (‐7,21)***  ‐0,000 (‐4,27)***
Tore  0,002 (2,15)**  ‐0,000 (‐0,21)+  0,002 (2,02)**  ‐0,000 (0,28)+ 
Abwehr  0,173 (5,28)***  0,307 (6,39)***  0,175 (5,29)***  0,297 (6,14)*** 
Mittelfeld  0,278 (8,65)***  0,388 (8,23)***  0,277 (8,58)***  0,385 (8,12)*** 
Sturm  0,425 (11,80)***  0,489 (9,57)***  0,420 (11,59)***  0,479 (9,34)*** 
Südamerika  0,565 (13,01)***  0,616 (9,66)***  0,560 (12,82)***  0,619 (9,65)*** 
Nordamerika  ‐0,125 (‐1,27)+  ‐0,045 (‐0,34)+  ‐0,111 (‐1,13)+  0,002 (0,02)+ 
Osteuropa  0,150(5,30)***  0,181 (4,52)***  0,139 (4,92)***  0,170 (4,22)*** 
Westeuropa  0,287 (9,29)***  0,347 (8,20)***  0,285 (9,19)***  0,347 (8,17)*** 
Afrika  0,059 (1,39)+  0,169 (2,75)***  0,047 (1,09)+  0,155 (2,51)** 
Asien/Austr.  0,079 (1,30)+  0,159 (1,86)*  0,068 (1,11)+  0,139 (1,62)+ 
Kapitän (t)  0,511 (10,56)***  0,396 (8,64)***  /  / 
Kapitän (t‐1)  /  /  0,369 (6,15)***  0,224 (4,05)*** 
Saison‐Dummies  Berücksichtigt 
Team‐Dummies  Berücksichtigt 
Adj R²  0,477  0,456  0,470  0,449 
Fallzahl  6147  6147 
*p<0,10; **p<0,05; ***p<0,01; + n. s. (t-Werte bzw. z-Werte in Klammern). 
Table 2-3: Determinants of Player Salary in the German Bundesliga 
20 
 
Die Ergebnisse der Regressionsschätzungen werden in Table 2-3 präsentiert. Hier lässt 
sich das bereits vermutete umgekehrt U-förmige Alters-Einkommens-Profil erkennen. 
Analog hierzu ist jeweils ein positiver Einfluss der Partizipation an Bundesliga- und 
Länderspielen, bei gleichzeitig negativem Grenznutzen zu beobachten. Der Einfluss von 
Erfahrung auf das Salär von Bundesligaprofis ist also sowohl auf nationaler, als auch 
auf internationaler Ebene erwartungsgemäß, wobei die Einsätze bei Länderspielen einen 
größeren Einfluss auf das Gehalt haben als Bundesligaspiele.20 Betrachtet man den Ein-
fluss der Position der Spieler auf das Gehalt, so fällt auf, dass Feldspieler, im Vergleich 
zur Referenzposition Torwart, signifikant mehr verdienen. Dies lässt sich möglicher-
weise durch die, bereits angesprochene, geringe Flexibilität der Torwarte hinsichtlich 
ihres Einsatzes auf anderen Positionen erklären sowie über die Berücksichtigung der 
Variablen “Tore“. Hierüber hinaus wird die Bedeutung der Herkunft der Spieler für das 
Gehalt deutlich. Im Vergleich zum Referenzland Deutschland verdienen Spieler aus 
Südamerika, Osteuropa und Westeuropa signifikant mehr. 
 
Um der zentralen Fragestellung, der monetären Entlohnung von Führungsqualitäten, 
nachzugehen, betrachten wir die Ausprägung der beiden Kapitänsvariablen. Als Haupt-
ergebnis unserer Arbeit stellen wir fest, dass die Ausübung des Kapitänsamtes einen 
signifikant positiven Einfluss auf das Spielergehalt hat. Halvorsen und Palmquist (1980) 
zeigen, dass bei semilogarithmischen Gleichungen der Koeffizient der Dummy-Vari-
ablen nicht als prozentualer Einfluss interpretiert werden darf. Stattdessen sei der 
prozentuale Einfluss als 100*(exp(K)-1) zu berechnen, wobei K der Koeffizient der 
Dummy-Variablen ist. Hiernach erhält der Mannschaftskapitän, je nach Schätzmethode, 
ein Surplus zwischen 25,61 und 66,70 Prozent. Dies bestätigt unsere eingangs formu-
lierte Hypothese, dass auch im professionellen Teamsport Führungsqualitäten pekuniär 
entlohnt werden. Einem eventuellen Endogenitätsproblem der Kapitänsvariablen kann 
durch eine analoge Regressionsanalyse, jetzt unter Berücksichtigung des Kapitäns des 
Vorjahres, Rechnung getragen werden (Modell 2). Auch im Rahmen dieser zweiten 
Modellschätzung kann der erwartete Einfluss des Kapitänsamtes auf das Spielergehalt 
nachgewiesen werden. Dieser ist abermals hochsignifikant positiv und spricht dem 
                                                 
20 Im neunten Kapitel wird hierauf detailliert eingegangen. 
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Kapitän einen Einkommensbonus zwischen 25,11 und 43,62 Prozent zu. Somit scheint 
die Exogenität der hier zentralen Variablen Kapitän (t) gegeben. 
 
Wie bereits angesprochen, wechselten im Beobachtungszeitraum viele Spieler die 
Position. Es stellt sich hierzu die Frage, inwieweit diese Flexibilität Einfluss auf das 
Spielergehalt nimmt. Daher wird für die folgende Analyse eine weitere Variable 
generiert, die einen Positionswechsel im Karriereverlauf abbildet (Wechsel Position). 
Für Table 2-4 wird die vorherige Regressionsgleichung um diese Variable erweitert. Es 
zeigt sich, dass kein signifikanter Einfluss auf das Gehalt messbar ist. Dies kann den 
Grund haben, dass ältere Spieler auf eine Position wechseln, die geringere 
Anforderungen an die körperliche Verfassung stellt. Dies würde den erwarteten 
Gehaltsbonus für die Flexibilität wettmachen.  
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   Modell 1 Modell 2 
   Koeffizienten Koeffizienten 
Variabel  OLS  RE OLS RE 
Alter  0.660 (24.77)***  0.687 (24.92)***  0.658 (24.55)***  0.685 (24.74)*** 
Alter²  ‐0.013 (‐27.49)*** ‐0.013 (‐27.03)*** ‐0.012 (‐27.19)***  ‐0.013 (‐26.80)***
BLS  0.004 (11.64)***  0.002 (4.35)***  0.004 (11.62)***  0.002 (4.39)*** 
BLS²  ‐0.000 (‐8.66)***  ‐0.000 (‐3.88)***  ‐0.000 (‐8.50)***  ‐0.000 (‐3.87)*** 
GP INT  0.017 (11.42)***  0.012 (6.63)***  0.018 (11.84)***  0.012 (6.96)*** 
GP INT²  ‐0.000 (‐6.90)***  ‐0.000 (‐4.16)***  ‐0.000 (‐7.18)***  ‐0.000 (‐4.41)*** 
Tore  0.002 (2.12)**  ‐0.000 (‐0.14)+  0.001 (1.97)**  ‐0.000 (‐0.25)+ 
Abwehr  0.176 (5.32)***  0.299 (6.20)***  0.179 (5.36)***  0.299 (6.15)*** 
Mittelfeld  0.280 (8.67)***  0.385 (8.17)***  0.281 (8.62)***  0.385 (8.13)*** 
Sturm  0.427 (11.82)***  0.487 (9.53)***  0.422 (11.62)***  0.482 (9.38)*** 
Südamerika  0.564 (12.98)***  0.618 (9.69)***  0.559 (12.79)***  0.613 (9.56)*** 
Nordamerika  ‐0.126 (‐1.28)+  ‐0.043 (‐0.32)+  ‐0.113 (‐1.14)+  ‐0.030 (‐0.22)+ 
Osteuropa  0.148 (5.27)***  0.182 (4.55)***  0.138 (4.88)***  0.172 (4.28)*** 
Westeuropa  0.287 (9.29)***  0.348 (8.22)***  0.285 (9.15)***  0.345 (8.12)*** 
Afrika  0.060 (1.39)+  0.168 (2.73)***  0.047 (1.09)+  0.159 (2.56)** 
Asien/Austr.  0.080 (1.31)+  0.158 (1.85)*  0.069 (1.13)+  0.150 (1.75)* 
Wechsel Pos.  ‐0.020 (‐0.69)+  0.051 (1.51)+  ‐0.026 (‐0.86)+  0.046 (1.36)+ 
Kapitän (t)  0.510 (10.53)***  0.398 (8.67)***  /  / 
Kapitän (t‐1)  /  /  0.368 (6.12)***  0.229 (4.14)*** 
Saison‐Dummies  Berücksichtigt 
Team‐Dummies  Berücksichtigt 
Adj R²  0.477  0.456  0.47  0.449 
Fallzahl  6147  6147 
*p<0,10; **p<0,05; ***p<0,01; + n. s. (t-Werte bzw. z-Werte in Klammern). 
Table 2-4: Determinants of Player Salary in the German Bundesliga Including Flexibility 
 
Aufgrund der linkssteilen und rechtsschiefen Verteilung der Spielergehälter wird in 
vielen aktuellen Arbeiten bei der Gehaltsschätzung auch auf Quantilsregressionen 
zurückgegriffen.21 Auch für den vorliegenden Datensatz lässt sich eine 
Normalverteilung der Gehaltsvariablen widerlegen. Schätzt man nun für die beiden 
Modellspezifikationen Quantilsregressionen (0,10; 0,25; 0,50; 0,75; 0,90 Quantil) um 
den Einfluss der exogenen Variablen in verschiedenen Bereichen der Lohnverteilung zu 
messen, so fällt auf, dass die Ergebnisse der Einkommensschätzungen denen der 
                                                 
21 Vergleiche Berri und Simmons (2009), Simmons und Berri (2009) und Vincent und Eastman (2009) für 
aktuelle Untersuchungen für den nordamerikanischen Teamsport. 
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Random Effects-Schätzungen sehr ähnlich sind. Da die Koeffizienten, bis auf wenige 
Ausnahmen, über die Perzentile sehr konstant sind, lässt sich schlussfolgern, dass der 
Einfluss der erklärenden Variablen auf die Gehälter an verschiedenen Stellen der 
Einkommensverteilung nahezu identisch ist. Gerade der Einfluss der Kapitänsvariablen 
ist über alle Perzentile hinweg signifikant positiv und bestätigt die Vermutung, dass 
Führungsqualitäten einen entscheidenden Einfluss auf die Spielergehälter nehmen. Auf 
den ersten Blick verwundert der abnehmende Koeffizient des „Kapitän-Dummies“ über 
die Perzentile. Hierfür bietet sich jedoch eine simple Erklärung an: Die Anzahl der 
Spieler in den höchsten Perzentilen ist nicht über alle Teams gleichmäßig verteilt. Von 
den 580 höchstbezahlten Spielern spielten 145 beim FC Bayern München. Da aber jeder 
Verein jeweils einen Kapitän je Saison stellt, gibt es Kapitäne, die aufgrund der 
Budgetrestriktionen der Vereine nicht zu den „Topverdienern“ der Liga gehören. Eine 
Darstellung der Schätzergebnisse der Quantilsregressionen, jeweils für 
Modellspezifikation 1 und Modellspezifikation 2, findet sich nachfolgend in Table 2-5 
und Table 2-6.22 
  
                                                 
22 Die Ergebnisse der Bootstrap und Jackknife Methode sind analog. 
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Variable  0,1 Quantil  0,25 Quantil 0,5 Quantil  0,75 Quantil  0,9 Quantil 
Alter  ,7721***  ,8306*** ,7058*** ,5726***  ,4362***
Alter2  ‐,0137***  ‐,0148*** ‐,0127*** ‐,0105***  ‐,0081***
BLS  ,0053***  ,0045*** ,0038*** ,0028***  ,0017***
BLS²  ‐,0000***  ‐,0000*** ‐,0000*** ‐,0000***  ‐,0000  **
GP INT  ,0205***  ,0155*** ,0155*** ,0163***  ,0173***
GP INT²  ‐,0002***  ‐,0001*** ‐,0001*** ‐,0001***  ‐,0001***
Tore  ,0007    +  ,0035*** ,0039*** ,0027***  ,0028  **
Abwehr  ,3674***  ,3167*** ,1814*** ‐,0105   +  ‐,1683***
Mittelfeld  ,4939***  ,3718*** ,2643*** ,1282***  ,0005    +
Sturm  ,5957***  ,4754*** ,3918*** ,2872***  ,1594***
Südamerika  ,5142***  ,5330*** ,5262*** ,5200***  ,5013***
Nordamerika  ‐,0826    +  ‐,0538    + ‐,0019     + ‐,0967     +  ‐,1804     +
Osteuropa  ,1854***  ,1685*** ,1241*** ,1130***  ,0701     +
Westeuropa  ,3451***  ,3367*** ,3096*** ,2100***  ,1627***
Afrika  ,0892    +  ,1264  ** ,0438    + ‐,0066   +  ‐,0054    +
Asien/Austr.  ,2035  **  ,1686  ** ,0699    + ‐,0773   +  ,1510    +
Kapitän (t)  ,6252***  ,5700*** ,5168*** ,4410***  ,3161***
Pseudo R²  ,3150  ,3114  ,2932  ,2879  ,2966 
Fallzahl  6147  6147  6147  6147  6147 
Raw Sum of Dev.  2.196,5  3.891,5  4.656,6  3.577,4  1.934,0 
Min Sum of Dev.  1.504,5  2.679,6  3.291,4  2.547,4  1.360,3 
*p<0,10; **p<0,05; ***p<0,01; + n. s. 
Table 2-5: Quantile Regressions of Player Salary in the Bundesliga (Model 1) 
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Variable  0,1 Quantil  0,25 Quantil 0,5 Quantil  0,75 Quantil  0,9 Quantil 
Alter  ,7774***  ,8455*** ,7033*** ,5416***  ,4618***
Alter2  ‐,0138***  ‐,0150*** ‐,0126*** ‐,0099***  ‐,0085***
BLS  ,0058***  ,0042*** ,0039*** ,0032***  ,0017***
BLS²  ‐,0000***  ‐,0000*** ‐,0000*** ‐,0000***  ‐,0000  **
GP INT  ,0181***  ,0167*** ,0165*** ,0175***  ,0165***
GP INT²  ‐,0001***  ‐,0001*** ‐,0001*** ‐,0001***  ‐,0001***
Tore  ,0014    +  ,0038*** ,0040*** ,0023  **  ,0027  **
Abwehr  ,3830***  ,3087*** ,1834*** ‐,0178    +  ‐,1530***
Mittelfeld  ,4695***  ,3630*** ,2704*** ,1178***  ,0178    +
Sturm  ,5746***  ,4566*** ,3860*** ,2713***  ,1753***
Südamerika  ,4913***  ,5054*** ,5108*** ,5317***  ,5003***
Nordamerika  ‐,0727    +  ‐,0403    + ‐,0078    + ‐,0732    +  ‐,0632    +
Osteuropa  ,1794***  ,1555*** ,1268*** ,1090***  ,0556    +
Westeuropa  ,3343***  ,3324*** ,3051*** ,2018***  ,1614***
Afrika  ,1093    +  ,0996    + ,0320    + ‐,0169    +  ‐,0017    +
Asien/Austr.  ,2510  **  ,1539    * ,0579    + ‐,0860    +  ,1844    +
Kapitän (t‐1)  ,3786***  ,4751*** ,4402*** ,3293***  ,3063***
Pseudo R²  ,3108  ,3071  ,2877  ,2817  ,2921 
Fallzahl  6147  6147  6147  6147  6147 
Raw Sum of Dev.  2.196,5  3.891,5  4.656,6  3.577,4  1.934,0 
Min Sum of Dev.  1.513,9  2.696,6  3.316,9  2.569,6  1.369,0 
*p<0,10; **p<0,05; ***p<0,01; + n. s. 
Table 2-6: Quantile Regressions of Player Salary in the Bundesliga (Model 2)  
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2.4 Summary and Implications 
Das aktuelle Kapitel liefert empirische Evidenz für die monetäre Entlohnung von 
Führungsqualitäten im professionellen Teamsport. Da sich der Aufsatz auf die deutsche 
Fußballbundesliga beschränkt, ergeben sich eine Vielzahl von denkbaren weiter-
führenden Arbeiten. Hier wäre es zum Beispiel von Interesse, inwieweit sich der mone-
täre Einfluss des Kapitänsamtes mit der Mannschaftsgröße verändert. Aus organisa-
tionsökonomischer Sicht wäre zu erwarten, dass mit steigender Anzahl an Team-
mitgliedern das Gehaltssurplus für die Übernahme der Kapitänsposition aufgrund des 
größeren Koordinationsaufwands steigt. Darüber hinaus könnte der Einfluss von ver-
schieden großen Führungsteams analysiert werden. Einige Sportarten, wie beispiels-
weise der US-amerikanische Basketball, weisen unterschiedliche Anzahlen von Kapi-
tänen je Team auf. Beim Basketball schwankt diese zwischen einem und drei Kapi-
tänen. Inwieweit diese Streuung der Führungsverantwortung einen monetären Einfluss 
nimmt, wäre ein weiterer interessanter Ansatzpunkt für weitere Untersuchungen. Hier 
ist zu erwarten, dass die Bündelung der Führungsaufgaben auf einen einzigen Kapitän 
für diesen zu dem größten Gehaltsbonus führt. 
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3 The Payoff to Leadership in Teams 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The presence of a leader is often said to be decisive for the success of a team. While the 
sum of individual skills of the team members might be a good indicator for the potential 
of a group, a team leader is expected to improve his teams’ performance by directing his 
team mates. This ability is assumed to be compensated monetarily. In professional 
sports a team captain is said to have responsibility for the strategy as well as teamwork. 
Since this requires leadership skills, the analysis of the monetary reward for captaincy is 
the main subject of this chapter. 
 
Looking at the existing literature one finds many articles explaining which factors influ-
ence the players’ salary in the National Hockey League (NHL), using data sets from 
different seasons and including various kinds of performance indicators. In an early 
study Jones and Walsh (1988) analyze the influence of players’ skills on their respective 
salaries. They also focus on the influence of penalty minutes on players’ salary, as they 
predict that players who play with a higher intensity, which results in a higher number 
of penalty minutes, earn significantly more. By clustering players into the two groups 
“grunts” and “non-grunts”, Jones, Nadeau and Walsh (1997) provide a rational for both 
types of players to find employment in the National Hockey League, as a market for 
both player types exists. The authors also show that the structure of salaries differs for 
both groups of players, even through the main salary for both groups does not differ 
statistically. 
 
There also exists a large body of literature concerning salary discrimination against 
French-Canadian players in the National Hockey League. Longley (1995), Lavoie 
(2000) and others investigate on this subject, ending up with mixed findings about this 
subject.23 Using a stochastic frontier approach, Kahane (2005) picks up this topic, and 
estimates an optimal relative presence of French-Canadian players for a given payroll. 
                                                 
23 See Kahn (1991) for a general survey on discrimination in professional sports. 
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He shows greater inefficiencies for National Hockey League teams which have an over-
representation of Francophone players. 
 
Regarding leadership skills, most research has been done concerning big company 
managers, whose ability to lead others is often concerned to be a “soft skill”. Hence the 
question arises, why some individuals develop leadership skills while others do not. 
Kuhn and Weinberger (2005) investigate the influence of occupying leadership posi-
tions in high school on the later salary. They identify team captains and club presidents 
as individuals who take leadership positions during high school and hereby accumulate 
important leadership skills for their further career. While accounting for cognitive skills 
as well as psychological and physical indicators on the individual basis, the authors 
show that men who possessed one of the named positions during high school receive a 
wage premium between 4 and 24 percent a decade later. In a related research Barron, 
Ewing and Waddell (2000) show that students who participate in extracurricular sport 
activities during high school years later earn a wage premium between 4 and 15 percent 
over students, who participated in non-sport extracurricular activities. 
 
To summarize, the literature offers different approaches to measure factors that influ-
ence players’ salary in team sports, especially for the National Hockey League. Addi-
tionally, a big body of literature is devoted to leadership skills, describing the develop-
ment of leadership skills. This chapter combines these two fields as it measures the 
impact of leadership skills on players’ salaries. Since team captains are expected to pos-
sess this ability, the main goal of this chapter is to measure the wage premium for team 
captains in the National Hockey League. Using a data set containing four successive 
seasons I show that, other things equal, players are paid an extra 21 to 35 percent for 
serving as team captains. 
 
The chapter is organized as follows: The next section describes the data and presents the 
goals of the chapter. Section three presents the results obtained from the analyses of the 
data set. Finally, the chapter concludes with section four. 
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3.2 Data 
The data set that I analyze in this chapter contains individual statistics of all ice hockey 
players who played in the National Hockey League between the 2003/2004 and the 
2007/2008 season. Due to the NHL lockout in 2004/2005 which resulted in the cancel-
lation of the entire season, our data set contains four seasons. Since salary information 
is not available for all players, the data set totals in 1067 players and 2773 player-year-
observations. The NHL had 30 teams during the observed period with 82 regular season 
games per team. This leads to 1230 games in each of the four seasons and therefore the 
data set includes statistics from a total of 4920 regular season games. The vast majority 
of teams have just one team captain, while in rare cases teams report up to five captains. 
For the course of four seasons 148 team captains were reported. Our data set excludes 
goalkeepers, since the official rules prohibit them to act as a team captains.24 Individual 
player statistics were drawn from the leagues official website at http://www.nhl.com, 
while player salaries were obtained from the website of USA Today at 
http://content.usatoday.com/sports/hockey/nhl/salaries/default.aspx. Finally, informa-
tion concerning the team captains was taken from the “NHL Official Guide & Record 
Book 2009”. 
 
In the National Hockey League, the team captain is selected before the start of each sea-
son and has a capital “C” sewn on the left side of his jersey to distinguish him from his 
teammates.25 He is the only player who is allowed to talk to the referees about the inter-
pretation of rules during the game. To minimize delay in case of disagreement about a 
call, the league disallows goalkeepers to be team captains. Beside the named compe-
tency, the main task for the team captain is to be a leader during games as well as before 
and after games in the locker room. Furthermore he is the one who is responsible to 
represent his teammates’ concerns to the team management. 
 
The primary task of this chapter is to analyze how this leadership, displayed by the 
function of serving as team captain, is rewarded monetarily. Observing the years of 
                                                 
24 See official NHL rules, section 2, rule 6 at http://www.nhl.com/ext/0708rules.pdf. 
25 NHL teams also name alternate captains each season, who carry a capital “A” on their jersey. Unfor-
tunately, information concerning alternate captains is unavailable. 
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experience team captains have, one can notice a nearly normal distribution around the 
average of eleven years of experience (see Figure 3-1). Hence it seems that leadership 
skills requires some experience in the league, as one observes an average experience of 
only 5.55 years for non team captains. 
 
 
Figure 3-1: Kernel Density Estimation of Captains and Non-Captains NHL Experience 
 
Besides the captaincy, one has got to consider other factors which influence players’ 
salary. The present approach hence accounts for a variety of individual characteristics 
presented in Table 3-1. Players’ experience is expected to have a positive impact 
according to the human capital theory. Therefore I consider years played in the National 
Hockey League prior to the respective season to display players’ experience in the 
league. Human capital theory lets us expect a positive impact of experience on salary 
accompanied with decreasing marginal returns, which would result in an upward-slop-
ing experience-earnings profile with diminishing returns to experience. Accordingly, 
one also has to consider the squared experience of the players.26 Especially in a fast-
                                                 
26 See also Idson and Kahane (2000). 
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paced game like hockey decreasing speed and agility can be hardly compensated by 
additional experience.27 
 
All-star game appearances seem to be an appropriate indicator to display players’ tal-
ents. Participating in this yearly event, which had been cancelled three times during the 
last 20 years due to a lockout or to simultaneously proceeding Winter Olympic Games, 
clearly allows distinguishing between talent levels. This differentiation proves to be 
quite important, since superstars have a big impact on media attention and hence might 
influence their franchises value.28 
 
The ability to occupy a certain position might also affect the individuals’ salary. Hence I 
differentiate between four positions as I exclude goalkeepers because of aforementioned 
reasons. I control for the positions defenseman (DE), center (CE), right wing (RW) and 
left wing (LW). Throughout the observed period players typically do not switch their 
position. Altogether, it occurred just once that a player switched positions in between 
seasons. 
 
Next to variables accounting for players’ experience, talent and position, one also has to 
consider performance on the ice as an important factor which influences players’ salary. 
Consequently, several individual statistics are included in the following salary determi-
nation. Considering games played during the regular season accounts for two things: 
First, it illustrates how important a player is to his teams’ success. Secondly, it displays 
if a player is injury prone, since this would lead to a cutback in games played. Further-
more, points scored per game serves as an indicator for the offensive ability of players. 
Following Lavoie (2000) and others, the squared term of the achieved points per game 
is also included in the salary regression.  
                                                 
27 See Fair (1994). 
28 For empirical evidence from the National Basketball Association (NBA) see Hausman and Leonard 
(1997). 
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Variable  Operationalization  Mean  Min.  Max. 
Exp  Experience (seasons) in the league  5.83  0  24 
Exp²  Squared experience (seasons) in the league  55.31  0  576 
ASG  All‐star game appearances  0.45  0  15 
ASG²  Squared All‐star game appearances  2.58  0  225 
DE  Defender (dummy; yes = 1)  0.35  0  1 
CE  Center (dummy; yes = 1)  0.26  0  1 
RW  Right wing (dummy; yes = 1)  0.20  0  1 
LW  Left wing (dummy; yes = 1)  0.19  0  1 
GP  Games played  61.36  1  84 
PPG  Points per game  0.39  0  1.6 
PPG²  Squared points per game  0.24  0  2.4 
Captain (t)  Captain in current season (dummy; yes = 1)  0.05  0  1 
Captain (t‐1)  Captain in prior season (dummy; yes = 1)  0.04  0  1 
Table 3-1: Descriptive Statistics of Player Characteristics and Performance Indicators 
 
3.3 Empirical Analyses 
To start off this chapter, I am going to analyze the salary structure of the National 
Hockey League. While the average salary for the observed period is 1,609,947 dollars 
one observes a right-skewed distribution of players’ salary as the mean salary is compa-
ratively low at 945,630 dollars (see Figure 3-2). Individual players’ salaries range from 
150,000 up to 13,500,000 dollars for one season. In the following regression analyses 
the natural logarithm of the salary is used as the dependent variable, as this is a better 
approximation to normal distribution. 
 
Since the selected captains are expected to be players who spend a lot of minutes on the 
ice, their salaries range from 570,000 to 9,880,939 dollars, with an average salary of 
3,903,226 dollars and a mean salary of 4,000,000 dollars. Hence the distribution of 
captain salaries is not as right-skewed as for the whole sample. 
 
33 
 
 
Figure 3-2: Kernel Density Estimation of the Salary in the NHL 
 
As mentioned before, the lockout resulted in the cancellation of the 2004-05 NHL sea-
son, because the team owners and the NHL Players Association (NHLPA) did not con-
sent on a new collective bargaining agreement. Subsequent to both sides agreeing to a 
new collective bargaining agreement during the summer of 2005, the total salary 
spending decreased considerably for the following season. Due to an agreed increase of 
the salary cap for the following seasons the average players’ salary rose afterwards. 
 
Following this rather general analysis of the players’ salary I turn to the investigation of 
the impact of leadership on players’ salary. For this purpose different regression models 
are being run, which also regard the individual characteristics and performance indica-
tors described in the previous section. Hereby I distinguish the impact of leadership on 
our dependent variable, denoted by the players’ log wage rate, from other influencing 
factors. On the basis of the standard Mincer (1974) wage equation the following equa-
tion to estimate the impact on salary is being suggested: 
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Due to the panel character of our data I apply a random effects model as well as a con-
ventional OLS model. The random effects model accounts for unobservable factors 
which might influence the given individual effects.29 One might argue that there could 
be an endogeneity problem, since the direction of causality between the dependent sal-
ary variable and the independent captain variable is not clear, as players might be 
appointed to be captains because they receive a large salary. In this regard a second 
regression analysis is being run, replacing the current team captains by the captains of 
the prior season. Hence the information on team captains in the 2002/03 season is 
included in the second model that uses salary information for 2003/04. Thus, the regres-
sion analysis for the 2003/04 season includes the captaincy information from the 
2002/03 season (and so forth). 
 
To account for further influencing factors, season dummies (SD) as well as team dum-
mies (TD) are included in both models. The season dummies account for the discon-
tinuous salary history within the league. As stated earlier, salaries dropped considerably 
after the lockout season and this is reflected by the season dummies. Furthermore, the 
team dummies depict prevailing differences in financial power. Teams’ spending on 
salary ranged from 18,932,830 dollar by the Washington Capitals for the 2005/06 sea-
son to 77,856,109 dollar by the Detroit Red Wings for the 2003/04 campaign, display-
ing this heterogeneity between teams. 
  
                                                 
29 See Mátyás / Sevestre (1996, p. 94). 
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  Model 1  Model 2 
Coefficients  Coefficients 
Variable  OLS  RE  OLS  RE 
Exp  0.143 (21.81)***  0.164 (21.59)***  0.143 (21.73)***  0.164 (21.63)*** 
Exp²  ‐0.006 (‐13.85)***  ‐0.008 (‐15.26)*** ‐0.006 (‐13.82)*** ‐0.008 (‐15.36)***
ASG  0.236 (13.34)***  0.280 (12.04)***  0.238 (13.49)***  0.283 (12.21)*** 
ASG²  ‐0.017 (‐8.89)***  ‐0.017 (‐6.97)***  ‐0.017 (‐9.02)***  ‐0.017 (‐7.13)***
DE  0.266 (10.60)***  0.164 (4.89)***  0.271 (10.78)***  0.168 (4.99)*** 
RW  ‐0.036 (‐1.34)+  ‐0.062 (‐1.67)*  ‐0.031 (‐1.14)+  ‐0.058 (‐1.57)+ 
LW  ‐0.021 (‐0.77)+  ‐0.052 (‐1.40)+  ‐0.020 (‐0.74)+  ‐0.051 (‐1.37)+ 
GP  0.002 (3.47)***  0.001 (1.09)+  0.002 (3.68)***  0.001 (1.29)+ 
PPG  1.492 (13.38)***  1.224 (10.48)***  1.517 (13.60)***  1.253 (10.75)*** 
PPG²  ‐0.279 (‐2.91)***  ‐0.330 (‐3.34)***  ‐0.297 (‐3.10)***  ‐0.361 (‐3.66)***
Captain (t)  0.314 (7.04)***  0.211 (4.74)***  /  / 
Captain (t‐1)  /  /  0.355 (7.37)***  0.278 (5.83)*** 
Season Dum.  Included 
Team Dum.  Included 
Adj R²  0.624  0.613  0.625  0.614 
Number of obs  2773  2773  2773  2773 
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 level, + denotes insignificance (z-values in brackets). 
Table 3-2: Determinants of Player Salary in the NHL 
 
Estimations are reported in Table 3-2. As one would expect the data goes in line with 
the human capital theory, as the experience-salary profile is upward sloping and con-
cave (see Figure 3-3). 
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Figure 3-3: Experience-Salary Profile 
 
The number of All-star game appearances enables one to separate between very good 
players and so-called star players. According to Rosen’s (1981, 1983) theory of 
superstars even a marginal difference in talent leads to a considerable difference in 
salary. The squared number of All-star game appearances is also considered, as one ex-
pects decreasing marginal returns of appearances. Data supports the expected influence 
of All-star game experience, independent of the chosen model. 
 
As I take the center position as the reference position there is no significant difference 
in salary between it and the other offensive positions right wing and left wing. Other 
things equal, defensemen earn significantly more than offensive players. This goes in 
line with Idson and Kahane (2000), who state that a defensemen with the same offen-
sive skills as an offensive player earns more due to his additional defensive abilities. 
 
Looking at the individual performance data, one finds the expected influence on the 
players’ salary. Independent of the selected model, the number of games played during 
the regular season have a significant positive impact on the salary, as it displays players’ 
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skills as well as physical characteristics like fatigue and frequency of injuries. Servicing 
as offensive skill indicators, points per game and squared points per game both have a 
highly significant impact on players’ salary. While points scored per game have a posi-
tive effect on players’ salary, one can observe decreasing marginal returns. 
 
To test the main hypothesis which claims that leadership skills in teams are rewarded 
monetarily, I look at the impact of the captain variable on players’ salary. All regression 
analyses support the thesis that leadership is indeed rewarded, since the impact of the 
captain variables is significantly positive for all models. As the main result of the thesis 
I state that the teams’ current captain, other things equal, is rewarded with a monetary 
bonus between 20 and 30 percent (Model 1) for obtaining his position.30 To accommo-
date for the potential heterogeneity problem of the captain variable I take a look at the 
team captains of the previous season (Model 2). As expected this does not change the 
result, since the impact of this captain variable is also highly significant. 
Since salaries in the NHL are not normally distributed which is supported by a 
skewness-kurtosis test for normality, I continue by performing quantile regressions for 
both models. This way, one can measure the impact of the independent variables at 
different parts of the salary distribution. As tables 3-3 and 3-4 report, coefficients are 
relatively constant throughout the quantiles. As in the previous chapter, the impact of 
the variable depicting the team captain decreases by the quantile. The argument goes in 
line with the one presented in the prior chapter. The number of players belonging to the 
highest quantiles is not equally distributed over all teams, but since every team has to 
name a team captain the impact of captain variable decreases over the quantiles. 
  
                                                 
30 Following the line of argumentation by Halvorsen and Palmquist (1980) as in the second chapter, the 
surplus ranges between 23.5 and 36.9 percent. 
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Variable  0.1 Quantile  0.25 Quantile 0.5 Quantile 0.75 Quantile  0.9 Quantile
Exp  .0661***  .1124*** .1437*** .1548***  .1522***
Exp²  ‐.0032***  ‐.0048*** ‐.0057*** ‐.0056***  ‐.0056***
ASG  .4058***  .3284*** .2742*** .2116***  .1604***
ASG²  ‐.0378***  ‐.0264*** ‐.0214*** ‐.0146***  ‐.0100***
DE  .0704***  .1874*** .3032*** .3309***  .3518***
RW  ‐.0069    +  ‐.0091    + ‐.0102    + ‐.0810  **  ‐.0330    +
LW  .0245    +  .0049    + .0280    + .0851  **  .0401    +
GP  .0020***  .0028*** .0016*** .0009    +  ‐.0004    +
PPG  .5698***  1.1247*** 1.4418*** 1.6098***  1.9771***
PPG²  ‐.0387    +  ‐.0875    + ‐.2249    * ‐.3113  **  ‐.4847***
Captain (t)  .4950***  .4180*** .2584*** .1783***  .1965***
Pseudo R²  0.2033  0.3167  0.4184  0.4763  0.4773 
Fallzahl  2773  2773  2773  2773  2773 
Raw Sum of Dev.  533.9  1200.4  1792.3  1566.5  856.0 
Min Sum of Dev.  425.3  820.3  1042.4  820.5  447.4 
*p<0,10; **p<0,05; ***p<0,01; + n. s. 
Table 3-3: Quantile Regressions of Player Salary in the NHL (Model 1) 
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Variable  0.1 Quantile  0.25 Quantile 0.5 Quantile 0.75 Quantile  0.9 Quantile
Exp  .0649***  .1125*** .1416*** .1580***  .1524***
Exp²  ‐.0031***  ‐.0048*** ‐.0055*** ‐.0058***  ‐.0057***
ASG  .4063***  .3282*** .2596*** .2056***  .1744***
ASG²  ‐.0389***  ‐.0265*** ‐.0192*** ‐.0142***  ‐.0112***
DE  .0674  **  .1968*** .3104*** .3153***  .3686***
RW  .0075    +  ‐.0053    + .0036    + ‐.0833  **  ‐.0173    +
LW  .0097    +  .0034    + ‐.0218    + ‐.0835  **  ‐.0392    +
GP  .0020***  .0027*** .0015  ** .0001    +  ‐.0002    +
PPG  .6193***  1.1680*** 1.5120*** 1.6081***  1.930***
PPG²  ‐.0088    +  ‐.1012    + ‐.2786  ** ‐.3145  **  ‐.4349***
Captain (t‐1)  .5729***  .4229*** .3306*** .2167***  .2863***
Pseudo R²  0.1979  0.3161  0.4182  0.4767  0.4788 
Fallzahl  2773  2773  2773  2773  2773 
Raw Sum of Dev.  533.9  1200.4  1792.3  1566.5  856 
Min Sum of Dev.  428.2  821.0  1042.8  819.7  446.2 
*p<0,10; **p<0,05; ***p<0,01; + n. s. 
Table 3-4: Quantile Regressions of Player Salary in the NHL (Model 2) 
 
3.4 Conclusions 
This article has investigated the impact of leadership in teams on individuals’ salary. 
The empirical work has focused on the National Hockey League. Using data from four 
seasons it was shown that leadership skills, displayed by the captain variable, have a 
significant positive impact on players’ salary. Depending on the chosen model, the 
pecuniary surplus for the team captains range between 21 and 35 percent. Further 
research might concentrate on other sports, possibly with a different team size and 
varying performance indicators. Theory of organization would lead us to the expectation 
of rising benefit of leadership as team size increases. A differentiation between roster 
size and actual number of players on the field might be necessary to distinguish between 
leadership on the field and leadership off the field. Next to this, further research on per-
sonal background of players might indicate under which circumstances individuals 
develop into leaders. In this content further information on players, concerning origin, 
education and earlier performance would be of great interest. 
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4 Performance under Pressure: Estimating the Returns to Mental 
Strength in Professional Basketball 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Human capital theory as developed by Gary S. Becker (1962, 1964) is clearly one of the 
cornerstones of modern labor and personnel economics. Since the term “human capital” 
refers to the stock of knowledge and expertise an individual brings to a job, any per-
sonal attributes and characteristics that are rewarded in a competitive labor market must 
be “skills”. Building on this concept, Jacob Mincer (1974) a few years later developed 
and estimated what is now called the “earnings function”. Here, an individual’s earnings 
are modeled as a function of her formal qualification, i.e. the years of schooling and 
experience. Since the publication dates of these two seminal contributions, hundreds of 
studies using data from different countries and/or time periods have appeared, each 
seeking to identify the impact of age and highest school degree obtained on hourly, 
monthly or annual wages (for an overview see e.g. Card 1999).31 Over the years, other 
(potential) determinants of an individual’s wage have been added to the regression 
models: Apart from schooling and experience most studies now include variables like 
tenure with the current employer and the duration of non-employment spells, both of 
which are likely to affect an individual’s stock of knowledge and expertise, too. 
 
In two recent contributions Bowles, Gintis and Osborne (2001a, 2001b) have challenged 
the traditional view by arguing that the “standard” human capital variables explain little 
of the observable variance in earnings. Moreover, they find that variables that have been 
omitted so far in the empirical literature very often prove to be important determinants 
of an individual’s labor market success. Most important among the omitted variables are 
“non-cognitive skills”, which are usually defined and measured in terms of work habits 
                                                 
31 Most of the more recent studies include additional variables that are considered valid measures of an 
individual’s productivity (see e.g. Krueger 1993, DiNardo and Pischke 1997). Moreover, the adequacy 
of the initial specification has been questioned in a number of studies. Murphy and Welch (1990) for 
example argue that the standard formulation understates early career wage growth by about 30-50 
percent and overstates midcareer earnings growth by 20-50 percent. They present a number of 
alternative specifications that seem to fit the data better. Depending on the treatment of economy-wide 
trends, the dating conventions for tenure and wages, the handling of wage observations that span 
multiple jobs and the estimation approaches used Altonji and Shakotko (1987), Topel (1991) and 
Altonji and Williams (2005) find huge variations in the returns to tenure. 
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(such as effort, determination and discipline) or in terms of personality traits (such as 
self-confidence, sociability and emotional stability) (ter Weel 2008: 729). 
 
Although the literature on the impact of work habits and personality traits on labor mar-
ket careers in general and on salaries in particular has grown rapidly over the last years 
(for an overview see e.g. Borghans et al. 2008), very few robust results have been pre-
sented so far. Most of the available studies suffer from the fact that the data used for 
estimation purposes cover a broad range of jobs where the returns to different work 
habits and personality traits are likely to vary considerably. This, in turn, is likely to 
bias the estimated coefficients downwards. Moreover, most of the available evidence is 
based on questionnaire responses to an often large number of statements intended to 
describe the respective individuals’ personality structures. 
 
This chapter tries to overcome these deficits by, first, restricting the empirical analysis 
to a particular dimension of an individual’s personality that we henceforth either call 
“mental strength” or “mental toughness”. Second, we avoid using subjective evaluations 
of individuals about their own personalities by restricting our analysis to observable 
behavior. Thus, we derive an “objective” measure of mental strength/toughness that we 
enter as an additional explanatory variable in our estimations. Contrary to most of the 
available literature, we use a data set with detailed information on workers who are 
employed in a quantitatively rather small and at the same time very specific labor mar-
ket, the “National Basketball Association” (NBA). While the data precludes generali-
zation of the findings beyond the professional team sports industry, it has the advantage 
that we have “clean” measures of individual productivity and performance as well as 
reliable information on individual salaries and that we can construct an unbiased 
measure of mental strength without having to ask the players to respond to a question-
naire to reveal their work habits and/or their personality traits.32 Summarizing, the goal 
of this chapter is to analyze the impact of a particular (and presumably highly valued) 
capability of professional basketball players – to avoid “choking under pressure” or to 
score “when it really counts” – on the individuals’ remuneration. 
 
                                                 
32 For a detailed discussion of the advantages of sports data to test different labor market theories see 
Kahn (2000). 
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The chapter proceeds as follows: Section two reviews the available literature, section 
three describes the setting from which we derive the data used in the estimations (the 
NBA). In section four we present our findings and section five concludes. 
 
4.2 What Can we Learn from the Available Literature? 
4.2.1 Personality Traits and Earnings: A Review of the Evidence 
While a large number of studies have documented the impact of cognitive ability (as 
measured by e.g. IQ test scores) on earnings, the impact of non-cognitive skills (such as 
motivation, persistence, dependability, etc.) has remained virtually unexplored (early 
examples include Andrisani 1978, Filer 1981 and Jencks 1979). 33 In the last five years, 
however, a large and still growing number of papers have studied the influence of 
personality traits on individuals’ incomes. Irrespective of considerable differences in the 
independent variables used, in sample sizes and in cultural contexts all the studies sug-
gest that wages are not only determined by “traditional” human capital measures and by 
cognitive abilities but are also affected by non-cognitive skills. Summarizing, these 
psychological traits have been found to account for as much as one third of the impact 
the traditional human capital variables have on individual earnings (Manning and Swaf-
field 2008). 
 
The studies by e.g. Braakman (2009), Fortin (2008), Heckman et al. (2006), Mueller 
and Plug (2006), Nyhus and Pons (2005) as well as Osborne Groves (2005) are based 
on slightly different versions of the “five factor model” of personality structure, a 
widely accepted instrument among psychologists. The five personality traits are extro-
version (a preference for human contact and attention and the wish to inspire other 
people), agreeableness (the willingness to help other people and to act in accordance 
with other people’s interests), conscientiousness (a person’s preference for following 
                                                 
33 A further branch of literature examines the impact of physical attributes on earnings. First, a number of 
papers have examined the possible effects of physical height on earnings (see Persico, Postlewaite and 
Silverman 2004, Heineck 2005, Gautschi and Hangartner 2006, Hübler 2009). Second, a number of 
papers look at the impact of handedness on earnings (see Denny and O’Sullivan 2007, Ruebeck, 
Harrington and Moffitt 2007). Finally – and perhaps most interestingly – there are a number of papers 
looking at the impact of physical attractiveness (“beauty”) on labor market outcomes (see e.g. Biddle 
and Hamermesh 1998, French 2002, Hamermesh and Biddle 1994 and Hamermesh, Meng and Zhang 
2002). 
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rules and schedules), emotional stability (self-confidence, coolness) and auton-
omy/openness to experience (a person’s propensity to make his or her own decisions 
and the degree of initiative and control).34 
 
While all the papers quoted above interpret an individual’s personality as a “bundle of 
productive attributes valued in the labor market” (Mueller and Plug 2006: 4), they differ 
in the data they use for estimation purposes: Nyhus and Pons (2005) use a represent-
ative sample of the Dutch population collected in 1996 while the study by Mueller and 
Plog (2006) is based on the “Wisconsin Longitudinal Study”. Braakmann (2009) uses 
the 2005 wave of the German “Socio-Economic Panel”, Fortin refers to the “National 
Longitudinal Study of the High School Class of 1972“ and the “National Education 
Longitudinal Study” of 1988. Osborne Groves (2005) relies on the US “National 
Longitudinal Survey of Young Women” and the British “National Child Development 
Study” while Heckman et al. (2006) again use the “National Longitudinal Survey of 
Youth”. 
 
Not surprisingly, the findings presented in these studies are quite heterogeneous: Nyhus 
and Pons (2005) find that extraversion as well as agreeableness is both associated with 
significantly lower wages while emotional stability is associated with significantly 
higher wages.35 These results are partly confirmed and partly rejected by Mueller and 
Plog (2006) who find that extraversion has no statistically significant impact on the 
wages of either men or women and that agreeableness is associated with a wage pre-
mium only for women. For men (but not for women), neuroticism (the opposite of 
emotional stability) is associated with a wage penalty. Finally, openness is found to 
have a significantly positive influence on wages for both, men and women. However, 
even the statistically significant coefficients are of marginal economic importance only. 
Braakmann (2009), in turn, finds that for both men and women, only conscientiousness 
has a statistically significant negative impact on individual wages while the remaining 
                                                 
34 Apart from the papers quoted above, Drago (2008) studied the impact of “self-esteem” on wages, Liu 
and Wong (2005) looked at the influence of “loyalty” on individual wages, Ippolito (1996) at the 
impact of “reliability” on individual remuneration and Laband and Lentz (1999) at the role of having a 
mentor on subsequent earnings. 
35 The remaining two dimensions of the five factors inventory (autonomy and conscientiousness) proved 
to be statistically insignificant. 
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four coefficients are all insignificant in the wage equation for men. In the case of 
women, agreeableness as well as neuroticism is also associated with a significant wage 
penalty. Using somewhat different measures of personality traits Fortin (2008), Heck-
man et al. (2006) and Osborne Groves (2005) find that individuals reporting a high 
degree of self-esteem and/or a high degree of control over their life earn significantly 
higher wages than individuals believing that luck and fate determine success and 
achievement. 
 
The most important common element of the remaining three studies is that they all use a 
more “objective” measure of another highly valued personal characteristic, i.e. leader-
ship skills. Using three different data sets from 1960, 1972 and 1982 (with 8,000, 3,000 
and 2,000 observations respectively) Kuhn and Weinberger (2005) find that among 
white men individuals who occupied leadership positions in high school (as president or 
as captain of a varsity team, for example) earn significantly more as adults. The leader-
ship-wage effect varies, depending on model specification and time period, from 4-33 
percent. Moreover, high school leaders are more likely to occupy managerial positions 
as adults, and leadership skills are associated with a higher wage premium in managerial 
positions than elsewhere. The two other studies looking at the influence of leadership 
skills on wages use data from two different professional team sports leagues: Deutscher 
(2009) relies on data from the National Hockey League over a period of five seasons 
(2003/04-2007/08) with some 2,800 player-year-observations while Battré, Deutscher 
and Frick (2009) analyze comparable data from the German “Bundesliga” over a period 
of thirteen consecutive seasons (1995/96-2007/08) with more than 6,500 player-year-
observations. Both studies reveal that players who have been appointed team captain by 
the respective head coach earn significantly higher wages: Other things equal, hockey 
and football players who are captains earn a wage premium of some 20-35 percent. 
Evaluated at the respective mean this implies that captains earn about 300,000-500,000 
$ (hockey) and 350,000-400,000 € (soccer) more per year than their teammates with a 
comparable performance on the ice/pitch. 
 
Summarizing, it appears that, first, the studies using “representative” data are likely to 
underestimate the “true” impact of personality traits on earnings, because the returns to 
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personality traits are likely to vary across occupations (see Cobb-Clark and Tan 2009). 
If, for example, extraversion is beneficial for sales people and teachers, but not for 
accountants, it is problematic to use a sample that includes sales people and teachers as 
well as accountants. Second, the significantly positive correlation between formal edu-
cation and various measures of self-esteem, extraversion, agreeableness, emotional sta-
bility, etc. found in most studies is likely to result in a downward bias of the coefficients 
of either the former or the latter variables. Given these methodological problems we 
restrict our analysis to a particular labor market, where one of the five dimensions of an 
individual’s personality, his emotional stability (something we call “mental strength” or 
“mental toughness” instead) is likely to be of prime importance for that person’s per-
formance (and, therefore, his income). Before explaining the institutional set-up of that 
particular labor market we will now briefly summarize the available literature analyzing 
the wage determinants of professional basketball players. 
 
4.2.2 Performance and Remuneration in Professional Basketball 
Since we use data from the professional team sports industry in the empirical section of 
this chapter it is helpful to take a brief look at the available studies that seek to identify 
the determinants of player salaries in that particular industry, i.e. professional 
basketball. Due to the availability of detailed and reliable information on player salaries, 
contract duration and performance/ productivity, a large number of studies have been 
published recently (see e.g. Kahn and Scherer 1988, Koch and Vander Hill 1988, 
Wallace 1988, Brown, Spiro and Keenan 1991, Jenkins 1996, Dey 1997, Hamilton 
1997, Gius and Johnson 1998, Escker, Perez and Siegler 2004, Hill 2004, Prinz 2005). 
Perhaps surprisingly, none of the available studies has so far included a measure of 
“non-cognitive skills”. Thus, the evidence only documents the returns to “standard” 
performance measures.36 
 
                                                 
36 Significant impacts of experience, performance and peer reputation on salary can also be found in 
studies of other North American sports, see Kahn (1993) for baseball, Berri and Simmons (2009) and 
Simmons and Berri (2009) for American football and Idson and Kahane (2000) for hockey. Moreover, 
similar effects have been found in studies on European soccer (see Lehmann and Weigand 1999, 
Huebl and Swieter 2002, Lucifora and Simmons 2003, Lehmann and Schulze 2008, Garcia-del-Barrio 
and Pujol 2007, Frick 2007, Battré, Deutscher and Frick 2009). 
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Irrespective of the time period37 and the size of the sample38 these studies unanimously 
agree that player wages are a function of, first, a player’s human capital (i.e. his ability/ 
potential as measured by his draft position and his years of experience), second, a 
player’s “fan appeal” (as measured by his number of all star appearances) and, finally, 
his productivity (i.e. an individual’s contribution to the “glamour statistics” such as 
scoring, rebounding and shot-blocking). While draft position, experience, tenure with 
the current team and number of all-star appearances all have a positive, yet decreasing 
impact on wages, minutes per game, points, rebounds, assists and blocks per minute 
have a positive and strictly linear influence. Moreover, height (Eschker et al. 2004, Hill 
2004 and Prinz 2005) and contract length (Jenkins 1996) seem to have a positive influ-
ence on player wages too, while the impact of the number of previous teams is negative 
(Gius and Johnson 1998, Eschker et al. 2004, Prinz 2005). 
 
Summarizing, it appears that the salaries of professional sports players are not just ran-
dom, but that systematic factors determine these salaries to a large extent and that these 
systematic factors e.g. age, experience and performance are very similar to those found 
in other occupations.39 However, the variation in salaries that can be explained with a 
small set of precisely measured right-hand side variables is quite large compared to the 
respective values in the studies that use data from representative labor market surveys 
(25-35 percent vs. 60-70 percent). 
 
                                                 
37 Some studies use data from the mid 1980s (Koch and Vander Hill 1988, Kahn and Sherer 1988, 
Wallace 1988 and Brown, Spiro and Keenan 1991), some from the mid 1990s (Hamilton 1997, Gius 
and Johnson 1998). Most interesting, however, are the papers that use longitudinal data covering a 
period of five to ten consecutive seasons (Jenkins 1996, Dey 1997, Eschker, Perez and Siegler 2004, 
Hill 2004, Prinz 2005). 
38 Some of the samples are rather small (with slightly more than 200 observations) while others are quite 
large (with up to 4,500 player-year-observations). 
39 Where sports teams differ is that they apply more stringent selection procedures into occupations. For 
example, poor performance by a player results in being dropped from team squad and very quickly 
being discarded; there are high levels of mobility within the industry (between teams) and into and out 
of the industry, with shorter careers than in most occupations. 
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4.3 “Choking Under Pressure”: The Fragility of Performance under Stress 
The term “choking under pressure” is widely used in the academic literature as well as 
in the popular press to describe poor performance in response to what an individual 
perceives as an important and stress-filled situation: 
 
“Choking under pressure is not just poor performance. Rather, choking is sub-
optimal performance – worse performance than expected given what the perfor-
mer is capable of doing and what this performer has achieved in the past. This 
less-than-optimal performance does not reflect a random fluctuation in skill level 
(…), but rather occurs in response to a high-pressure situation” (Beilock and Gray 
2007: 426). 
 
The pressure experienced by many individuals – be it athletes in a competition, students 
in an exam or executives in a business meeting – can be the result of the level of 
rewards that the individuals expect to receive in the case of success (e.g. Baumeister 
1984) or the level of punishment they fear in the case of failure (see e.g. Paulus 1983). 
Given the well-documented influence of pressure on performance40, we seek to answer 
the question whether and to what extent an individual’s ability to deal with pressure 
situations has an impact on that person’s remuneration. More specifically, we analyze 
                                                 
40 A significant amount of research has examined choking under pressure in laboratory settings rather 
than in actual game situations. While a laboratory environment provides a controlled setting in which 
performance failures can be studied while the amount and the players’ perceptions of pressure can be 
manipulated. For example Leith (1988) found that individuals shooting free throws who were made 
aware of the fact that “some people have the tendency to choke at the free throw line” performed 
significantly worse than those who had not received that kind of information. Dohmen (2008a) finds 
that professional football players are more successful in penalty shot-outs when playing away games, 
i.e. when not playing in front of their fans (a finding that supports the related ‘social pressure 
hypothesis’). 
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the performance under pressure of professional basketball players41 and the monetary 
returns to the ability to handle pressure situations. 
 
To measure a player’s “stress resistance” or “mental toughness” we compare his 
performance from the free throw line in “crucial game situations”, i.e. during crunch-
time with his performance during the rest of the game. As crunch-time we define the 
last five minutes of the 4th quarter of a match or overtime, when no team is ahead by 
more than five points. In that situation, the preconditions for “choking under pressure” 
are likely to be fulfilled: First, missing an opportunity to score is particularly proble-
matic in a close match and, second, making a mistake that cannot be corrected as the 
match is coming to an end is particular problematic, too. Thus, pressure and stress are 
likely to increase towards the end of a match when the score is close. 
 
Why are free throws particularly suited to study the impact of “stress resistance” and 
“mental strength” on individual performance (and, subsequently, on remuneration)? The 
free throw is a quite unique situation in sports: It is a routine task for a player without an 
opponent being able to deter him from hitting the basket. The distance from the free-
throw line to the basket is 15 feet in every arena and there is no influence apart from 
crowd size and behavior. However, average attendance in the NBA is very similar 
across the teams42 and the distance between the crowd and the player is the same in 
every NBA arena. Thus, the free throw is the only instance during a match where a 
player’s output is independent of the efforts made by players of the opposing team. A 
player is awarded one or more free throws if he gets fouled while taking a shot, if he 
                                                 
41 Anecdotal evidence abounds: With 90 seconds left to play in the national championship game in the 
2008 NCAA men’s division I basketball tournament, the Memphis Tigers had a six point lead over the 
Kansas Jayhawks. Kansas fouled strategically to send Memphis to the free throw line, hoping to see 
them fail. Memphis, with a previous 59 percent completion rate, missed four out of five free throws, 
helping Kansas to reach overtime and finally win the game. Another example: In the first game of the 
1995 finals of the National Basketball Association (NBA) between the Orlando Magic and the 
Houston Rockets, Nick Anderson, a 70 percent career free throw shooter of the Orlando Magic, had 
four straight free throw attempts with a few seconds left to expand the team’s lead of three points. He 
missed all four shots enabling the Houston Rockets to tie the game with a last second shot and finally 
win the match in overtime. Later on, the Rockets won the series in four games. Nick Anderson’s free 
throw percentage declined significantly after this incidence to a level of 40 percent in the two seasons 
after that particular game. 
42 During our observation period the Detroit Pistons had the highest average attendance (with 20,335 in 
the 2005/06 season) while the Atlanta Hawks had the smallest crowd on average (with an average of 
15,026 spectators in the 2003/04 campaign). This difference is far smaller than the difference between 
the strong and the weak drawing teams in European football. 
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gets fouled while the opposing team is over the team foul limit for the quarter, or if the 
opponent receives a technical or flagrant foul. 
 
Given the importance of free throws in close matches particularly during crunch-time 
the question arises whether players who are better able to maintain their performance 
level in “critical situations” benefit in terms of higher salaries. We assume that being 
able to avoid “choking under pressure” is a scarce talent that is particularly rewarded in 
the labor market. To measure an individual player’s response to pressure we compare 
his performance from the free throw-line in crunch-time with the same player’s perfor-
mance during the rest of the match. Thus, our measure of “mental strength” is computed 
as follows43: 
 
ܯ݁݊ݐ݈ܽ ܵݐݎ݁݊݃ݐ݄ ൌ
ܨݎ݁݁ ݄ܶݎ݋ݓ ܲ݁ݎܿ݁݊ݐܽ݃݁ ሺܥݎݑ݄݊ܿݐ݅݉݁ሻ
ܨݎ݁݁ ݄ܶݎ݋ݓ ܲ݁ݎܿ݁݊ݐܽ݃݁ ሺܰ݋݊ ܿݎݑ݄݊ܿݐ݅݉݁ሻ
 
 
Thus, for players whose performance suffers under pressure we end up with a value of 
less than one while for those doing better (i.e. improving) in pressure situations, we 
have a value above one.44 
 
On average, players successfully complete 77.8 percent of their free throws in pressure 
situations, while the respective percentage share for the rest of the time on the court is 
78.6 percent. Thus, players seem to perform worse in pressure situations, but this differ-
ence is not statistically significant.45 Since the individual players’ response to pressure 
varies considerably (see Figure 4-1) we now take a closer look at the impact of mental 
strength on player remuneration. 
                                                 
43 Data on player performance under pressure were obtained from the website http://www.82games.com. 
44 We also take into account that it is harder for a good free throw shooter to improve further during 
crunch-time situations compared to a mediocre shooter by multiplying the respective player’s 
improvement/decline during crunch-time by his non-crunchtime free throw percentage. This does not 
change any of the results presented in this chapter. 
45 If, as one might argue, a player’s performance suffers due to fatigue, we should find in our data a 
negative correlation between our measure of “mental toughness” and the number of minutes played 
per game. The resulting correlation coefficient is close to zero and not statistically significant. Thus, 
the relative performance of players from the free throw line does not suffer from having played more 
minutes. Moreover, one might also expect to observe a significantly positive correlation between a 
player’s mental strength and his minutes on the court during crunch-time. Again, our data does not 
support this hypothesis, because the correlation is again insignificant. 
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Figure 4-1: Kernel Density Estimation “Mental Strength” 
 
4.4 Data, Estimation, and Findings 
The data set analyzed in this chapter includes the standard performance statistics as well 
as the annual salaries of all professional basketball players who appeared in at least one 
regular season match in the National Basketball Association (NBA) in the period 
between 2003/04 and 2006/07. We start with a data set that includes 697 different play-
ers and 2,008 player-year-observations that have been compiled from all 4,879 regular 
season games that have been played during that period.46 Statistics on player perfor-
mance were drawn from the league’s official website (http://www.nba.com), while 
player salaries were obtained from http://www.eskimo.com/~pbender. Our final data set 
includes only players who were awarded at least 15 free throw attempts during crunch-
time in the 82 regular season games in the 2003/04-2006/07 seasons. This leaves us 
with 208 different players and 458 player-year-observations. These players were 
awarded a total of 147,518 free throws, of which 14,325 occurred during crunchtime. 
                                                 
46 The NBA had 1,189 regular season games during the 2003/04 season and, due to the arrival of one 
expansion team (the Charlotte Bobcats) 1,230 games during following three seasons. 
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Apart from mental strength, a number of additional factors are likely to affect an indi-
vidual’s annual salary. As suggested by the previous literature, we control for player 
experience and “potential” (measured by the number of years in the NBA at the start of 
the respective season and the draft number). Since we expect decreasing marginal 
returns to experience, we also entered experience squared in our estimations. A low 
draft number, in turn, indicates a player of high ability, as he has been selected at an 
early stage of the annual recruiting event of the NBA. We therefore expect a negative 
influence of draft position on annual earnings (the higher the draft number, the lower 
the ability level and, consequently, the lower the salary). Since there are 30 teams in the 
NBA and each team has two picks, the highest possible draft number is 60. Players who 
were not selected during a draft, but still made it into the league and into our sample, 
were coded as pick number 61. 
 
In addition to talent and experience a player’s performance on the court is likely to have 
a strong impact on his remuneration. We therefore control in our estimations for the 
number of minutes played per match as well as the individual’s performance in the 
offense and the defense by including, first, the number of points scored per game and, 
second, the non-scoring performance that we measure as follows: 
 
ܰ݋݊ ܵܿ݋ݎ݅݊݃ ܲ݁ݎ݂݋ݎ݉ܽ݊ܿ݁ ൌ  
ܴܾ݁݋ݑ݊݀ݏ ൅ ܣݏݏ݅ݏݐݏ ൅ ܤ݈݋ܿ݇ݏ ൅ ܵݐ݈݁ܽݏ
ܩܽ݉݁ݏ ݈ܲܽݕ݁݀
 
 
However, since individual performance statistics might not tell the whole story, we 
additionally control for the impact that individual players have on their team’s perfor-
mance. We therefore measure the different teams’ performance in defense and offense 
per 100 ball possessions when a particular player is either on or off the court. The vari-
able “ONOF” measures the difference between these values and was obtained from the 
website http://www.82games.com. 
 
The number of all-star appearances serves as our measure of “superstardom” and/or 
“fan appeal” and allows distinguishing between exceptional players and very good 
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ones.47 Since we expect decreasing marginal returns to the number of all-star appear-
ances we include the squared term of that variable in our estimations too. Moreover, 
left-handed players might be harder to defend, since players are accustomed to defend 
right-handed players during practice and during the majority of the games played. One 
might therefore assume that left-handed players, due to their short supply, earn more 
than their right-handed counterparts.48 Our data set contains twelve left-handed players 
who account for 35 player-year observations. Finally, an individual’s ability to play on a 
certain position is expected to have an influence on his salary, too. We therefore control 
for the five positions point guard (PG), shooting guard (SG), small forward (SF), power 
forward (PF) and center (CE). Due to the short supply of individuals who are able to 
play the center position, we expect centers to be among the highest paid individuals in 
professional basketball. We also control for the different clubs’ financial situation by 
including the natural log of the team wage bill in the estimations. 
 
Table 4-1 displays the descriptive statistics of our sample. Since our sample includes 
only players with a minimum of 15 free throw attempts during crunch-time, we have a 
highly selected population of athletes who are among the highest paid in the league. The 
average salary is about 6.9 million dollars with a median of 5.5 million dollars.49 Indi-
vidual salaries vary from 366,931 dollars that were paid to Udonis Haslem in the 
2003/04 season to 28 million dollars that went to Kevin Garnett during the same cam-
paign.50  
                                                 
47 Superstars have been shown to increase the public interest in a franchise and raise its market value 
considerably (see Hausman and Leonard 1997). 
48 Bryson, Frick and Simmons (2009) show that left-footed soccer players are paid significantly higher 
salaries. 
49 The average salary in our complete (“starting”) sample is slightly below 3 million dollars. Moreover, 
the players in our final sample spend more than 32 minutes per match on the court (compared to 12 
minutes in the whole sample). 
50 To account for possible discontinuous salary history and heterogeneous financial powers of the teams, 
season dummies (SD) as well as team dummies (TD) are included in the regression analysis. 
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Variable  Definition  Mean  Min.  Max. 
LNTP  Natural logarithm of team payroll  17.90  16.97  18.65 
EXP  Experience  5.08  0  17 
EXP²  Experience squared  35.94  0  289 
DN  Draft number  19.27  1  61 
DN²  Draft number squared  716.39  1  3721 
ASG  All‐star game appearances  1.28  0  14 
ASG²  All‐star game appearances squared  7.42  0  196 
MIN  Minutes played in % of maximum minutes possible  60.95  18.36  85.19 
PPG  Points scored per game  15.74  4.2  35.4 
NSP  Non‐scoring performance per game  8.53  3  20 
ONOF  Difference in team performance if player is on court 3.0  ‐9.8  20.2 
LH  Left‐handed player (dummy; left = 1)  0.08  0  1 
PG  Point guard (dummy; yes=1; reference category)  0.27  0  1 
SG  Shooting guard (dummy; yes=1)  0.24  0  1 
SF  Small forward (dummy; yes=1)  0.21  0  1 
PF  Power forward (dummy; yes=1)  0.19  0  1 
CE  Center (dummy; yes=1)  0.10  0  1 
MEST  Relative performance in pressure situation  0.99  0.53  1.64 
Table 4-1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Before presenting our estimation results we want to emphasize that experience and 
mental strength are not correlated. Neither the time a player has managed to survive in 
the NBA – a certainly highly competitive labor market – nor the time per match he is on 
the court have any discernible influence on “performance under pressure”. Thus, mental 
strength seems to be an innate skill and ability rather than a personal characteristic that 
can be improved upon by systematic training. We have in our sample young players 
who perform well under pressure as well as older players who tend to choke under 
stress. These findings confirm sportswriters as well as fans, both usually stating that 
mental toughness is an innate skill, which enables some players to respond to pressure 
situations better than others. 
 
We take this result as the starting point to test our initial hypothesis stating that players, 
who maintain or exceed their performance level during crucial game situations, are paid 
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better than observationally similar players who tend to choke under pressure. To esti-
mate the impact of the aforementioned individual characteristics and performance 
measures on player salaries, we estimate different Mincer-type earnings functions that 
all have the following general form: 
 
ln ݈ܵܽܽݎݕ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߙଵܧܺܲ ൅ ߙଶܧܺܲଶ ൅ ߙଷܦܰ ൅ ߙସܦܰଶ ൅ ߙହܲܲܩ ൅ ߙ଺ܯܫܰ
൅ ߙ଻ܰܵܲ ൅ ߙ଼ܣܵܩ ൅ ߙଽܣܵܩଶ ൅ ߙଵ଴ܮܪ ൅ ߙଵଵܶܲ ൅ ߙଵଶܯܧܵܶ
൅ ߙଵଷܵܦ ൅ ߙଵସTD  ൅ ߝ  
 
We admit that the models based on the equation above may suffer from an endogeneity 
problem, because the direction of causality between the dependent variable (log of an-
nual salary) and our key independent variable (mental strength; MEST) is not com-
pletely clear. It may well be the case that players with higher incomes – who are finan-
cially better endowed with private wealth – are mentally stronger due to an increase in 
self-confidence. In order to test for potential endogeneity we performed a Durbin-Wu-
Hausman test (see Hausman, 1978), which analyzes whether there is sufficient differ-
ence between the coefficients of the instrumental variables regression (2SLS) and those 
of the conventional OLS specification. The Prob >chi2 statistic of our regression model 
(χ2= 14.36, p > .1) clearly demonstrates that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that 
the OLS specification is a consistent unbiased estimator, supporting the assumption that 
an instrumental approach is not necessary. 
 
Estimation results are reported in Tables 4-2 to 4-4 below. We start with our OLS 
model, followed by the random effects estimation and the quantile regressions. Several 
studies of salary determination in professional team sports use quantile regression esti-
mation since log salary measures tend to have even greater kurtosis values than standard 
occupations (Hamilton 1997, Berri and Simmons 2009, Vincent and Eastman, 2009). Of 
course, ordinary least squares is the best linear unbiased estimator provided that the 
error distribution is homoscedastic. Moreover, ordinary least squares parameters tend to 
a normal distribution around true values even if the individual residuals are not nor-
mally distributed. The particular advantage of quantile regression is that it facilitates 
examination of salary returns to characteristics at different points in the salary distri-
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bution (Koenker 2005). Ordinary least square estimates constrain marginal effects of 
covariates to be the same at the mean and elsewhere. But in salary models, and more so 
in sports than in standard labor markets, the average salary is greater than the median 
due to excess kurtosis of the distribution. Marginal effects at the median are not neces-
sarily the same as at the mean or anywhere else in the distribution. The presence of 
player outliers – the “superstars” – may well cause marginal effects of covariates, such 
as mental strength, to differ through the distribution. However, we have no prior on the 
pattern of this variation. It does appear, though, from evidence on some other North 
American sports, that marginal effects of covariates on player salaries do differ in mag-
nitude, sometimes substantially, over the salary distribution (Simmons and Berri 2009, 
Vincent and Eastman 2009).51 
 
The OLS and the RE estimations include three different models with model (1) being as 
close as possible to the ones that have been used in the literature so far. Models (2) and 
(3) differ from model (1) insofar as they both include our measure of mental strength as 
an additional right hand-side variable. The difference between models (2) and (3) is that 
the former uses points per game and non-scoring performance per game as explanatory 
variables while model (3) uses the “on-off” statistic as the main performance measure. 
The reason for replacing the more traditional performance measures by the “on-off” 
metric is twofold: First, individual statistics are not the only possible way to measure a 
players’ contribution to his team’s performance. Comparing the team’s performance 
when a certain player is on the court to the team’s performance when he is off the court 
provides an alternative measure of that player’s efficiency. Second, the different esti-
mations allow us to evaluate the robustness of our findings with respect to our key inde-
pendent variable, mental strength. 
 
Since the data we use is an unbalanced panel it is possible (and necessary) to exploit 
this additional information and account for unobserved player heterogeneity by using 
                                                 
51 Presence of non-normality in the dependent variable is indicated by a large kurtosis value and in our 
case the D’Agostino (1990) test is performed by the sktest command in Stata 10.1. We can investigate 
the impacts of mental strength at any quantile of the salary distribution, not just the conditional mean. 
Moreover, the quantile regression approach is semi-parametric in that it avoids assumptions about the 
parametric distribution of the regression error term, an especially suitable feature where the data are 
heteroskedastic as in our case. 
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the random effects estimation technique. In order to select the most appropriate model 
we performed a Lagrange-Multiplier test (Breusch and Pagan 1980) that analyzes 
whether the null hypothesis that the pooled OLS model would work just as well as the 
random effects model is rejected or not. The Prob > chi2 statistic of our two regression 
models (χ2 = 12.74, p <. 01 (Model 1) and χ2 = 24.24, p < .01 (Model 2)) clearly indi-
cates that unobserved player heterogeneity is present which suggests that applying the 
random effects model is more appropriate than using the pooled OLS.52 Nevertheless, 
the coefficients obtained via OLS and RE are virtually identical suggesting that the bias 
in the OLS-estimation resulting from unobserved heterogeneity may be negligible. 
 
Tables 4-2 and 4-3 reveal that around 70 percent of the variation in player salaries can 
be explained by our set of independent variables. This is surprisingly high, as our sam-
ple includes only players whose performance is above average, i.e. who differ far less in 
their “glamour statistics” than those excluded from the sample. Moreover, with regard 
to the “standard” performance measures our results corroborate the findings that have 
been presented in the literature already: Earnings increase with experience, but at a 
decreasing rate with player incomes reaching their maximum after nine years and 
declining thereafter (Gius and Johnson 1998: 704, Kahn and Sherer 1988: 50, Hamilton 
1997: 292, Hill 2004: 88). The draft number also has the expected influence on player 
salaries53: The earlier a player is picked out of the pool of applicants ready to join the 
NBA, the higher is his income (Gius and Johnson 1998: 704, Wallace 1988: 305, Hill 
2004: 88). This effect, too, declines as the resulting profile exhibits a downward-sloping 
and convex form (Koch and Vander Hill 1988: 88, Prinz 2005: 119).  
                                                 
52 Estimation of a fixed effects model is not possible, as some of the right hand side variables (such as 
draft number and left-handedness) are constant over time. 
53 Moreover, Staw and Hoang (1995) find that the draft number has a statistically significant impact on 
the individuals’ playing time in the NBA. 
57 
 
Variable 
1.1  2.1  3.1 
Coefficients  Coefficients  Coefficients 
LNTP  0.295 (1,54)+  0.299 (1.54)+  0.319 (1.68)* 
EXP  0.348 (14.24)***  0.372 (15.08)***  0.350 (14.33)*** 
EXP²  ‐0.018 (‐9.07)***  ‐0.021 (‐10.47)***  ‐0.018 (‐9.22)*** 
DN  ‐0.024 (‐3.83)***  ‐0.027 (‐4.45)***  ‐0.025 (‐3.98)*** 
DN²  0.000 (1.89)*  0.000 (2.24)**  0.000 (2.06)** 
ASG  0.110 (3.42)***  0.187 (6.36)***  0.112 (3.60)*** 
ASG²  ‐0.008 (‐2.34)**  ‐0.012 (‐3.60)***  ‐0.008 (‐2.73)*** 
MIN  0.000 (0.15)+  0.007 (3.14)***  0.000 (0.18)+ 
PPG  0.028 (4.06)***  ‐‐‐  0.028 (4.08)*** 
NSP  0.034 (2.81)***  ‐‐‐  0.033 (2.81)*** 
ONOF  ‐‐‐  0.007 (1.27)+  ‐‐‐ 
LH  0.220 (2.06)**  0.278 (2.48)**  0.221 (2.08)** 
SG  0.123 (1.65)+  0.127 (1.79)*  0.114 (1.53)+ 
SF  0.075 (0.97)+  0.092 (1.17)+  0.067 (0.87)+ 
PF  0.035 (0.45)+  0.111 (1.47)+  0.026 (0.33)+ 
CE  0.400 (4.12)***  0.436 (4.57)***  0.402 (4.20)*** 
MEST  ‐‐‐  0.456 (2.17)**  0.432 (2.16)** 
Season dummies  Included 
Team dummies  Included 
Const  8.51 (2.41)**  8.21 (2.26)**  7.636 (2.15)** 
R²  0.730  0.718  0.733 
Number of obs  458  458  458 
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 level, + denotes insignificance (z-values in brackets). 
Table 4-2: The Impact of Mental Strength on Player Salaries (OLS-Estimation) 
 
Apart from experience and draft number, the number of all-star appearances is also a 
valid measure of a player’s talent. Entering the linear as well as the squared number of 
all-star appearances in our estimation results in the well-known picture: First, the mar-
ginal returns to all-star appearances are decreasing and, second, the number of all-star 
appearances at which the income maximum is reached (the turning point) is about nine 
– a number that very few players ever reach (Prinz 2005: 119). 
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Variable 
1.2  2.2  3.2 
Coefficients  Coefficients  Coefficients 
LNTP  0.352 (2.02)**  0.371 (2.13)**  0.371 (2.14)** 
EXP  0.372 (11.60)***  0.389 (12.53)***  0.374 (11.63)*** 
EXP²  ‐0.020 (‐7.65)***  ‐0.025 (‐8.72)***  ‐0.020 (‐7.78)*** 
DN  ‐0.030 (‐3.77)***  ‐0.033 (‐4.22)***  ‐0.031 (‐3.91)*** 
DN²  0.000 (1.74)*  0.000 (1.99)**  0.000 (1.87)* 
ASG  0.116 (2.94)***  0.122 (3.25)***  0.122 (3.25)*** 
ASG²  ‐0.007 (‐1.75)*  ‐0.008 (‐2.28)**  ‐0.008 (‐2.28)** 
MIN  0.000 (0.10)+  0.002 (1.15)+  0.000 (0.09)+ 
PPG  0.013 (1.67)*  ‐‐‐  0.012 (1.58)+ 
NSP  0.016 (1.05)+  ‐‐‐  0.017 (1.13)+ 
ONOF  ‐‐‐  0.005 (1.02)+  ‐‐‐ 
LH  0.268 (1.64)+  0.298 (1.77)*  0.274 (1.67)* 
SG  0.126 (1.35)+  0.116 (1.26)+  0.117 (1.23)+ 
SF  0.014 (0.14)+  0.005 (0.05)+  0.002 (0.02)+ 
PF  0.126 (1.23)+  0.142 (1.40)+  0.101 (1.08)+ 
CE  0.377 (3.09)***  0.389 (3.28)***  0.383 (3.20)*** 
MEST  ‐‐‐  0.427 (2.44)**  0.407 (2.33)** 
Season dummies  Included 
Team dummies  Included 
Const  7.80 (2.44)**  7.261 (2.24)**  7.052 (2.19)** 
R²  0.707  0.698  0.710 
Number of obs  458  458  458 
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 level, + denotes insignificance (z-values in brackets). 
Table 4-3: The Impact of Mental Strength on Player Salaries (RE-Estimation) 
 
Perhaps surprisingly, minutes played, points scored per game, non-scoring performance 
and the on-off statistic do not have pronounced effects on player salaries once unob-
served heterogeneity is taken into account. This is certainly due to the fact that we have 
a highly selected population, where the variance in these performance measures is far 
lower than in the total player population.54 
 
                                                 
54 This is again in line with the available literature: Using a large unbalanced panel of NBA players in the 
seasons 1990/91-1999/2000 with 4,072 player-year-observations, Prinz (2005: 125) finds that when 
controlling for other (potential) determinants of individual salaries, few of the measures of scoring and 
non-scoring performance are statistically significant. 
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Variable  0.1 Quantile  0.25 Quantile 0.5 Quantile  0.75 Quantile  0.9 Quantile
LNTP  .5993***  .3280  ** .2621  ** .1815    +  .1680    +
EXP  .4206***  .3966*** .3746*** .2972***  .2536***
EXP²  ‐.0291***  ‐.0208*** ‐.0185*** ‐.0141***  ‐.0125***
DN  ‐.0525***  ‐.0034*** ‐.0200*** ‐.0164***  ‐.0045    +
DN²  .0005***  .0003  ** .0001   + .0001    +  ‐.0000    +
ASG  .1307***  .1373*** .0442    + .0512    +  .0800    *
ASG²  ‐.0034    +  ‐.0115*** ‐.0036    + ‐.0043    +  ‐.0058    +
MIN  .0026    +  .0020    + .0002    + .0018    +  ‐.0031    +
PPG  .0053    +  .0158    * .0252*** .0334***  .0271***
NSP  .0101    +  .0420  ** .0397*** .0258  **  .0311  **
LH  ‐.0060    +  ‐.2048    + .2039  ** .3367***  ‐.2210    *
SG  .0499    +  .1836    * .1382    * .0455    +  .0670    +
SF  .0198    +  .1060    + .1340    * .0967    +  .0941    +
PF  .0388    +  ‐.0160    + .0748    + .0451    +  .0204    +
CE  .1307    +  .3496*** .4379*** .4205***  .3705***
MEST  .2816    +  .7282*** .4389  ** .1547    +  .3352    +
Season dummies  included 
Team dummies  included 
Const  2.892    +  6.783  ** 8.483*** 10.82***  11.29***
Pseudo R²  0.527  0.523  0.490  0.467  0.426 
Number of obs.  458  458  458  458  458 
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 level, + denotes insignificance (z-values in brackets). 
Table 4-4: The Impact of Mental Strength on Player Salaries (Quantile Regression) 
 
Interestingly – and in line with the evidence from the general labor market (see e.g. 
Rueback, Harrington and Moffitt 2007; Denny and O’Sullivan 2007) – we find that left 
handed players earn significantly more than players who shoot the ball with their right 
hand. As only a small fraction of the players is left handed and as these players appear 
to be harder to defend, the short supply of that scarce talent leads to a higher remune-
ration of these particularly “gifted” players. 
 
Of the four position dummies (reference category: point guard) only the coefficient for 
centers turned out to be statistically significant, indicating that centers earn significantly 
more than players at any other position on the court (see e.g. Hamilton 1997: 292, Dey 
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1997: 86).55 This result is in line with Berri et al. (2005), who find that particularly tall 
basketball players earn significantly more than their observationally similar smaller 
counterparts. Finally, the log of the teams’ total wage bill has a significantly positive 
impact on the individual players’ salary, indicating that large market teams share their 
revenues with players and that the players on their rosters benefit to the same extent 
from the rich teams’ “ability to pay” (Wallace 1988: 305). 
 
We now turn to the interpretation of the coefficient that we are most interested in, our 
measure of “mental strength”. It appears from Tables 4-2 and 4-3 above that players 
who are able to maintain their performance from the free throw line in “critical” game 
situations receive a statistically significant and economically sizeable pay premium. An 
increase in mental strength of one standard deviation (i.e. by about 10 percent) causes a 
player’s annual salary to increase by about 40 percent. Thus, mental strength – a perso-
nality trait that we assume to be an innate skill that neither increases with experience 
nor declines as fatigue and exhaustion set in – has a pronounced effect on individual 
salaries. In our data, the p-value for the test statistic of the null hypothesis that kurtosis 
does not depart from the value associated with a normal distribution is 0.000 and hence 
our log salary data depart from normality, a result that is similar to those found in other 
studies of North American sports too (e.g. Berri and Simmons 2009 on NFL and Vin-
cent and Eastman 2009 on NHL). We therefore report quantile regression estimates in 
Table 4-4. We find that the salary premium for mental strength is significant at 5 per 
cent or better only at the 0.25 and the 0.50 quantile. At the median the premium for 
mental strength is again estimated at about 40 percent. Thus, the quantile regression 
results corroborate those from the OLS and the RE estimations. Summarizing, it appears 
that the “median player” enjoys a significant pay rise in case of pronounced mental 
strength while the “marginal players” as well as the “real superstars”56 do not benefit at 
all from that particular ability. 
 
                                                 
55 Throughout, we derive percentage impacts of changes in dummy variable from coefficients as 
exp ( β ) – 1, where β is an estimated coefficient (Halvorsen and Palmquist 1980). 
56 This term has first been used by Alan B. Krueger (2005) who analyzes the revenues generated by 
particularly successful rock bands and musicians. 
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Our finding has a number of practical implications: First, we can think of no justi-
fication to invest additional resources in mental training in professional sports with the 
goal of improving players’ self-confidence. Since the ability to respond to pressure 
(something that is ubiquitous in professional sports) seems to be an innate ability that 
cannot be improved by training and practice and does not increase with experience, the 
clubs’ scouts should try to identify “stress resistant” players when they are still in col-
lege. When successful, this could lead to another “moneyball” story (Lewis 2003). 
 
4.5 Summary and Implications 
In this chapter we have tried to answer the question whether the ability to maintain 
one’s performance level “under pressure”, i.e. in situations that people perceive as 
“stressful” is particularly rewarded by employers. Due to the deficits of the available 
data sets we use an unbalanced panel of players from a particular team sports industry, 
the NBA. Although this precludes generalization of our findings to the “real world”, we 
are able to measure the distribution of mental toughness in the population under study. 
Moreover, we identify the impact of mental strength – the ability to perform well from 
the free throw line during “crunch-time” – on player salaries. Athletes whose 
performance “when it really counts” is one standard deviation above the mean of the 
sample are paid about 40 percent more than their observationally similar teammates. 
 
Moreover, we find that the ability to maintain one’s performance level is an innate skill 
that can hardly be improved by training and practice. Experienced players do not per-
form significantly better under pressure and tired players do not perform worse. Thus, 
the ability to avoid “choking under pressure” is a valuable and scarce resource that is in 
particularly short supply. 
 
Since this chapter is the first to identify the impact of mental toughness on individual 
salaries, additional research is urgently required to either document or question the 
robustness of our results. First natural candidates are certainly other team sports indus-
tries like soccer or hockey as the players here very often experience similar feelings of 
pressure when taking penalty kicks to finally decide a match. 
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5 Productivity in Friendly and Hostile Environments: Empirical Evi-
dence from the National Basketball Association. 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Recent studies have shown that the presence of spectators influences the aggressive 
stance as well as the performance of individuals, as shown by Charness, Rigotti and 
Rustichini (2007) and Dohmen (2008b), respectively. In order to categorize the impact 
of the audience on performance, social psychologists distinguish between the “social 
support hypothesis” and the “social pressure hypothesis”. The social support hypothesis 
claims that performance of an individual increases once he is surrounded by spectators. 
The social pressure hypothesis however alleges the opposite, stating that individuals 
performance declines due to spectators expectations. Past research neglected the impact 
of changing audiences on the individual performance due to a change of group member-
ship. Professional sports appear to be a fitting natural experiment as players change 
teams within the league between seasons and face a new home crowd after a team 
switch. 
 
In the present chapter I analyze the impact of the crowd on the free throw shooting per-
formance by professional players from the National Basketball Association, by distin-
guishing between performance in front of the home crowd and performance during 
away games. The longitudinal character of the data set enables me to analyze the influ-
ence of a change of the team between seasons on the individual players. After changing 
teams a player has to play in front of a new home audience during the new season which 
might have an impact on performance. Hence I distinguish between players who 
remained with their team, players who signed as free agents for new teams and players 
who were traded during the offseason. The main difference between being traded or 
signing as a free agent is the choice of a player on his new team: Players who get traded 
usually do not have a say on the team they get traded to, while free agents can sign with 
the team of their choice.57 Results suggest that for away games, the performance is inde-
                                                 
57 Devean George, former player of the Dallas Mavericks, is one of very few players with a right to veto a 
trade embedded in his contract. He used this right to inhibit being traded to the New Jersey Nets in 
February of 2008. 
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pendent of a possible team change in between seasons by a player, which is not sur-
prising since away games are virtually the same. Playing schedules are nearly the same 
for every team, so a player still has to play away games against practically the same 
teams as before. Data for home games reveals that players who get traded to a new 
team, compared to players who stay with their team, maintain their performance level 
from the free throw line. In contrast, players who sign with a new team exhibit a signifi-
cantly lower performance level during home games. I conclude that only players who 
are able to select a new team worsen their performance due to social pressure expe-
rienced at home games, as their performance during away games is unaffected. 
 
5.2 Literature 
With this research I add a natural experiment to the literature concerning the impact of 
spectators on sports performance for both, individual and team sports. For Olympics 
Games, a home advantage has been found for Winter Olympics as well as Summer 
Olympics. Overall, Balmer, Nevill and Williams (2001) report a statistical significant 
higher winning percentage for contestants from the host country during Winter Olym-
pics between 1908 and 1998. By examining the different events in greater detail, the 
authors illustrate that while some sports such as figure skating and alpine skiing provide 
evidence of home advantage, others like bobsled and biathlon do not. In their related 
work, Balmer, Nevill and Williams (2003) also analyze the home advantage for the 
Summer Olympics from 1896-1986. They group sports according to the impact that 
judges have on the outcome of the event. As one of their main results, the authors state 
that a highly significant home advantage can be found for events where performance 
was predominantly judged subjectively. 
 
For professional team sports in the United States, studies coincidently report a home 
advantage, leading to more home wins than away wins under “balanced home and away 
schedule”, equivalent to an identical number of home and away matchups between two 
teams. In their works concerning the home advantage in all major leagues in the United 
States as well as in four levels of professional soccer in England, Pollard and Pollard 
(2005) show that the winning percentage for home teams in the National Basketball 
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Association for the relevant time period of the present data set was around 60 percent.58 
Comparing this with the numbers the authors provide for the other major league sports, 
one can see that it is the highest percentage. Major League Baseball reports a winning 
percentage of home teams of around 54 percent, while the National Hockey League and 
the National Football League display average home winning percentages of 55 percent 
and 59 percentage, respectively.59 
 
These studies display the influence of the audience on regular season games, but espe-
cially in decisive playoff games the atmosphere might impact the outcome of a game 
even stronger: Baumeister and Steinhilber (1984) present a work concerning the per-
formance of home teams in decisive games in professional sports. Looking at data from 
the National Football League as well as the National Basketball Association, they find 
that home teams win early playoff games rather than decisive ones. Related to the 
present chapter they find that players from the home team rather choke shooting free 
throws, as the performance from the free throw stripe declines. Using updated infor-
mation a decade later, Schlenker, Philipps, Boniecki and Schlenker (1995b) find chok-
ing by home teams to be ceased for their more comprehensive data.60 In their opinion 
chocking is rather associated with the anticipation of failure than the distraction of 
potential success, as they go in line with Baumeister and Steinhilber (1984). 
 
Given these results for team performance, the question arises what personality traits 
lead to individual excelling or choking in pressure situations. Heaton and Sigall (1991) 
analyze which personality type is most prone to be influenced by pressure situations. 
Performing a laboratory experiment which includes performing a psychomotor task in 
front of a supportive and non supportive audiences, they find that individuals low in 
self-consciousness perform relatively well when they are expected to please the 
audience. On the other hand they choke, when there is a high chance that the audience 
was disappointed by the outcome. The influence of self-consciousness on performance 
under pressure was earlier explored by Baumeister (1984), who finds that self-conscious 
                                                 
58 For more detailed results on the emergence of home court advantage in the National Basketball Asso-
ciation see Jones (2007) and Jones (2008). 
59 For a review and further evidence of home advantage in team sports see Nevill and Holder (1999). 
60 For a review on why supportive audience might have a positive or negative impact on performance, see 
Butler and Baumeister (1998). 
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persons are more susceptible to choking, while Brockner (1979) shows the opposite as 
he observes a positive significant correlation between self-consciousness and perfor-
mance under pressure. 
 
The influence of pressure on free throw shooting in basketball has been illustrated in 
several studies. Dandy, Brewer and Tottman (2001) show that Australian basketball 
players performed significantly worse in games than during practice which might indi-
cate influence of the audience on the performance. Leith (1998) had some basketball 
players talking within the team about choking in pressure situations before the compe-
tition while others did not. It turned out that groups that did not discuss choking per-
formed significantly better than groups that did. In a related study, Wang, Marchant, 
Morris and Gibbs (2004) let individuals perform repeated free throw shooting tasks, 
first without pressure and later with methods adding pressure on them. This resulted in 
reduced performance in pressure situation while it displays that high self-conscious 
persons were more likely to choke under pressure. For the National Basketball Asso-
ciation Deutscher, Frick and Prinz (2009) show that players receive an additional mon-
etary reward if they are able to perform relatively well from the free throw line during 
pressure situations. These pressure situations are defined as being during the last five 
minutes of a game when neither team is ahead by more than five points. 
 
Players are not the only individuals in professional sports whose performance is influ-
enced by social pressure, as many studies illustrate the influence of the spectators on 
individuals’ decision making. Garicano, Palacious-Huerta and Prendergast (2005) find 
proof for social pressure on behavior of individuals. Using a data set from professional 
soccer in Spain they show that referees lengthen the amount of stoppage time in close 
games when the home team is behind, while they shorten the time in close games when 
the home team is leading, supporting the thesis that social pressure indeed impacts indi-
viduals’ behavior.61 Similar results are presented by Sutter and Kocher (2004) as they 
analyze a data set from the German Bundesliga from the 2000/2001 season. They find 
that referees award more extra time at the end of the match when the home team is be-
                                                 
61 The problem with refereeing decisions is based on the circumstance that they result from subjective 
judgment (See Dawson, Dobson, Goddard and Wilson (2007) and Boyko, Boyko and Boyko (2007)). 
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hind. In addition there is a bias in favor of home teams in regard to the number of pe-
nalties being awarded. Dohmen (2005) comes to a very similar finding, also for the 
German Bundesliga for the seasons 1992/1993 to 2003/2004. He emphasizes a stronger 
bias toward the home team when the crowd largely consists of home team supporters. 
Scoppa (2008) also reports similar results for two seasons in Italy’s Serie A.62 As a 
main finding he reports injury time being rewarded if the home team is losing and a 
greater bias towards the home team if there is no running track between the field and the 
stance. Also working with data from Italian professional soccer, Pettersson-Lidbom and 
Priks (2009) compare the decision making by referees when games are played in an 
empty stadium to the situation when games are played in front of spectators, as some 
teams were punished to play in empty stadiums due to hooligan violence. The authors 
find that referees punish away players less harshly in these games compared to when 
spectators are attending. The authors show that teams play with the same level of inten-
sity in front of spectators compared to games in empty stadiums and conclude that 
social pressure rather affects referees than players. In an earlier study concerning the 
influence of the crowd on referees Nevill, Balmer and Williams (2002) confront refe-
rees with video tapes of game situations from a Premier League game. Results show 
more favorable calls for the home team with crowd noise audible than when watching 
the videos in silent. Once more, this underlines the thesis that referees are indeed influ-
enced by the atmosphere in the arena. 
 
Furthermore, next to studies concerning sports, experimental research on the impact of 
group membership on decision making of individuals has also been done in the recent 
past. Eckel and Grossman (2005) show in their work how team identification impacts 
the willingness to cooperate. This in turn leads to a higher team output in their setting. 
In a related work by Charness, Rigotti and Rustichini (2007) individuals increase their 
aggressive stance if they have members of their group in the audience. In the Battle of 
the Sexes game this leads to more coordination, while in the Prisoner’s Dilemma it 
leads to less cooperation. Supporting the assumption that social pressure might impact 
productivity, Mas and Moretti (2009) reveal in their empirical work that social pressure 
can partially internalize problems of free-riding when considering team outputs. 
                                                 
62 For a recent empirical work on the referee bias toward home teams in European cup football see 
Dawson and Dobson (2009). 
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Observing performance of workers at a large supermarket chain, they find that replacing 
a worker with a below average permanent productivity with a worker who shows above 
average permanent productivity eventually increases the effort of the other workers in 
that same working shift. 
 
Summarizing, the abovementioned literature analyzes the impact of audience on indi-
viduals’ performance, providing support for both, the social support hypothesis as well 
as the social pressure hypothesis. As performance improvement as well as performance 
decline in front of a supportive audience has been shown by these studies, this present 
chapter adds to the aforementioned literature by presenting a large database to measure 
performance in front of changing audiences. In particular, the free throw shooting per-
formance in the National Basketball Association is the main subject of this work as I 
analyze the impact of changing teams between two seasons. The chapter is organized as 
follows: The next section presents the data set used for the research. While section three 
provides the empirical results which display the impact of a change of teams on players’ 
performance, section four concludes. 
 
5.3 Data 
To measure the impact of the crowd on players’ performance from the free throw line, I 
analyze a data set from the National Basketball Association. It reports the outcomes of 
all 584,396 free throw attempts during regular season games between the 1997/1998 
season and the 2006/2007 season on an individual player basis and differentiates 
between the performance during home games and away games. Studies concerning team 
sports usually pose the problem of interaction, where success of one side is also 
depending on the effort of the other side. Contrary, free throw shooting in basketball 
provides a rare situation in sports, where success of the performing player is indepen-
dent of opponents’ or teammates’ actions. The fact that the average attendance in arenas 
is relatively constant throughout the league displays another advantage over other lea-
gues since players might be influenced by the size of the attending crowd. For the given 
period, average home attendance in the National Basketball Association was 17,123, 
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while 80 percent of the average home attendance was between 14,369 and 19,954. For 
an illustration of the average home attendance during the relevant period see Figure 5-1. 
 
 
Figure 5-1: Average Home Attendance in the NBA between 1997/1998 and 2006/2007 
 
Furthermore, the distance between the crowd and the players is virtually the same in 
every NBA arena, which is an additional advantage compared to games like soccer. 
Distinguishing between skill based performance and effort based performance, I classify 
basketball free throw shots to belong to the first category. The motion sequence of 
shooting free throws becomes increasingly automatic and less conscious due to repe-
tition during practice. I consider the shooting procedure as skill based performance 
which is largely controlled by procedures outside of the working memory.63 Baumeister 
(1984) notes, that skill based performance is rather influenced by pressure than effort-
based performance. In addition to that, Muraven, Tice and Baumeister (1998) state that 
skill based performance is rather not as much subject to cognitive or physical fatigue as 
effort based performance. These two remarks clearly support the free throw shot as a 
                                                 
63 See Anderson (1993). 
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feasible test subject, as it is a skill based performance which allows us to neglect the 
playing time of the individual player. 
 
Analyzing the data set, I set a minimum of 10 free throw attempts for both home and 
away games. By doing so, I minimize the number of players who exhibit a perfect suc-
cess rate due to the low number of attempts.64 Hereby, the number of players is 630, 
while the data set totals in 2,675 player-year-observations and 502,317 free throw 
attempts, including 257,144 attempts for home teams and 245,173 for away teams. Data 
concerning the free throw performance has been taken from the league’s official website 
at http://www.nba.com and http://www.basketball-reference.com. Data concerning the 
players’ salary was obtained from Patricia Bender’s webpage at 
http://www.eskimo.com/~pbender/. Information on the average home and away atten-
dance in the NBA has been taken from the website of the Entertainment and Sports Pro-
gramming Network at http://www.sports.espn.go.com/nba/attendance. 
 
To measure the impact of the audience on free throw performance, I distinguish 
between free throw shooting percentages during home games and free throw shooting 
percentages during away games which allows estimating the influence of the crowd on 
the players’ performance. The two dependent variables that I analyze in the following 
are the free throw percentages in a given season T, both during home games (denoted 
as: FT (T) Home) and during away games (denoted as: FT (T) Away). Since signing 
with a new team apparently is not the only explanatory variable for performance from 
the free throw line, I also include a number of other variables in the following regres-
sion analyses. Table 5-1 shows the descriptive statistics for the dependent as well as the 
independent variables used in the following estimations. 
  
                                                 
64 Out of 2,675 player-year observations, only five players show a perfect success rate during home 
games, while four did not miss a single free throw during away games. 
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Variable  Operationalization  Mean  Min.  Max.
FT (T) Home  Free throw perc. at home games current season  0.74  0.22  1 
FT (T) Away  Free throw perc. at away games current season  0.74  0.14  1 
FT (T‐1) Home  Free throw perc. at home games previous season  0.74  0.21  1 
FT (T‐1) Away  Free throw perc. at away games previous season  0.74  0.21  1 
Exp  Experience  5.68  1  19 
Exp²  Squared experience  45.8  1  361 
Attempts Home  Change of free throw attempts at home  1.18  0.04  14.2 
Attempts Away  Change of free throw attempts at away  1.15  0.05  10.3 
ln Salary  Natural logarithm of players salary  15.0  9.46  17.2 
Stayer  Player remained with his old team  0.74  0  1 
Trade  Player got traded before the season  0.12  0  1 
Free Agent  Player signed with a new team before the season  0.14  0  1 
Table 5-1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
As the free throw routine is a task a player has to perform throughout his amateur and 
professional career, the free throw percentage of a particular player from the previous 
season should be a decent indicator to estimate his ability. Hereby, I distinguish 
between the previous season free throw percentages during home games (denoted as: FT 
(T-1) Home) and during away games (denoted as: FT (T-1) Away). As players’ expe-
rience might also impact his performance and his response to social pressure, the expe-
rience is also included in the following regression analyses (denoted as: Exp). It is 
measured in years as a professional player in the National Basketball Association. As I 
also take the performance from the previous season T-1 into account, the minimum 
experience of the players included in the data set is one year. Since one might expect 
decreasing marginal returns to experience, the squared experience is included as well 
(denoted as: Exp²). As the number of free throw attempts sometimes differs dramati-
cally between two seasons, the players’ performance might be subject to change due to 
a higher or lower number of attempted free throws and resulting in higher or lower 
recent experience in this particular game situation. I therefore account for an increase or 
decrease in attempts between the most recent season T and the previous season T-1 by 
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dividing the number of attempts in season T by the number of attempts in season T-1.65 
Once more, I differentiate between the change in attempts during home games (denoted 
as: Attempts Home) and away games (denoted as: Attempts Away).66 As players’ salary 
might also impact the pressure put upon a player it is also included as an independent 
variable. Since Figure 5-2 clearly shows a right-skewed distribution of players’ salary, 
the natural logarithm of the salary is included in the following analyses (denoted as: ln 
Salary). 
 
 
Figure 5-2: Kernel Density Estimation of the Salary in the NBA 
 
Since the aim of this chapter is to measure the effect of playing for a new team on the 
players’ performance, I distinguish between three different situations a player might 
                                                 
65 If the number of free throw attempts is the same in T as in T-1, the variable has a value of one. Due to 
the lockout in 1998/1999, the number of regular season games was reduced from 82 to 50 in this 
particular season. I weigh the number of free throws attempted and free throws made for this 
particular season by the factor 1.64. 
66 The apparently low numbers of 0.04 and 0.05 result from Orlando’s Grant Hills’ injury during the 
2000/2001 season and the resulting decline of attempts in that particular year. The maximum values 
display the vast increment of Gerald Wallaces’ playing time after being picked by Charlotte during the 
expansion draft in 2004 and the return of Miami’s Alonzo Mourning in 2001/2002 after an injury 
during the previous season. 
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face in season T. The first and most common situation is that a player still plays for the 
team he has already played for it in the previous season T-1. 74 percent of the players in 
the data set remained with their teams (denoted as: Stayer). The second situation, 
switching teams between season T-1 and season T, can be subdivided into two possible 
events: A player either gets traded by his former team to another team (denoted as: 
Trade) or he signs with the team of his choice as a free agent (denoted as: Free Agent). 
Since also the contract of a player gets traded between season T-1 and T, any player 
who is traded at least has to have a valid contract for season T and does not have a 
choice on the team he gets traded to. A player who signs as a free agent does not have a 
running contract for season T and is free to sign with a team of his choice after season 
T-1. In the present data set, 12 percent of the players are traded between seasons, while 
14 percent of the players sign as free agents with a new team. A player who has signed 
as a free agent with his old team is also denoted as being a Stayer, since the home crowd 
he is playing in front of is the same in season T as it has been in season T-1. 
 
5.4 Empirical Results 
The main purpose of this section is to determine what impacts the players’ performance 
from the free throw line during home and away games. I particularly want to determine 
the impact of the audience on the performance as some players change teams between 
two seasons while others do not. The data set shows that 184,856 out of 245,173 
attempted free throw during away games were successful, which equals a success rate of 
75.40 percent. During home games, 194,736 of 257,144 free throws attempts were 
made, equivalent to a success rate of 75.73 percent. Applying a simple t-test while 
controlling for the number of attempts by the players, this difference proves to be insig-
nificant (t=0.1657+). While cumulated performance shows that players on average hit 
three out of four free throws, individual performances range between a 26.2 and 98.8 
percent success rate. Kernel density estimations for players’ free throw percentages are 
shown in Figure 5-3, again distinguishing between free throw success during home and 
free throw success during away games and supporting the finding that individual 
performance indeed differs between players. 
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Figure 5-3: Kernel Density Estimation of Free Throw Success during Home and Away Games 
 
Even though it might be seen as a bit disappointing that performance appears to be 
independent of playing at home or away, I go on by running four regression analyses on 
individual player basis to estimate the impact of the variables introduced in the previous 
section on free throw success during home and away games in season T, which are the 
dependent variables. I suggest the two equations to look as follows: 
 
FT ሺTሻ Home ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߙଵܨܶ ሺܶ െ 1ሻ ܪ݋݉݁ ൅ ߙଶܣݐݐ݁݉݌ݐݏ ሺܪ݋݉݁ሻ ൅ ߙଷܧݔ݌
൅ ߙସܧݔ݌ ² ൅ ߙହ ln  ݈ܵܽܽݎݕ ൅ ߙ଺ܵݐܽݕ݁ݎ ൅ ߙ଻ܶݎܽ݀݁ ൅ ߙ଼ܨݎ݁݁ ܣ݃݁݊ݐ
൅ ߝ  
 
FT ሺTሻ Away ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߙଵܨܶ ሺܶ െ 1ሻ ܣݓܽݕ ൅ ߙଶܣݐݐ݁݉݌ݐݏ ሺܣݓܽݕሻ ൅ ߙଷܧݔ݌
൅ ߙସܧݔ݌ ² ൅ ߙହ ln  ݈ܵܽܽݎݕ ൅ ߙ଺ܵݐܽݕ݁ݎ ൅ ߙ଻ܶݎܽ݀݁ ൅ ߙ଼ܨݎ݁݁ ܣ݃݁݊ݐ
൅ ߝ 
 
Due to the panel characteristics of the data it is possible to account for some unobserved 
player specific characteristics via the random effects estimation technique. Hence, next 
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to the conventional OLS specification two random effects models are run.67 Estimations 
of both models are reported in Table 5-2, where the results of the regression analyses 
are shown for home games (Model 1) and away games (Model 2).68 
 
   Home (Model 1)  Away (Model 2) 
   Coefficients  Coefficients 
Variable  OLS  RE  OLS  RE 
FT (T‐1)  0.679 (45.10)***  0.442 (24.23)*** 0.653 (41.82)***  0.424 (22.95)*** 
Attempts  0.010 (5.74)***  0.009 (5.61)***  0.014 (7.16)***  0.013 (6.71)*** 
Exp  0.000 (0.48)+  0.000 (1.25)+  0.000 (0.52)+  0.000 (1.27)+ 
Exp²  ‐0.000 (‐0.14)+  ‐0.000 (‐0.76)+  ‐0.000 (‐0.25)+  ‐0.000 (‐0.92)+ 
ln Salary  ‐0.001 (‐0.47)+  ‐0.001 (‐0.29)+  0.002 (0.89)+  0.002 (0.76)+ 
Trade  ‐0.005 (‐0.88)+  ‐0.004 (‐0.81)+  ‐0.006 (‐1.21)+  ‐0.008 (‐1.49)+ 
Free Agent  ‐0.017 (‐3.11)***  ‐0.017 (‐3.32)*** ‐0.004 (‐0.75)+  ‐0.005 (‐0.93)+ 
Adj R²  0.439  0.438  0.406  0.405 
Observations  2675  2675  2675  2675 
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 level, + denotes insignificance. 
Table 5-2: Determinants of Free Throw Shooting Success in the NBA 
 
Already introduced in the previous section, the main concern of this work is the impact 
of the audience on the performance of the players. Observing the results from the 
regression analyses, the performance from the free throw line during the previous sea-
son T-1, separately reported for home and away games, has a highly significant positive 
impact on the performance during the most recent season T. This is not very surprising, 
since the free throw shot is a standardized situation, practiced at a high volume. Hence, 
the assumption that prior performance is a good indicator for the ability to shoot free 
                                                 
67 Even though the Hausman-test suggests performing a fixed effects model, I prefer to present the 
random effects model, as robustness checks support the results presented in Table 5-2. Furthermore, 
fixed effects results are not very convincing, as they suggest no significant impact of the free throw 
performance from the previous season on the most recent performance. This appears to be odd, since 
the correlation between FT (T-1) Home and FT (T) is 0.6574 for home games and 0.6276 for away 
games, respectively. Furthermore, applying fixed effects models for Model 1 and Model 2 does not 
impact the significant levels of the Free Agent variables. 
68 As Wallace, Baumeister and Vohs (2005) note, not all audiences show the same type of support for 
players and hence some home audiences might put more pressure on players than others. Including 
data on average home and away attendance does not impact the significance level of any other 
variable. Including team dummies to control for the intenseness of the atmosphere in the different 
arenas does not affect them either. 
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throws is supported by the regression analyses. Likewise, the change of free throw 
attempts during home and away games in season T compared to season T-1 has a sig-
nificantly positive impact, meaning that shooting more free throws increases the success 
rate of a player. While these variables, depicting recent experience during games have a 
positive impact on the shooting percentage, experience measured as seasons in the 
NBA, does not.69 A possible explanation for this is the fact that players have already 
faced pressure situations during their basketball career prior to playing in the NBA, as 
college games as well as games in Europe attract a similar number of spectators.70 Since 
the players’ income might put additional pressure on him, the natural logarithm of the 
salary is included as a control variable in the analyses, showing that it has no impact on 
the performance. 
 
To answer the main research question of this chapter one has to look at the key inde-
pendent variables, denoting the change of teams between season T-1 and season T. For 
the regression analyses, the players who remain with their teams (denoted as: stayers) 
serve as the reference group. Compared to those, neither players who were traded nor 
players who sign as free agents with a new team perform significantly different during 
away games. This does not surprise, since away games are basically the same as in the 
previous season, except for those for the old and the new team. On the other hand, the 
free throw shooting performance during home games is clearly influenced by the change 
of teams during the offseason. Compared to the players who stay with their team, play-
ers who are traded to a new team do not show a significantly different performance. 
This result can be justified by the fact that players commonly do not have a say on the 
team that they are traded to, which consequently does not create additional pressure on 
them. Taking a look at players who signed as free agents before the start of the new sea-
son, the results show that those perform significantly worse during home games com-
pared to players who stayed with their old team. As a main result of this chapter, I con-
clude that social pressure, generated by selecting a new supporting audience due to 
signing with the team as a free agent, leads to a reduction in performance. 
                                                 
69 Running the regression analyses without the variable Attempts does not change the significance level of 
any other variable. 
70 This result goes in line with a finding in the previous chapter. In chapter four we show that experience 
does not increase players’ ability to remain their performance level during crucial game situations. 
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Furthermore, one might be interested whose performance suffers most under social 
pressure, targeting the question if rather good or bad free throw shooters are influenced 
by a changing home audience. Several laboratory experiments analyze the impact of 
distraction on performance by novices and experienced players in sports. These appear 
to be comparable to the quantile regressions in this chapter, as they analyze how indi-
viduals of different skill levels respond to pressure situations. They coincidently find 
that distraction from a main task hurts performance of novices more than it hurts per-
formance by experts. Leavitt (1979) was the first to support this hypothesis by demon-
strating how speed skating by novices, while stick handling through pylons, was signifi-
cantly slowed down under dual-task condition, while this result does not hold for 
experts. Studies by Beilock, Carr, MacMahon and Starkes (2002) and Gray (2004) sup-
port this finding as they study the performance on soccer dribbling and baseball batting, 
respectively. Coincidently, they find experts to be significantly less prone to distraction 
than novices. 
 
As the present data set only includes professionals one can distinguish between different 
levels of free throw shooting within the cohort. Performing quantile regressions for 
home and away free throw performances serves as a decent tool to answer the question 
if rather good or rather bad shooters suffer from playing for a new team. Results are 
presented in Table 5-3 for home games and in Table 5-4 for away games. One can see 
that the results for the quantile regressions (.10, .25, .50, .75, .90 quantile) are pretty 
similar to the OLS and random effects results presented in Table 5-2 for most variables. 
Bearing in mind that players who signed as free agents prior to the season perform 
significantly worse during home games one might be interested if rather good or rather 
bad free throw shooters at home games are affected by playing in front of a new home 
audience. Table 5-3 illustrated that only comparably bad shooters, belonging to the .1, 
.25 or .5 percentile, are affected negatively by the new audience, as the performance of 
players belonging to the .75 and .9 percentile remains unchanged. Performance during 
away games is again independent of changing teams between seasons.  
77 
 
Variable  .1 Quantile  .25 Quantile  .5 Quantile  .75 Quantile  .9 Quantile 
FT (T‐1)  .8414***  .7971*** .7118*** .6020***  .4298***
Attempts  .0121***  .0128*** .0102*** .0049***  .0002    +
Exp  ‐.0042    +  ‐.0029    + ‐.0003    + .0026    +  .0048    *
Exp²  .0002    +  .0002    + .0000    + ‐.0001    +  ‐.0002    +
ln Salary  .0158***  .0065*** ‐.0010    + ‐.0043  **  ‐.0123***
Trade  ‐.0198    +  ‐.0068    + .0008    + ‐.0004    +  ‐.0048    +
Free Agent  ‐.0287  **  ‐.0240*** ‐.0116  ** ‐.0064    +  ‐.0045    +
Pseudo R²  .3146  .3052  .2644  .2150  .1689 
N of Cases  72675  2675  2675  2675  2675 
Raw Sum of Dev.  127.7  210.7  234.9  168.0  85.6 
Min Sum of Dev.  87.5  146.4  172.8  131.8  71.1 
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 level, + denotes insignificance. 
Table 5-3: Quantile Regression of Free Throw Success during Home Games (Model 1) 
 
Variable  .1 Quantile  .25 Quantile  .5 Quantile  .75 Quantile  .9 Quantile 
FT (T‐1)  .7974***  .7727*** .6665*** .5766***  .4603***
Attempts  .0193***  .0143*** .0118*** .0082***  .0026    +
Exp  ‐.0021    +  ‐.0013    + .0008    + .0029    +  .0040    +
Exp²  .0000    +  .0000    + ‐.0000    + ‐.0001    +  ‐.0001    +
ln Salary  .0208***  .0082*** .0037    + ‐.0076***  ‐.0129***
Trade  ‐.0143    +  ‐.0140  ** ‐.0016    + ‐.0143    +  ‐.0095    +
Free Agent  ‐.0120    +  ‐.0078    + .0074    + ‐.0040    +  ‐.0067    +
Pseudo R²  .2841  .2736  .2357  .2011  .1663 
N of Cases  2675  2675  2675  2675  2675 
Raw Sum of Dev.  129.4  211.4  232.9  166.4  84.8 
Min Sum of Dev.  92.6  153.4  178.0  132.9  70.7 
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 level, + denotes insignificance. 
Table 5-4: Quantile Regression of Free Throw Success during Away Games (Model 2)  
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5.5 Conclusion and Future Research 
This chapter presents an empirical work about the effect of performing in front of 
supportive audiences, focusing on the effect of changing teams and supportive 
audiences between two seasons. Observing data of free throw shooting in the National 
Basketball Association, the outcome is contrary to studies which are based on outcomes 
of interaction, as I do not find reduced performance in away games on an aggregated 
level. Due to the panel characteristic, the data provides the possibility to test how 
individuals respond to changing audiences. The key result presented in this chapter 
shows that players who changed teams after free agency suffer decline of performance 
at home games compared to those who stay with their old team or are traded. Therefore, 
I conclude that the possibility to select the team to play for by oneself has a negative 
impact on the performance during home games as players feel additional pressure 
during the following season. By performing quantile regression it has been shown that 
especially bad free throw shooters suffer from facing this additional pressure, while 
good free throw shooters performance does not decline after signing as a free agent with 
a new team. 
 
Future research might take a look at the impact of trading a player within the season. 
Players are allowed to be traded from one team to another up until the end of February, 
so one might want to analyze the impact of changing teams within the season. Since 
decent players rarely sign within the season, the control group would be players who 
were not traded within the season. Further future research might subdivide the stayers 
into two groups: Players with a running contract and players who resigned as free 
agents with their old team. There might be problems with the implementation, since 
players sometimes sign extensions of the contract long before the old contract runs out. 
Still, this data might provide further insights on the impact of the audience on players. 
Another future research question could go in line with Baumeister and Steinhilber 
(1984) and Schlenker, Philipps, Boniecki and Schlenker (1995) to analyze if free throw 
performance of players from the home team suffers in decisive playoff games if they 
joined the team as free agents prior to the season. Especially, since the results from the 
aforementioned papers contradict, this research would shed more light on the individual 
impact of social pressure on individuals. 
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6 Cut-off Dates and Their Effect on Player Selection, Salaries and 
Hazard Rates in the German Bundesliga 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The implementation of cut-off dates is said to have a severe impact on the personal 
development of the affected individuals. Grouping children according to the date of 
their birth leads to a high difference in relative age between the oldest and the youngest 
of the relevant cohort. The relative age difference between a child who just turned six 
years old and another who is close to his seventh birthday is around 15 percent. In Ger-
man soccer the cut-off date is 1st of August for all youth leagues. One possible effect of 
introducing a cut-off date is a selection bias, favoring children born shortly after this 
cut-off date as they have a physical advantage over the children born afterwards, who 
are nevertheless put into the same age cohort. Once these children reach the age which 
enables them to become professionals, this in turn would lead to an overrepresentation 
of German players in the Bundesliga who were born shortly after the cut-off date. 
Furthermore, as previous studies show, players who were among the youngest in their 
cohort and still managed to make it to the professional level earn a wage premium. This 
might be seen as a surprise, as the market for soccer players should only take perfor-
mance into account which is relevant for the output of players and this would certainly 
not include the players’ birth date. In addition, market efficiency would not lead to dif-
ferent hazard rates for different birth dates if players’ performance is indeed indepen-
dent of birth dates. This article tries to shed light on aforementioned possible impacts of 
cut-off dates on player selection and player salary in the German Bundesliga. It goes in 
line with a big body of literature, which analyzes the effect of cut-off dates and the rela-
tive age effect in education and sports. 
 
In regard to education, research results are ambiguous. Jinks (1964) is among the first to 
find evidence for a better school performance of children who are born within the first 
six months of the school year, compared to peers who are born in the second half of the 
school year. Closely related, Pidgeon (1965) points out that while children born in the 
later month of the school year score higher points in intelligence tests, they later per-
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form comparatively badly due to their disadvantageous date of birth. In a study covering 
a wide range of countries, Bedard and Dhuey (2006) analyze long-run effects of cut-off 
dates. They find a persistence of better school performance by children who belong to 
the oldest of their cohort for the course of their school career. In a recent study, Billardi 
and Pellizzari (2008) find contrary results for students at an Italian university, as they 
show that the younger students of a cohort perform better than their older counter-
parts.71 
 
Angrist and Krueger (1991) were the first to study the impact of cut-off dates on the end 
of school careers at compulsory schooling. They argue that children born shortly after 
the cut-off date start school at an older age and hence are allowed to drop out after less 
school years than their younger counterparts. Plug (2001) finds that this leads to an 
increase in the probability of receiving a university degree by 12 to 16 percent for child-
ren who are born shortly after the cut-off date and hence are the oldest in their cohort. 
 
With regard to professional sports, Barnsley, Thompson and Barnsley (1985) were the 
first to discover the relative age effect, as they observed that a disproportionally high 
number of hockey players in Canada were born in the first three months after the cut-off 
date.72 In a more recent study by Baker and Logan (2007), the authors show that the 
relative age plays a role at the annual NHL draft. Furthermore, Barnsley, Thompson and 
Legault (1992) find additional evidence of the relative age effect analyzing the rosters 
of national teams in the 1990 soccer world cup as well as two soccer youth world tour-
naments. In a related work, Helsen, Van Winckel and Williams (2005) examine the rel-
ative age effect for a number of European national youth teams playing at international 
tournaments. Analyzing a total of more than 2000 players, they find a highly significant 
effect for nearly all teams, resulting in an overrepresentation of players who were born 
shortly after the cut-off date. Musch and Hay (1999) find cross-cultural evidence for a 
selection bias of players’ born shortly after the cut-off date as they analyze data from 
professional soccer leagues located on different continents. In addition, they observe a 
                                                 
71 See Fertig and Kluve (2005), Puhani and Weber (2007) and Puhani and Mühlenweg (2010) for analyses 
of educational outcomes from Germany. 
72 See Boucher and Mutimer (1994) for a review of the early literature regarding the impact of cut-off 
date in professional sports. 
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shifted peak in the distribution of the birthdays of Australian players once the cut-off 
date changed. Verhulst (1992) observes cross-country data on professional soccer play-
ers in Europe to also find a relative age effect for the professional leagues in the Neth-
erlands, Belgium and France. Dudink (1994) observes a skewed distribution of the birth 
dates in Dutch youth tennis leagues as well as in the Premier League and the first three 
divisions in British professional soccer. 
 
Concerning the player numeration, a number of papers using data from different Euro-
pean soccer leagues analyze the determinants which help explain the players’ salary.73 
For the German Bundesliga, Lehmann and Weigand (1999) as well as Lehmann (2000) 
were among the first to determine influencing factors of players’ salary in the Bundes-
liga. Both studies use data from one season, as they also take into account the players 
origin as well as the performance of their team. Being the first to use longitudinal data, 
Huebl and Swieter (2002) and Frick (2007a) support the human capital theory, as they 
find positive, yet decreasing impact of several variables depicting players’ experience.74 
 
As hazard rates in the Bundesliga are going to be discussed in the following work, a 
short overview of the existing literature seems to be appropriate. Frick, Pietzner and 
Prinz (2007) are to my best knowledge the only authors who analyze hazard rates in the 
Bundesliga. They investigate the influence of individual performance indicators and 
players’ origin on the probability to remain in the league. Analyzing the careers of all 
players who played in the Bundesliga between the season 1963/64 and 2002/03, they 
find evidence of the position of players as well as their age and experience impacting 
the probability of staying in the league. Further studies on hazard rates in professional 
sports include careers of Japanese baseball players by Ohkusa (2001) as well as Kura 
and Matsuzawa (2006). 
 
For studies about American professional sport leagues Atkinson and Tschirhart (1986) 
analyze which determinants influence players’ careers in the National Football League, 
while in their work concerning matching models, Chapman and Southwick (1991) 
                                                 
73 See Frick (2007b) for an overview. 
74 For similar studies concerning other European leagues see Garcia-del-Barrio and Pujol (2005, 2006) 
and Lucifora and Simmons (2003). 
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address the hazard rates for American baseball players. In a more recent study Dilger 
and Prinz (2004) show that players from the National Basketball Association have to 
leave the league rather due to poor performance than on a voluntarily basis.75 To con-
clude, a growing body of literature has developed during the last years, displaying the 
interest of economics in player remuneration and career tracks in professional sports. 
 
The present chapter combines the field of analyzing the impact of cut-off dates on play-
ers’ careers as well as on their salary determination. It is organized as follows: The next 
section presents the data while the birth-distribution of German players in the Bundes-
liga is presented in section 3. Section four contains the salary determination of the 
soccer players. Hazard rates in the Bundesliga are presented in section five and section 
six concludes the chapter. 
 
6.2 Data 
Analyzing the impact of the implementation of cut-off dates on players’ career perspec-
tive and players’ salary is the main subject of this chapter. The data set that I analyze in 
this chapter contains individual statistics as well as approximated salaries of 2011 
players who played in the German Bundesliga between the 1995/96 and the 2007/08 
season and totals in 6146 player-year-observations.76 To my knowledge this is the first 
longitudinal analysis run with such a large number of observed seasons, as previous 
studies include a time frame of at most two seasons. Individual players’ performance 
and statistics were obtained from the yearly published special issue of the “Kicker 
Sportmagazin”. During the course of the relevant period the cut-off date in German 
youth leagues was 1st of August. Since one has to assume that only players born in 
Germany were subject to this rule and following Musch and Hay (1999), the number of 
observed players decreases to 1090. Consequently the number of player-year-
observations decreases to 3550. 
 
                                                 
75 Further studies concerning hazard rates in the NBA include Staw and Hoang (1995) as well as Hoang 
and Rascher (1999). 
76 To explain the number of players, which differentiates from chapter 2 and 8, one should note that this 
chapter was written with big timely distance and using a then up-to-date data set. 
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6.3 Birth-Distribution in the Bundesliga 
Following Ashworth and Heyndels (2007), I will initially take a look at a possible 
selection bias of German players entering the Bundesliga. The reasoning behind such a 
selection bias is as follows: Due to their physical predominance over the later born 
members of the cohort, adolescent soccer players who are born shortly after the cut-off 
date are rather labeled as talents and hence receive stronger support. In other words, the 
youngest players of the cohort are easily overlooked in favor of their older counter-
parts.77 Looking at the distribution of players’ birth dates in Table 6-1 one can see that 
over 29 percent of the German players in the Bundesliga are born in the first three 
months after the cut-off date and hence between 1st of August and 31st of October. 
Furthermore, 55 percent of the players are born in the first half of the year following 
this date which includes 1st of August to 30th of January. Since the data set includes the 
precise birth date of every player one can compare it to the birth dates in the population. 
Following Barnsley, Thompson and Legault (1992) in assuming an equal distribution of 
birth throughout the course of the year, one would expect the players to be born, on 
average, 182 days after the cut-off date 1st of August. The 1090 players in the sample 
are born, on average, 170 days after 1st of August. Applying a simple t-test, one can see 
that this difference proves to be highly significant (t=-4.76). 
 
Players  Fraction  Cumulated 
1st Quarter  317  0.291  0.291 
2nd Quarter  282  0.259  0.550 
3rd Quarter  247  0.227  0.776 
4th Quarter  244  0.224  1.000 
Table 6-1: Distribution of German Players’ Birth Dates in the Bundesliga 
 
                                                 
77 Helsen, Starkes and Van Winckel (1999) find that youth players born shortly after the cut-off date are 
identified as being talented by their coaches with a higher probability than their peers. Helsen, Starkes 
and Van Winckel (2000) furthermore show for the Belgian youth soccer that a change of the cut-off 
date immediately changed the distribution of players’ birth in teams for the following season. In a 
study of the Olympic Development Program for youth soccer players in United States, Glamser and 
Vincent (2004) find a disproportional high number of players born in the first half of the year after the 
cut-off date. 
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The above shown results go in line with Allen and Barnsley (1993), even though the 
impact of the cut-off date in Canadian hockey seems to be more drastic. After showing 
the expected selection bias, I proceed by estimating the influence of the players’ birth 
date on their salary. 
 
6.4 Salary Determinations in the Bundesliga 
Concerning the influence of the players’ birth date on salary one is confronted with the 
thesis by Ashworth and Heyndels (2007), who claim that late born players receive a 
wage premium when they achieve to play in the Bundesliga. They explain this thesis by 
stating that everything else equal, these players are more productive and hence earn 
more money. In the following, I will show that including goals as a performance para-
meter in my data set also supports the salary bias in favor of late born players while 
differentiating between recent career performance and experience revokes the impact of 
the birth date on players’ salary.78 Before looking at the detailed results I will start by 
presenting the data set. 
 
The players’ salary is approximated by the data from the “Kicker Managerspiel”, which 
is run every year. Before the season, every player is assigned a value for this virtual 
management game. Comparing these player values with information available from the 
licensing procedure by the Deutsche Fußball Liga (DFL), one finds that these values are 
very good estimators for players’ salary in season t which are approximated as follows: 
 
݈ܲܽݕ݁ݎݏᇱݏ݈ܽܽݎݕ ሺݐሻ ൌ
݈ܲܽݕ݁ݎݏᇱݏ݈ܽܽݎݕ ܽݐ ݇݅ܿ݇݁ݎ െ  ݉ܽ݊ܽ݃݁݉݁݊ݐ ݃ܽ݉݁ ሺݐሻ
1.5
 
 
Before giving information on which individual player characteristics and performance 
indicators might impact the salary, I start by presenting the salary structure of German 
players in the Bundesliga. As one can see in Figure 6-1 the average salary nearly 
doubled in the observed period, increasing from 513,327 Euro in 1995/1996, to 
                                                 
78 This goes in line with the finding of Du, Gao and Levi (2008). They show that, after controlling for 
relevant information like firm performance and size, the season of birth of CEOs of S&P 500 
companies has no impact on their compensation. 
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1,062,903 Euro in 2006/2007. This rapidly increased salary suggests that season dum-
mies should be included in the following salary regression. 
 
 
Figure 6-1: Salary History of German Players in the German Bundesliga 
 
While individual player salaries range between 17,043 and 10,000,000 Euro per year, 
one observes a right-skewed distribution of players’ salary as the medium salary in the 
Bundesliga is 769,208 Euro. Looking at the salaries subject to the quarter the players 
were born in, one observes the highest average salary for players born in the fourth 
quarter (839,694 Euro) and the lowest for players born in the third quarter (707,889 
Euro). The distribution of players’ salary subject to their birth date is shown in Figure 6-
2. As there is obviously is no normal distribution of the players’ salary, the following 
salary regressions are performed using the natural logarithm of the salary. 
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Figure 6-2: Kernel Density Estimation of Players’ Salary Subject to the Quarter of Birth 
 
In order to perform the salary estimation and to measure the effect of birth dates on the 
salary a variety of other factors have to be considered, which also explain the variation 
in players’ payoff. To begin with the differentiation between the players’ position on the 
field, I distinguish between goalkeepers, defenders, midfielders and forwards. As 
human capital suggests that experience increases productivity, even though with 
decreasing marginal returns, I introduce several parameters which depict experience. I 
control for players’ age at the start of the particular Bundesliga season as well as for the 
squared age, expecting an upward-sloping and concave age-earnings profile. For the 
other experience indicators, I distinguish between recent and career experience: Games 
played in the Bundesliga also serves as a good indicator for experience. In line with the 
age variable, I also include the squared number of Bundesliga games, expecting 
decreasing marginal returns. Experience in international matches serves as the third and 
final experience indicator and the squared number is included once again. Finally, goals 
scored in the Bundesliga serve as an indicator for offensive performance by players. 
Following Lucifora and Simmons (2003), I distinguish between recent and career per-
formance. Therefore, I run a second salary regression, in which I differentiate between 
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the aforementioned players’ experience and performance indicators observed in the pre-
vious season (labeled as: t-1) and the cumulated performance before the previous season 
(labeled as: prior t-1). 
 
To measure the impact of the birth date on the salary of the player, the variable Birthday 
is introduced, denoting the number of days the respective player is born after the cut-off 
date 1st of August. Descriptive statistics of the experience and performance indicators 
are presented in Table 6-2.  
 
Variable  Operationalization  Mean  Min.  Max. 
Goalkeeper  Goalkeeper (Dummy; 1 =yes)  0.14  0  1 
Defender  Defender (Dummy; 1 =yes)  0.30  0  1 
Midfielder  Midfielder (Dummy; =yes)  0.38  0  1 
Forward  Forward (Dummy; 1 =yes)  0.18  0  1 
AGE  Age at the beginning of the season  24.2  17  41 
AGE²  Squa. age at the beginning of the season  604  289  1681 
GP BL  Career Bundesliga games  69.2  0  540 
GP BL²  Squa. Bundesliga career games  12155  0  291600
GP INT  Career international games  8.97  0  137 
GP INT²  Squa. career international games  418  0  18769
GS  Career goals  7.93  0  182 
GP BL (t‐1)  Bundesliga games (previous season)  14.9  0  34 
GP BL (t‐1)²  Squa. Bundesliga games (previous season)  376.82  0  1156 
GP BL (prior t‐1)  Bundesliga games prior to previous season  54.3  0  512 
GP BL (prior t‐1)²  Squa. Bundesliga games prior to previous season  9389  0  262144
GP INT (t‐1)  International games in previous season  1.43  0  25 
GP INT (t‐1)²  Squa. international games in previous season  11.5  0  625 
GP INT (prior t‐1)  International games prior to previous season  7.54  0  130 
GP INT (prior t‐1)²  Squa. international games prior to previous season 331  0  16900
GS (t‐1)  Goals in previous season  1.63  0  28 
GS (prior t‐1)  Goals prior to previous season  6.34  0  171 
Birthday  Days born after the cut‐off date  175  0  365 
Table 6-2: Descriptive Statistics of Player Characteristics and Performance Indicators 
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Season dummies (SD) and team dummies (TD) are included in all regression analyses 
to account for further influencing factors. As shown above, the inclusion of season 
dummies appears to be reasonable. As teams in the Bundesliga exhibit differences in 
financial power, team dummies are also included in the salary regressions. 
 
In order to estimate the impact of the date of birth on the players’ salary, the time gap 
between the respective birthday and the cut-off date is included in the salary regression. 
Different regression analyses are run, which include experience as well as performance 
indicators described above. Next to performing a salary regression which refers to total 
experience and performance, a second model is run in which I distinguish between 
recent and career experience and performance. On basis of the standard Mincer wage 
equation (1974) the following equation of players’ salary is suggested: 
 
ln ݈ܵܽܽݎݕ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߙଵܦ݂݁݁݊݀݁ݎ ൅ ߙଶܯ݂݈݅݀݅݁݀݁ݎ ൅ ߙଷܨ݋ݎݓܽݎ݀ ൅ ߙସܣܩܧ ൅ ߙହܣܩܧ²
൅ ߙ଺ܩܲ ܤܮ ൅ ߙ଻ ܩܲ ܤܮ² ൅ ߙ଼ܩܲ ܫܰܶ ൅ ߙଽܩܲ ܫܰܶ² ൅ ߙଵ଴ܩܵ
൅ ߙଵଵܤ݅ݎݐ݄݀ܽݕ ൅ ߙଵଶܵܦ ൅ ߙଵଷܶܦ ൅ ߝ  
 
I run two models, the first includes overall career player information (Model 1), while 
the second differentiates between recent and previous performance indicators (Model 
2). Due to the panel characteristics of the data it is possible to exploit this additional 
information and account for some unobserved player specific characteristics via the 
random effects estimation technique. Hence, a Breusch/Pagan (1980) Lagrange-multip-
lier test is performed, which analyzes whether the pooled OLS model would work as 
well as the random effects model. The Prob > chi2 statistic of the two regression models 
(χ2 = 344.06, p < .01 (Model 1)) and (χ2 = 163.29, p < .01 (Model 2)) clearly indicate 
that unobserved player heterogeneity is present. This suggests that applying the random 
effects model is more appropriate than the pooled OLS. Estimations of both models are 
illustrated in Table 6-3. 
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Model 1  Model 2 
Coefficients  Coefficients 
Variable  OLS  RE  OLS  RE 
Defender  .020 (0.55)+  .020 (0.51)+  ‐.061 (‐1.88)*  .100 (2.08)*** 
Midfielder  .127 (3.49)***  .127 (3.22)***  .021 (0.65)+  .151 (3.25)*** 
Forward  .276 (6.16)***  .276 (5.68)***  .092 (2.34)**  .235 (4.34)*** 
AGE  .612 (2.06)***  .612 (17.72)***  .451 (17.04)***  .491 (17.26)*** 
AGE²  ‐.011 (‐2.32)***  ‐.011 (‐17.87)*** ‐.008 (‐17.18)***  ‐.009 (‐17.06)***
GP BL  .008 (2.12)***  .008 (16.42)***  /  / 
GP BL²  ‐.000 (‐15.79)*** ‐.000 (‐11.32)*** /  / 
GP INT  .026 (1.84)***  .026 (11.01)***  /  / 
GP INT²  ‐.000 (‐5.89)***  ‐.000 (‐6.17)***  /  / 
GS  .001 (1.07)+  .001 (1.06)+  /  / 
GP BL (t‐1)  /  /  .058 (16.83)***  .049 (14.96)*** 
GP BL (t‐1)²  /  /  ‐.001 (‐7.55)***  ‐.001 (‐6.83)*** 
GP BL (prior t‐1)  /  /  .002 (3.93)***  .002 (3.39)*** 
GP BL (prior t‐1)²  /  /  ‐.000 (‐2.50)**  ‐.000 (‐1.65)* 
GP INT (t‐1)  /  /  .111 (7.86)***  .086 (6.49)*** 
GP INT (t‐1)²  /  /  ‐.005 (‐4.09)***  ‐.003 (‐3.00)*** 
GP INT (prior t‐1)  /  /  .012 (5.05)***  .005 (1.85)* 
GP INT (prior t‐1)²  /  /  ‐.000 (‐2.37)**  ‐.000 (‐0.36)+ 
GS (t‐1)  /  /  .040 (8.40)***  .043 (9.36)*** 
GS (prior t‐1)  /  /  ‐.002 (‐1.62)+  ‐.002 (‐1.97)** 
Birthday  .000 (2.30)**  .000 (2.35)**  .000 (0.78)+  .000 (0.92)+ 
Season dummies  Included 
Team dummies  Included 
Adj R²  0.506  0.514  0.644  0.640 
Observations  3550  3550 
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 level, + denotes insignificance (t/z-values in brackets). 
Table 6-3: Determinants of Player Salary 
 
Looking at the results of both models, one can see that the impact of most variables on 
players’ salary is the same for all four regression analyses. Supporting the findings of 
Frick (2007a) and Garcia-del-Barrio and Pujol (2005, 2006), goalkeepers earn rather 
low salaries. This might be explained by their high degree of specialization. Going in 
line with human capital theory, all variables indicating the experience of a player have a 
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significantly positive impact on the players’ salary with decreasing marginal returns. 
Additionally, the non-impact of career goals scored in the Bundesliga in Model 1 
changes to a highly significant impact of goals scored in the previous season. To test if 
German players who make it to the Bundesliga despite being born shortly before the 
cut-off date earn a wage premium, the results differ between the models. Supporting the 
findings by Ashworth and Heyndels (2007), Model 1 suggests that players who make it 
into the league despite their unfavorable birth date are indeed additionally rewarded 
monetarily. But once I distinguish between recent and career performance parameters, 
this wage premium vanishes. Comparing which fraction of salary variance can be 
explained by the independent variables, I clearly prefer Model 2 over Model 1 as the 
adjusted R-square increases considerably. In addition, it seems to be very reasonable to 
distinguish between recent and previous performance expecting decreasing impact as 
the time lag increases. Furthermore, as the birth date of a player should not impact his 
performance on the field, there should be no impact on his salary, once I control for his 
performance. Therefore, efficient markets should not give a monetary reward or 
punishment for the players’ birth date. 
 
6.5 Hazard Rates 
After observing a selection bias for the market for professional soccer players in section 
three, the question arises if there is a selection bias once a player has achieved to obtain 
a spot on the roster of a Bundesliga team. This section will shed light, applying a hazard 
rate model. For this purpose, I observe if players remain in the Bundesliga after a season 
to estimate the survival rates depending on the players’ quarter of birth. Following 
Frick, Pietzner and Prinz (2007), I refer to “spell duration” as the numbers of consecu-
tive seasons spent in the Bundesliga by a certain player.79 On average, German players 
exhibit spell durations of 4.04 seasons, while the mean duration is considerably lower at 
just 2 seasons. Figure 6-3 provides the hazard rates of German players in the Bundesliga 
with regard to their position on the field. Since this data set only includes players who 
left the Bundesliga before the start of the 2008/2009 season, it reduces the number of 
                                                 
79 Frick, Pietzner and Prinz (2007) show that estimating a similar hazard model leads to nearly identical 
results, regardless of including or excluding left-censored spells. 
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observed exits to 931. For players who were already in the league before the 1995/1996 
season, information about their previous career length had been added and thus I control 
for left truncated cases. This leads to players exhibiting career length of more than 13 
seasons. 
 
It can be observed that forwards have on average shorter careers in the Bundesliga than 
players on the other positions. Frick, Pietzner and Prinz (2007), who come to a similar 
finding, explain this result by stating that the performance by forwards is easy to meas-
ure as it is often equated with the number of goals scored during the season. Hence, 
their average career length would be shorter than for players playing on the other posi-
tions. For the other positions on the field there is not such a clear indicator for perfor-
mance. 
 
 
Figure 6-3: Survival Rates in the Bundesliga with Regard to the Position on the Field 
 
For the following analysis I keep up the distinction from the third section as I assort 
players in four different groups according to their date of birth. As stated earlier, I 
expect players’ performance on the field to be independent of their birth date. This 
indeed would lead to an expected stay in the league which is not dependent on the date 
of birth. Calculating the survival rates of individuals born in the first quarter after the 
cut-off date, one can observe that around 28 percent of the players leave the Bundesliga 
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after just one season. This value is the lowest compared to the other quarters of birth, 
even though just by a small margin. The same holds true for the percentage of players 
who leave the league after just two years. But as one analyzes the survival rates for 
more than two seasons the percentage of players who manage to stay in the league for a 
certain period of time appears to be independent of the date of birth.  
 
To check for potential statistical significant difference in the survival rates, a Cox 
(1972) semi-parametric proportional hazard model for censored data is applied. The 
Cox-Model is the most general regression model developed to investigate survival data, 
because it does not impose any assumptions concerning the nature of the shape of the 
underlying distribution. It assumes that the underlying hazard rate is a function of the 
independent variables and it solves the problem of censored observations. One 
additional feature of the model is that exogenous variables can be time-constant 
variables, but also, time-varying variables such as performance or age. As I expect the 
survival rates to be independent of the date of birth, I test whether the survival rates for 
players are dependent on the quarter of birth. This turns out not to be the case, as the 
quarter of birth does not have a significant effect on the spell duration in the Bundesliga 
while controlling for the performance indicators included in the salary regression.80 
Results of the Cox semi-parametric proportional hazard model are presented in Table 6-
4.81  
                                                 
80 These results do not change as one omits the team- and season dummies. 
81 Results of a log logistic modell suggests that results are in line with the results presented in Table 6‐5. 
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Model 1  Model 2 
Variable  Hazard Ratio  z‐Value  Hazard Ratio  z‐Value 
Defender  2.83  (8.24)***  3.27  (9.01)*** 
Midfielder  2.53  (7.23)***  2.98  (8.22)*** 
Forward  2.82  (7.07)***  3.50  (8.21)*** 
AGE  0.55  (‐7.28)***  0.62  (‐5.69)*** 
AGE²  1.01  (7.84)***  1.01  (6.39)*** 
GP BL  0.98  (‐16.37)***  /  / 
GP BL²  1.00  (8.90)***  /  / 
GP INT  1.00  (‐0.35)+  /  / 
GP INT²  1.00  (0.63)+  /  / 
GS  1.00  (‐0.89)+  /  / 
GP BL (t‐1)  /  /  0.94  (‐5.30)*** 
GP BL (t‐1)²  /  /  1.00  (2.40)*** 
GP BL (prior t‐1)  /  /  0.98  (‐14.45)*** 
GP BL (prior t‐1)²  /  /  1.00  (7.18)*** 
GP INT (t‐1)  /  /  0.91  (‐1.20)+ 
GP INT (t‐1)²  /  /  1.01  (‐1.67)* 
GP INT (prior t‐1)  /  /  1.00  (‐0.04)+ 
GP INT (prior t‐1)²  /  /  1.00  (1.00)+ 
GS (t‐1)  /  /  0.97  (‐1.89)* 
GS (prior t‐1)  /  /  1.00  (1.97)** 
Birthday  1.01  (0.26)+  1.01  (0.44)+ 
Observations  2850  2850 
No. Of Failure  931  931 
Wald Chi2  1178.53  1227.47 
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 level 
Table 6-4: Determinants of Spell Duration in the Bundesliga 
 
For visual support of these results, Figure 6-4 shows the survival rates for players in the 
Bundesliga dependent on their quarter of birth. At this stage I do not control for the 
aforementioned performance indicators as I analyze the survival rates contingent on the 
quarter of birth. As it can be observed that the lines in Figure 6-4, which represent the 
hazard rates contingent on the quarters of birth, cross multiple times, the survival rates 
can be seen as independent of the date of birth. 
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Figure 6-4: Survival Rates in the Bundesliga with Regard to the Quarter of Birth 
 
6.6 Conclusions 
The present chapter is subdivided into three parts concerning the relative age effect in 
the German Bundesliga. The first part offers an analysis concerning the unequal 
distribution of players in the league subject to their birth date. The data supports the 
popular thesis that players who are born shortly after the cut-off date are more often 
considered to be talented and hence get more support during their early playing years. 
This again improves their probability to become professional soccer players in later 
years and goes in line with the results of the majority of previous studies. The second 
part of the chapter deals with the salary determination of the players, taking the birth 
date of the players into consideration. Here I state that since the birth date of the players 
should not affect the performance it should not impact their salary. Separating between 
recent and career performance my data supports this hypothesis, contradicting the thesis 
stated by Ashworth and Heyndels (2007), who claim that players who belong to the 
youngest in their cohort and still make it to the professional level receive an additional 
monetary reward. The third and final part of this chapter deals with hazard rates of 
players in the Bundesliga. Going along with the proposition of the second part of the 
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present chapter, the birth date should not impact the players’ performance once he 
achieves to obtain a roster spot in the Bundesliga and hence should not have an impact 
on his chance of survival in the league. Data also supports this thesis, as the length of 
stay in the Bundesliga proves to be independent of the date of birth. 
 
In summary, the selection into the Bundesliga is affected by the date of birth, while the 
implementation of cut-off dates does not impact the players’ salary or the length of stay 
in the league. Still the question arises how the discriminating effect of cut-off dates can 
be resolved. The literature offers a number of possible solutions like the yearly change 
of the cut-off date82 or allowing the age difference in a cohort to be maximally six 
month.83 These ideas would probably reduce the problem, still the organizational excess 
work does not justify the change of the existing rules. 
 
Further work using the present data set might include observing the career track of the 
included athletes. Since data concerning the switching between youth teams is available, 
it might be of interest at what age young soccer players change from the youth team of 
their small home town to the youth team of a “big club” to be provided with better 
practice. In this context the date of birth might be a factor, as I would expect players 
who are born closely after to the cut-off date to be identified as talents at an earlier stage 
than late-born players. This proposition is based on the fact that the relative age differ-
ence decreases as the age of the players increases. Furthermore, the date of the first-time 
nomination to a German national youth team might also be influenced by the players’ 
birth date, especially since these teams are selected from a considerably larger cohort. 
                                                 
82 See Ashworth and Heyndels (2007). 
83 See Billari and Pellizzari (2008). 
96 
 
7 Sabotage in Heterogeneous Tournaments: A Field Study 
 
7.1 Introduction 
In practice, tournaments or contests are ubiquitous. A typical example is an internal 
labor market tournament, in which employees compete for a bonus or a promotion 
(Lazear and Rosen 1981). Other examples include R&D races, litigation contests, rent-
seeking contests, political campaigns or sports contests.84 
 
In tournaments, only the relative performance of the contestants matters. The partici-
pants therefore have an incentive to decrease the performance of their opponents. This is 
typically called the “sabotage problem”. In the meantime, a number of theoretical con-
tributions on sabotage in tournaments have appeared (e.g. Lazear 1989, Konrad 2000, 
Chen 2003, 2005, Kräkel 2005, Münster 2007, Gürtler 2008 or Gürtler & Münster 
2008). Unfortunately, however, there are only a few empirical studies. Garicano and 
Palacios-Huerta (2005) for instance show that an increase in the price difference in pro-
fessional soccer (from two to three points for a win) has led to more sabotage (as 
measured by the number of defenders and the number of disciplinary actions). Drago 
and Garvey (1998) find that in Australian companies employees help each other less if 
they are paid according to their relative performance.85 Harbring et al. (2007) find in a 
laboratory experiment that subjects tend to retaliate against sabotage activities if the 
identity of the saboteur is known. Moreover, they are able to show that sabotage is more 
pronounced if the identity of the saboteur is unknown since retaliation is then less 
strong.86 
 
The aim of this chapter is to extend both, the theoretical and the empirical literature on 
sabotage in tournaments. We consider a tournament between two heterogeneous play-
ers, both of whom may take legal and illegal actions to increase their probability of 
winning. We impose two assumptions: First, the favorite is more productive than the 
underdog with respect to legal actions. Second, the players’ cost function is such that 
                                                 
84 See Frick (2003) or Konrad (2007) for surveys. 
85 Note that help can be interpreted as the opposite of sabotage. 
86 See Harbring and Irlenbusch (2004, 2005) for further experiments on sabotage in tournaments. 
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both activities are substitutes. We then show that the favorite chooses a higher level of 
legal and a lower level of illegal actions than the underdog. In other words, the favorite 
is sabotaged more strongly than the underdog. This complements the theoretical lite-
rature on sabotage in asymmetric tournaments, where the favorite is sabotaged the most 
because he is the truly dangerous rival (Chen 2003, Münster 2007). This latter finding, 
however, requires at least three contestants. In our model, we show that the favorite is 
subject to most illegal activities even if there are only two players, a result that has not 
been derived before. 
 
In a second step, we perform an empirical analysis to test our derived results. Similar to 
Garicano and Palacios-Huerta (2005) we use data from professional soccer. As a proxy 
for legal activities we use the percentage of fair, i.e. successful, tackles of a team, while 
sabotage is measured by the percentage of fouls a team has committed. We further use 
betting odds to determine the favorite and the underdog in a particular match. Control-
ling for a number of additional factors that may have an impact on legal and illegal 
activities we confirm both our theoretical results. In particular, we find that a team fouls 
less often and wins more tackles in a fair way the more it is favored by the betting odds. 
 
Altogether, we find that sabotage is a serious problem in heterogeneous tournaments. 
We show that players indeed take actions to reduce the performance of their opponents. 
Apart from this direct negative effect, this shifts their focus away from own legal 
actions. Finally, if tournaments are also used for selection purposes, sabotage increases 
the probability of selecting (and promoting) the wrong player. As the favorite is subject 
to most illegal actions, sabotage increases the likelihood for the underdog to win the 
tournament. For an employer designing an intra-company promotion tournament it is 
thus important to prevent the employees from engaging in sabotage activities. One way 
to achieve this is to punish detected sabotage harshly. Another way is to make it more 
difficult for the employees to sabotage each other. The employer may for instance not 
reveal the identities of the contestants. Moreover, he may organize a tournament 
between employees who are separated from each other (i.e. they are working in differ-
ent business units or departments in different cities). 
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The chapter is organized as follows: The next section presents our model and the theo-
retical findings. In section 3, we describe our data. Section four contains the empirical 
results, and section five concludes. 
 
7.2 The Model 
7.2.1  Description of the Model and Notation 
Consider a situation, in which two risk-neutral players, i=1, 2, compete in a tournament. 
The player with the higher performance is declared the winner and receives the winner’s 
prize 0>w , while the loser’s prize is normalized to zero. We focus on actions that are 
intended to decrease the opposing player’s performance. This can either be done 
„fairly”, i.e. by actions that are in accordance with the rules of the game, or „unfairly”, 
i.e. by violating the rules of the game.87 We denote by 0≥ie  a player’s fair effort and 
by 0≥is  his unfair or sabotage effort. The players’ performances are then given by 
 
(1) 12211 ε+−−= bseyy  and 21122 ε+−−= bsaeyy , 
 
with iy  as the players’ gross performance from their (unmodeled) productive decisions, 
a, b as productivity parameters and iε  as a random term being independently 
distributed according to pdf )(⋅if . Let the pdf of 12: εεε −=  be defined as )(⋅g  and 
denote the corresponding cdf as )(⋅G . 
 
We assume the players to be heterogeneous. In particular, we have 1>a , ba >  and 
0: 21 ≥−= yyyΔ . This means that player 1 is better in reducing his opponent’s output 
in a fair way and also has a weakly higher productive performance.88 In the following, 
we therefore speak of player 1 as the favorite and player 2 as the underdog. 
 
                                                 
87 We introduce two efforts decreasing the opponent’s performance to keep the model in line with the 
empirical part of the chapter, where the available proxy variables also decrease the opposing team’s 
performance. Note, however, that the model results would continue to hold, if e would describe a 
productive effort increasing the own performance. This is demonstrated in Appendix A. 
88 As we will show, the latter assumption does not affect the qualitative results of our model. 
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Both types of effort are costly to a player and these costs are given by the function 
),( iii seCC = . The function ),( ii seC  is assumed to be symmetric89 and to satisfy90 
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, for 0, >ii se . The last assumption 
implies that the players’ actions are substitutes. Thus, if a player decides to increase his 
fair effort, he decreases his unfair effort and vice versa. For the application we address, 
this assumption seems very suitable. When trying to stop the opponent, a player can 
either exert effort to do this fairly or he can just foul the opponent, in which case he has 
to accept the consequences (e.g. a free kick, a yellow or a red card). The more fouls a 
player commits in a game, the less fairly he behaves. Thus, it is reasonable to assume 
costs to be such that both kinds of effort are substitutes. 
Finally91, we impose the Inada-conditions 0),0( =∂
∂
i
i
e
sC  and ∞=∂
∂
i
ii
e
seC ),( , for 
∞→ie . 
These conditions imply that we have an interior solution, where optimal efforts are 
strictly positive, but finite. 
  
                                                 
89 One may argue that the marginal costs of fair and unfair actions are different. Different marginal costs, 
however, have a similar effect as different marginal productivities of the actions in the performance 
functions. It is, therefore, sufficient to assume that b is different from 1. 
90 Note that the symmetry of the cost function implies that we obtain the same conditions if we consider 
the partial derivatives with respect to the sabotage activity. 
91 Again, the symmetry of the cost function implies that we obtain the same conditions for the sabotage 
activity. 
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7.2.2  Solution to the Model 
In the tournament, each player chooses ie  and is  so as to maximize his expected payoff. 
This payoff is given by 
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for player 1 and 
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for player 2. 
 
The optimality conditions are given by92 
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92 A sufficient condition for this first-order approach to be valid is that the players’ objective functions are 
strictly concave. This requires 0
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Hammond, Seierstad and Strom 2005: 55). For player 1, for instance, these conditions can be written 
as 
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 This is e.g. fulfilled, if 
2
1
11
2 ),(
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∂
∂  is everywhere high enough. In Section 2.3, we consider a specific 
example where these conditions are always fulfilled. 
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Using the optimality conditions (4) to (7), we can derive the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 1: In equilibrium, the favorite exerts higher fair effort than the underdog 
but sabotages less (i.e. *2
*
1 ee >  and *2*1 ss < ). Moreover, if 1≥b  ( 1<b ), we have 
*
2
*
2 se ≤  ( *2*2 se > ). 
 
Proof: See Appendix B. 
 
According to Proposition 1 the favorite always chooses a higher fair effort than the 
underdog, but sabotages less. Two effects drive this result. First, the favorite has a 
higher return on fair effort which, in turn, induces him to engage more strongly in the 
legal activity. Second, both types of effort are substitutes. This means that a player 
engaging more strongly in one activity engages less strongly in the other one. Accor-
dingly, player 1, choosing a higher fair effort, sabotages less. 
 
In Sections three and four, we are going to test these results using data from German 
professional soccer. Before we do so, however, we consider a parameterized version of 
the tournament model to develop a better understanding of the sabotage problem. 
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7.2.3 Parameterized Version of the Model 
In this section, we assume specific forms for our functions to be able to derive some 
closed-form solutions for the optimal efforts. To keep the model tractable, we assume 
the composed random variable 12 εε −  to be uniformly distributed on ],[ uu− , with 
u>093, and effort costs to be given by )5.05.0(),( 22 iiiiii skesecseC ++= , with 0>c  
and )1,min,0( ⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧∈
ba
bk 94 . Then, the optimality conditions simplify to95 
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Solving these conditions simultaneously, optimal efforts can be written as96 
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From these conditions, it is straightforward to see that all efforts are increasing in the 
prize w and decreasing in u (which measures how strongly the tournament outcome is 
influenced by factors beyond the players’ control) and the cost parameter c. Moreover, 
*
1e  (
*
1s ) is increasing in a (b) and decreasing in b (a). This is intuitive. If player 1 
                                                 
93 If ε1 is a constant v and ε2 is uniformly distributed on [-u+v,u+v], the composed random variable ε2-ε1 
would be uniformly distributed on [-u,u].  
94 See for this kind of cost function e.g. Itoh (1994). Note that the function does not fulfill the Inada-
conditions described above. We will nevertheless see that the solution is an interior one. 
95 The sufficient conditions for optimality are –c<0 and c2-(ck)2>0. Under the assumptions imposed on the 
parameters c and k, these conditions are always fulfilled. 
96 Note that the assumption ⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧<
ba
bk 1,min  ensures that all equilibrium efforts are strictly positive. 
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becomes more productive with respect to his fair (unfair) activity, he increases his fair 
(unfair) effort and, since both efforts are substitutes, decreases his unfair (fair) effort. A 
similar argument applies to the second player. Finally, it is not clear how optimal efforts 
react to changes in k. On the one hand, an increase in k leads to higher effort costs, thus 
reducing efforts. On the other hand, it may yield a substitution of one kind of effort by 
the other. Therefore, efforts may either increase or decrease. 
 
From the optimal efforts, we are able to compute the players’ winning probabilities. We 
can show that player 1 wins with probability 
 
(9) ))21(
)1(2
)1(())(( 2
*
2
*
1
*
2
*
1 bkakcu
awyGssbeaeyG −+−
−+Δ=−+−+Δ
 
 
It is straightforward to see that player 1 is more likely to win, if yΔ  or a gets higher and 
c or u gets lower. All this is intuitive. Moreover, we can see that player 1’s winning 
probability is also increasing in w: while both players increase their efforts as a reaction 
to a higher price, the first player’s increase is more effective in influencing the winning 
probability. As k does not have a clear-cut effect on the efforts, its effect on the win-
ning-probability is ambiguous, too. Finally, player 1 becomes less likely to win the 
tournament if b gets higher. This has the following implication: If the tournament orga-
nizer were able to completely rule out unfair behavior (which is the same as setting b 
equal to zero), the more able player were most likely to win. Hence, if tournaments are 
also used for selection purposes, sabotage increases the probability of selecting the 
wrong player. As the favorite is subject to more illegal actions, sabotage increases the 
likelihood for the underdog to win the tournament. 
 
7.3 Data Set and Descriptive Statistics 
In the following section we empirically test our proposition that in a contest with two 
heterogeneous players the favorite prefers legal (“fair”) actions while the underdog pre-
fers illegal (“unfair”) activities to increase his probability of winning. Our empirical 
investigation is based on a data set from the German “Bundesliga” covering a 2.5 year 
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period from the start of the 2005/06 season until the middle of the 2007/08 season. For 
that period we have compiled complete and detailed information on all the 765 matches 
(2005/06: 306 matches; 2006/07: 306 matches; 2007/08: 153 matches). The data come 
from the league’s homepage (www.bundesliga.de), the highly respected soccer maga-
zine “Kicker” (www.kicker.de) and from the largest betting company in the country 
(www.oddset.de). 
 
Most important in our context is the question of how to operationalize the dependent 
and independent variables. Since the act of taking the ball away from an opposing 
player by either kicking it away or by stopping that player with one’s own feet is either 
considered a successful tackle or a foul, we distinguish between these two outcomes as 
being the results of either “fair” or “unfair” efforts. Hence we define as “constructive” 
or “fair” effort the home team’s number of successful tackles divided by the total num-
ber of tackles during a match 
tacklessuccessfulofnumbertotal
teamomehoftacklessuccessfulofn . Our preferred meas-
ure of “destructive” or “unfair” effort is the number of fouls committed by the home 
team divided by the total number of fouls during a particular match 
foulsofnumbertotal
teamomehoffoulsofn .97 
 
Following Fama (1970), we assume the betting market to be efficient in the sense that 
prices (the odds) fully reflect all available information. He distinguishes between three 
different forms of test depending on the information used: “Weak form” tests use past 
prices only, “semi-strong” tests use all publicly available information and “strong” tests 
also include information that is only accessible to certain people (see Kuypers 2000). In 
betting markets semi-strong efficiency implies that the incorporation of publicly avail-
able information on the two teams’ playing strength, their current form, player injuries, 
etc. should not improve the accuracy of outcome predictions based on odds. In the 
empirical part of this chapter we therefore use betting odds to distinguish between the 
favorite and the underdog to analyze the effect of heterogeneity (i.e. match uncertainty) 
on the choice of fair and unfair effort. Our betting odds are from “Oddset”, which pub-
                                                 
97 Note that the number of tackles and the number of fouls committed by the away team is accounted for 
in the respective denominator. 
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lishes these figures a few days before the weekend (usually on Tuesday). Thus, all bets 
are fixed in the sense that information regarding the fitness of key players, injuries, 
playing strategy, etc. that becomes available between Tuesday and Saturday (when most 
of the matches are played) will have no impact on the odds. 
 
For example, in week 16 of the 2007/08 season, Bayern Munich played MSV Duisburg 
at home and was heavily favored by the bookmakers. In case of a home win bettors 
received an amount of 1.10 € for every € they had placed on the home team. In the case 
of a draw the payoff to bettors was 5.50 € and in the unlikely case of an away win the 
payoff would have been 10.00 €. Summing up the inverse of the quotes not only yields 
the mark-up of the betting company, but also allows computation of the implicit proba-
bilities of a home win, a draw and an away win.98 
 
The payout ratio is determined as follows: 
 
winawayPayoffdrawPayoffwinmehoPayoff
ratioPayout
111
1
++
= , 
 
which in the case of the above mentioned game resulted in a payout ratio of 0.8397.99 
To calculate the implicit probabilities of the possible outcomes, we divide the payout 
ratio by the payoffs associated with the respective outcomes. This leads to an implicit 
probability of a home win of 76.3 percent, while the implicit draw and away win proba-
bilities are 15.3 percent and 8.4 percent respectively. To measure the heterogeneity 
between the opponents, we now introduce “HET” which will later serve as our main 
exogenous variable. HET is calculated as the difference between the implicit winning 
probabilities of the opposing teams: 
AH PPHET −= , 
                                                 
98 Sauer (1998) provides a detailed analysis of the economics of wagering markets. Forrest, Goddard and 
Simmons (2005) demonstrate the (increasing) effectiveness of the betting market using data from 
English football. 
99 This implies that the bookmaker’s mark-up is about 16 percent - a value that is quite high compared to 
most online bookmakers. Using data from www.gamebookers.com Stadtmann (2006) calculates an 
average mark-up of only 12 percent. 
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where PH and PA represent the implicit winning probabilities of home and away team. 
Hence HET can theoretically vary between -1 and +1. Positive values indicate that the 
home team is the favorite while in the case of negative values the away team is the favo-
rite. The further away HET is from zero, the more heterogeneous the two teams facing 
each other are. The overall (expected) home advantage is obvious from our Figure 7-1, 
as the mean of HET is 0.152. 
 
As stated in our proposition in the previous section, we expect the favorite to exert a 
higher level of fair effort and a lower level of sabotage compared to the underdog, as we 
measure fair effort as the percentage of successful tackles and sabotage as the percen-
tage of fouls. Obviously, we do not only have to control for the degree of heterogeneity 
of the opposing teams but also for some other factors that may have an influence on the 
effort levels chosen by the two clubs. These controls are necessary in order to eliminate 
alternative explanations for either team’s choice of fair and unfair effort. Thus, we 
include the natural logarithm of the number of spectators (ATT) to control for the 
atmosphere in the arena as well as a dummy-variable DERBY, which takes a value of 1 
if the respective match is one between two long-time rivals whose home grounds are 
located closely to each other.  
 
Variable  Description  Mean  Min.  Max. 
FOULS  Percentage of Fouls by Home Team (UNFAIR)  0.478  0.208  0.792 
TACKLES  Percentage of Tackles Won by Home Team (FAIR)  0.514  0.311  0.683 
ATT  Attendance  40105  10914  81264 
DERBY  Match is a Derby  0.024  0  1 
HWP  Winning Probability of Home Team  0.437  0.149  0.763 
AWP  Winning Probability of Away Team  0.285  0.084  0.609 
HET  HWP – AWP  0.15  ‐0.46  0.68 
ODDS  Log odds of HWP – AWP  0.06  ‐0.79  0.77 
Table 7-1: Descriptive Statistics 
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Table 7-1 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the estimations 
(Kernel density estimates of the two dependent variables (HET and log odds of HET) 
are displayed in Appendix C)). 
 
7.4 Empirical Results 
The main purpose of the empirical section of this chapter is to investigate whether 
weaker teams have an incentive to choose more unfair and unconstructive effort, while 
stronger clubs have a preference for fair and constructive effort. We employ two 
different estimation techniques which produce more or less identical results, 
documenting the robustness of our findings. 
 
We start with two conventional OLS-estimations where the percentage of fouls by the 
home team (FOULS) and the percentage of successful and fair tackles won by the home 
team (TACKLES) respectively are the dependent variables. These specifications have 
the advantage that we can control for systematic effects on the residual errors; i.e. the 
estimation errors are robust (White 1980) and clustered at the match level. While this 
procedure seems to produce conclusive results, we have not yet paid attention to the fact 
that the two endogenous variables (FOULS/TACKLES) are proportions or percentage 
variables with values must ranging by definition from zero to one. In order to obtain 
unbiased estimates a traditional solution to this problem is to perform a logit transfor-
mation of the variables ((y → log(y/(1-y)))). Following such a transformation it is then 
possible to use the OLS method. 
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Variable 
Model 1  Model 2 
(OLS)  LOGIT‐TRANS (OLS) 
TACKLES  FOULS  TACKLES  FOULS 
log(ATT)  0.004 (0.96)+  ‐0.002 (‐0.27)+  0.017 (0.95)+  ‐0.010 (‐0.32)+ 
DERBY  ‐0.001 (‐0.09)+  0.003 (0.16)+  ‐0.004 (‐0.10)+  0.012 (0.18)+ 
HET  0.027 (3.00)***  ‐0.070 (‐4.65)***  0.111 (3.02)***  ‐0.290 (‐4.65)***
REFEREE‐
DUMMIES  Included  Included 
CONST  0.491 (10.25)***  0.459 (5.97)***  ‐0.321 (‐0.17)+  ‐0.150 (‐0.47)+ 
Adj. R2  0.04  0.05  0.04  0.05 
F‐Test  1.30+  1.97*  1.37+  1.98** 
N of Cases  765  765  765  765 
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 level 
Table 7-2: Determinants of Fair and Unfair Behavior 
 
Note: Both models are estimated with White robust standard errors. 21 referee dummies 
are included in the estimations (Manuel Graefe is the reference referee. The full results 
are available upon request). 
 
Table 7-2 displays the contribution of the independent variables in explaining the 
variance of the two left-hand side variables. It appears that only a small fraction of that 
variation can be explained by our set of exogenous parameters. The number of specta-
tors and the character of a match as a “neighborhood duel” do not have any statistically 
significant impact on the “intensity” of the match. Since a number of recent studies have 
documented a tendency of referees to favor the home team (Sutter and Kocher 2004, 
Garicano, Palacios-Huerta and Prendergast 2005, Petterson-Lidbom and Priks 2009, 
Buraimo et al. 2007, Scoppa 2008, Dohmen 2005)100, we initially expected to find that 
the higher the attendance in a stadium, the more biased the referee’s decision-making 
towards the home team will be.101 Moreover, we expected that type of bias to be partic-
ularly strong in local derbies with their peculiar “atmosphere”. It turns out, however, 
that the coefficient of these two match-variables have the “correct” sign in all of our 
                                                 
100 Moreover, a number of recent studies have demonstrated that referees react to financial incentives in 
the same way as “ordinary” people by adjusting their effort levels (see Frick et al. 2009, Rickman and 
Witt 2008). 
101 Replacing the number of spectators by the capacity utilization leaves the findings virtually unaffected. 
The results are, of course, available from the authors upon request. 
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estimations, but their magnitude is not statistically significant or economically rele-
vant.102 
 
Most important in our context is the coefficient of our key independent variable, the 
heterogeneity measure HET. Since HET measures the difference in the playing strength 
of the two opposing teams, the highly significant coefficients in the TACKLES- as well 
as in the FOULS-model support our theoretically derived proposition that favorites 
usually exert higher levels of “legal” effort while the respective underdogs’ best answer 
is to engage in “illegal” activities.103 
 
7.5 Conclusion 
The present chapter consists of two different, yet closely related parts. In the first (theo-
retical) section we develop a formal model demonstrating that the favorite in a tourna-
ment chooses legal activities, while the underdog is tempted to engage in illegal activi-
ties. The reasons for this are twofold: First, the favorite is more productive with respect 
to legal activities and, second, the two types of activities are substitutes. In a second 
(empirical) section we demonstrate the plausibility of the theoretical model by using 
match-level data from German professional soccer. In particular, we find that teams that 
are more likely to win a match (as measured by the respective betting odds) win signifi-
                                                 
102 Since both left-hand side variables (FOULS and TACKLES) are determined by the same set of 
explanatory variables, it may be advisable to estimate a seemingly unrelated regression model (Zellner 
1962). The SURE approach takes into account the potential correlation of the residuals in the two 
models. If such a correlation exists, simple OLS-regressions are likely to produce inefficient estimates 
(Frick 2004). Although the findings of the SURE specification are identical to the ones from the OLS- 
models, the Lagrange-Multiplier Test (Breusch and Pagan 1980) of (χ2 = 210.1 p<.001) indicates that 
the correlation of the residuals in the FOULS and the TACKLES-equations is highly significant. 
Nevertheless, the relevant coefficients are not at all affected by that correlation. Moreover, we have 
also estimated a random-effects version of the SURE approach as developed by Biörn (2004). While 
most coefficients remained at their initial level, the statistical significance of our heterogeneity 
measure decreased in the TACKLES-model (which is due to some unobserved referee specific 
heterogeneity, such as differences in cognitive skills). The findings are available from the authors 
upon request.  
103 It may also be argued that the logit-transformation is not always feasible and the coefficients are 
difficult to interpret if the dependent variable takes on values of 0 and 1 (Wooldrigde 2001: 661). We 
therefore also employed the “fractional logit estimator” developed by Papke and Wooldridge (1996) 
to get rid of that particular problem. In that latter estimation the coefficient of our heterogeneity 
measure increases dramatically compared to the OLS-estimation (as well as the SURE-model). These 
results are also available from the authors upon request. 
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cantly more tackles in a fair way and, at the same time, commit significantly fewer 
fouls. 
 
Intra-company tournaments are typically used to induce incentives and to select the 
most able contestants. Our findings indicate that either of these two objectives may be 
difficult to reach. On the one hand, we find that weaker contestants (“underdogs”) tend 
to engage in sabotage which shifts their focus away from legal activities and thus 
reduces the incentive effects of tournaments. On the other hand, stronger contestant 
(“favorites”) are sabotaged more heavily which, in turn, reduces the selection efficiency 
of tournaments. For an employer designing an intra-company promotion tournament it 
is therefore important to prevent the employees from engaging in sabotage activities. 
One way to achieve this is to punish detected sabotage harshly. Another way is to make 
it more difficult for the employees to sabotage each other. The employer may for 
instance not reveal the identities of the contestants. Moreover, he may organize a tour-
nament between employees that are locally separated, for example in units in different 
cities. 
 
From time to time the organizers of professional team sports leagues in general and of 
soccer leagues in particular (i.e. the respective national associations) instruct their refe-
rees to punish certain types of fouls more harshly.104 In this sense, sabotage should 
become more costly and the teams should sabotage less. An interesting array for future 
research would therefore be to analyze whether these measures indeed affect behavior. 
This may offer some indication on the effectiveness of punishments in tackling the 
sabotage problem. 
                                                 
104 For instance, referees are nowadays advised to punish tackling from behind with a red card, the 
strongest punishment a referee can inflict on a player. 
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7.6 Appendix A 
 
In this appendix, we show that all the results of our model continue to hold, if e 
describes a productive effort increasing the own performance. To see this, consider the 
same model as before with the exception that the players’ performances are now given 
by 
 
(1’) 12111 ε+−+= bsaeyy  and 21222 ε+−+= bseyy  
 
Then, player 1’s winning-probability can be written as 
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This is the same winning probability as in the original model. As nothing else was 
changed, all our results continue to hold. Q.E.D.      
 
7.7 Appendix B 
 
In this appendix, we present the proof of Proposition 1. We restrict attention to the case 
where 1<b . The proof in the case where 1≥b  is completely analogous. 
 
From (4) and (5), we have 
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have *1
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1 se >  and with a similar argument *2*2 se > . 
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Consider now the case *2
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2 ssee ≥>≥ . As each player’s choice is (expected) utility-
maximizing, a player prefers his own choice to the other player’s choice. Hence, it must 
be that 
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Transforming (11) and (12) yields 
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Combining these conditions, we obtain 
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Assuming *1
*
2 ee ≥ , this condition can only hold if *2*1 ee = . Together with 
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∂
∂=∂
∂
, this implies *2
*
1 ss = . As before this leads again to a contra-
diction. 
 
Hence, the only case that remains has *1
*
2
*
2
*
1 ssee ≥>≥ . Here, we have to show that nei-
ther *2
*
1 ee ≥  nor *1*2 ss ≥  can be binding (recall that both conditions cannot be binding at 
the same time). First, let *2
*
1 ee = , but *1*2 ss > . Again, this contradicts the condition
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. Second, let *2
*
1 ee >  and *1*2 ss = . This contradicts the con-
dition
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. Thus, in equilibrium it must be the case that 
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7.8 Appendix C 
 
 
Figure 7-1: Epanechikov-Kernel Density Estimation of HET 
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The D’Agostino et al. (1990) test (implemented in Stata 10.1 as “sktest”) reveals that in 
the case of HET the distribution deviates from normality. However, presence of nor-
mality is indicated by a rather small kurtosis and an insignificant value of the 
D’Agostiono et al. (1990) test in the case of log odds of HET. 
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Figure 7-2: Epanechikov-Kernel Density Estimation of log Odds of HET. 
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8 The Economics of the World Cup 
 
8.1 Introduction 
The FIFA World Cup is an international soccer tournament played every four years in a 
different country to the previous location. FIFA stands for Fédération Internationale de 
Football Association, and is the governing body of world soccer. In addition to holding 
the rights to host the World Cup, and owning the World Cup brand, FIFA is responsible 
for the rules of soccer, as played at both professional and amateur levels worldwide. The 
World Cup is competed by teams representing countries, more specifically national 
soccer associations that are officially recognized by the organizers. The first World Cup 
was in 1930 and the tournament has been held every four years since, with breaks for 
wartime disruption in 1942 and 1946. Although the specific format of the Finals has 
varied, the basic concept remains that a large number of national teams compete in a 
qualifying tournament organized around regional football associations, for the right to 
participate in the World Cup Finals. In 2010, 32 teams were awarded places in the 
Finals, played in South Africa between June 11 and July 11 2010. One place is tradi-
tionally reserved for the host nation (two places if there are co-hosts as in the case of 
Japan and South Korea in 2002). The 2010 Finals comprised a round-robin league com-
petition of eight divisions of four teams each, with places allocated by complex seeding 
principles; this was followed by a knock-out tournament involving single games, lead-
ing eventually to the Final. The World Cup Final is the planet’s most-viewed sports 
event. The 2006 Final in Germany played between Italy and France, drew an estimated 
75 million television viewers. FIFA estimated that an overall total of $3.4 billion would 
be generated from proceeds of the most recent World Cup Finals (www.sportcal.com). 
This would represent an increase from $2.6 billion in the 2006 World Cup held in Ger-
many (Maennig and du Plessis, 2007). 
 
This Chapter will present a general review of the economics of the FIFA World Cup. 
We shall proceed as follows. Section 1 explores the method by which host countries are 
selected by FIFA for the rights to organize the World Cup finals. Section two explores 
the benefits to host countries from organizing the World Cup finals. Since the literature 
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consensus that the direct benefits are at best modest we move on to consider intangible 
benefits to host country residents from the World Cup finals. In Section three we 
consider the later benefits to soccer fans in a host country from new stadium 
infrastructure and other legacies of hosting the World Cup finals. Section four turns our 
attention to the players participating in the World Cup finals, examining their direct 
remuneration from participation plus later benefits in terms of career advantages. This 
Section will present new evidence from the German Bundesliga of salary premia to 
players associated with World Cup participation. In Section 5, we offer some views on 
attempts by some national soccer associations to restrict imports of foreign players, 
sometimes with the explicit goal of using import controls as a means of promoting 
national success in tournaments such as the World Cup. 
 
8.2 Selection of Host Countries for the World Cup Finals 
FIFA is essentially an umbrella organization, comprising six confederations which in 
turn represent national associations. The six confederations are Africa (CAF), Asia 
(AFC), Europe (UEFA), North America, Central America and the Caribbean 
(CONCACAF), Oceania (OFC) and South America (CONMEBOL). Places for the 
World Cup Finals are allocated by confederations so, for example, UEFA sent nine 
teams to the 2010 Finals. On the executive committee, UEFA has the largest represen-
tation with nine seats out of 24, followed by CONMEBOL, AFC and CAF with four 
each. 
 
The choice of host country for the World Cup Finals is made by the FIFA Executive 
Committee from a set of national association bids. In several respects, the choice 
mechanism has some similarities with that of host city for the Olympic Games, also 
held every four years, but not in the same year as the World Cup Finals. Hosting the 
World Cup Finals is a right that the local soccer federation buys off FIFA. Similar to the 
Olympic Games, FIFA sets up an auction for the rights to hold the World Cup Finals 
every four years. Also similar to the Olympic Games, FIFA extracts economic rent due 
to its position as monopoly provider of the tournament. FIFA does not take a fee from 
the successful bidder but instead insists on a number of favorable contract provisions 
118 
 
which can be judged to be components of economic rent. For example, Maennig and du 
Plessis (2007) report that FIFA insisted that, for the 2010 Finals in South Africa, adver-
tising billboards within 1 kilometer of stadia where Finals games were played, and 
along access roads to such stadia, should be restricted to FIFA-endorsed enterprises. 
Profits from such advertising went to FIFA. A similar rule applied to the 2006 Finals in 
Germany. From 1958 to 2006, FIFA followed a rotation policy, although this was only 
ever explicit from 2000. Under this policy, the Finals would be held every eight years in 
Europe, alternating with a venue from another continent (see Table 8-1). Ostensibly, 
this policy was designed to promote soccer in continents and countries where soccer 
leagues and soccer participation were less well-established. The choice of South Korea 
and Japan as co-hosts in 2002 could be rationalized in this way. 
 
Year  Host  Winner 
1930  Uruguay  Uruguay 
1934  Italy  Italy 
1938  France  Italy 
1950  Brazil  Uruguay 
1954  Switzerland  West Germany 
1958  Sweden  Brazil 
1962  Chile  Brazil 
1966  England  England 
1970  Mexico  Brazil 
1974  West Germany  West Germany 
1978  Argentina  Argentina 
1982  Spain  Italy 
1986  Mexico  Argentina 
1990  Italy  Germany 
1994  USA  Brazil 
1998  France  France 
2002  South Korea/Japan  Brazil 
2006  Germany  Italy 
2010  South Africa   
2014  Brazil   
Table 8-1: Hosts and Winners of the World Cup Finals since Origin 
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A counter-argument to the rotation policy is that FIFA has taken the World Cup Finals 
to countries where soccer is always likely to be a minority sport (USA) or where a club 
league is always going to be small in size and audience interest (South Africa). Con-
versely, the continent where soccer is most intensely followed as the dominant team 
sport is of course Europe. So why does FIFA not locate the World Cup Finals in Europe 
at every opportunity so as to maximize attendances, broadcast audiences and possibly 
revenues? One answer to this objection is that the stadium audience is much smaller 
than the global television audience, now enhanced by other media such as cell phones 
and internet. With a huge global broadcast audience available it may not matter where 
the games are actually played. It is notable that part of the revenue from sales of the 
2010 Finals broadcast rights came from the USA. FIFA negotiated a deal with the Eng-
lish-language networks, ABC and ESPN for a total of $100 million for the two tourna-
ments in 2010 (South Africa) and 2014 (Brazil). This sum was exceeded, however, by 
the amount of $325 million paid by the Spanish-language network, Univisión, over the 
same period. The reason for this large fee is the sizeable and growing Hispanic/Latino 
minority group in the United States, and their passionate interest in soccer. 
 
There may be a deeper reason for FIFA’s rotation policy than an ambassadorial function 
for the Finals. UEFA, itself one of the FIFA confederations, hosts two tournaments, the 
prestigious club-level UEFA Champions’ League contested by the most successful 
teams across national leagues within Europe, and the European Championship, a 
national team tournament contested by European national sides every four years and 
two years apart from the World Cup Finals. Locating the World Cup Finals on every 
occasion in Europe, would dilute the FIFA brand and would present UEFA with 
enhanced negotiating power within FIFA. Understandably, therefore, FIFA avoids the 
option of locating the Finals in Europe on every occasion. 
 
After the 2018 finals, FIFA will operate a new system for allocation of host nation(s). 
Rotation will be formally abandoned in favor of a new rule whereby the confederations 
whose associations have hosted the two preceding World Cups are not eligible to bid. 
However, all the associations from Asia, North and Central America and the Caribbean, 
Oceania and Europe could bid for the 2018 FIFA World Cup. The reason for this 
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change in policy came about because Brazil emerged as sole (and successful) bidder for 
the rights to host the 2014 Finals. As shown in the case of the Olympic Games, rights 
holders gain more rents from a larger number of bids. 
 
Competition between bidders drives up the sums of money committed to stadium and 
other infrastructure and these sums are an important part of any successful bid. For the 
2006 Finals in Germany, many club stadia needed renovation and redevelopment rather 
than being built as new. The German Organizing Committee spent $1.9 billion over 12 
locations with over 60 per cent of this figure coming from clubs and private investors, 
meaning that the share of public spending on stadia development programs was rela-
tively low. In contrast, the spending on stadia in South Africa was estimated by Maen-
nig and du Plessis (2007) at $1.4 billion over 10 venues, with five new and five reno-
vated stadia. The key difference from the German case was that in South Africa vir-
tually all the financial commitment was made by the Government. Another difference is 
that South Africa does not have a well-developed and vibrant team-level soccer league, 
which Germany clearly has. 
 
In addition to stadia and related infrastructure, such as roads and public transport net-
works, host associations must commit to various other expenses which include security, 
advertising and cultural programs. Maennig and du Plessis (2007) estimate the profit for 
the German organizing committee in 2006 to be $206m, aided by near capacity sales of 
match tickets. This surplus was distributed among the German Soccer Association 
(DFB), the German Premier League (DFL) and the German Olympic Federation. In 
contrast, the estimated profit to FIFA from the 2006 Finals was $1.9 billion, although 
part of this was redistributed to FIFA development programs worldwide. 
 
Despite the substantial costs involved, which extend to non-trivial costs of the bidding 
process itself, the likelihood of cost overruns and projections of fairly modest net profits 
to the host organizing committee, there has been no shortage of bids to host the 2018 
and 2022 World Cup Finals. FIFA decided to allocate both sets of Finals simultaneously 
and by deadline of March 2009, had received seven bids for 2018 or 2022, featuring 
Australia, Belgium and Netherlands as co-hosts, England, Japan, Russia, Spain and 
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Portugal as co-hosts and USA. A further four bids were received for 2022 only, includ-
ing Indonesia, South Korea and Qatar. As at November 2009, the betting odds offered 
by Sky Bet for host of the 2018 tournament where 11/8 for England, 3/1 for Spain and 
Portugal and 7/2 for Australia. However, the short odds on England may be driven by 
national sentiment and odds do vary in response to news stories, such as internal argu-
ments within the England bid team which moved the odds from 11/10 to 11/8 in 
November 2009. 
 
Given the high costs of stadium infrastructure, security and advertising and the ability 
of FIFA to extract economic rents as tournament rights holder, it is worth considering in 
more detail the likely pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits from hosting the World 
Cup Finals. Benefits to host country populations are considered next. 
 
8.3 Benefits to Local and National Economies 
The general consensus of the economic benefits from hosting large-scale sports events 
is that these are both exaggerated in ex ante studies and small ex post (Baade, 2003; 
Matheson, 2008). This consensus covers the Olympic Games (Baade and Matheson, 
2002; Hotchkiss et al. 2003; Humphreys and Zimbalist, 2008) and the National Football 
League’s Superbowl (Baade and Matheson, 2006). Ex ante estimates of expected eco-
nomic benefits of large-scale sporting events tend to be optimistic, partly through 
booster studies undertaken by consultants who have an incentive to report large bene-
fits. The events themselves are subject to a number of leakages and diversion effects. 
For example, hotel room rates rise around locations of large sporting events. Local resi-
dents may leave the area to avoid congestion and nuisance associated with the event. 
Projected employment gains may be misleading as the jobs involved may well be low-
skilled and temporary and many services are actually performed by volunteer workers 
whose activity will not form any part of Gross Domestic Product. 
 
In contrast, ex post studies of the economic benefits to local economies from hosting a 
large scale sports studies are more downbeat. There are two methods typically used to 
evaluate economic benefits ex post. The first is applied by Baade and Matheson (2004) 
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to the World Cup Finals hosted by the USA in 1994 and estimates a regression model of 
income growth with national GDP growth, demographic variables and time trend as 
control variables. This study compared income growth in the 75 largest population cen-
ters (Metropolitan Standard Areas) before and after the World Cup, spanning a period of 
1970 to 2000. The main finding was that actual growth in incomes was less than would 
have been expected prior to the World Cup event. Moreover, 9 out of thirteen host cities 
suffered lower growth after the World Cup compared to before. Using a similar 
approach, Hagn and Maennig (2008) could not find any evidence of statistically signifi-
cant positive benefits to German regions (in the old Federal Republic) from hosting the 
1974 World Cup, whether assessed by GDP growth, income growth or unemployment 
reductions. 
 
The second approach involves use of local employment data and a difference-in-differ-
ence methodology in which employment levels in localities which hosted World Cup 
games are compared with those that did not host, using differences in employment as 
the dependent variable in a regression model. This method was applied by Hotchkiss et 
al (2003) in a study of employment effects of the Atlanta Olympic Games on counties in 
the Atlanta area. Applying this method to German cities before and after the 2006 
World Cup, Feddersen et al (2009) find a lack of significant short-run or long-run 
employment or unemployment effects attributable to hosting the World Cup in Ger-
many. The procedure was to consider 12 World Cup venues as a treatment group in 
amongst the 118 largest population urban districts in Germany. Noting that construction 
projects on host city stadia began several years before the World Cup actually took 
place, and using a time span of 1995 to 2005, the authors compare differences in out-
come measured as per capita income, employment and unemployment levels (sepa-
rately) before and after the intervention, defined as beginning of a large stadium con-
struction project. The hypotheses of zero income and employment effects of the stadia 
construction projects in urban districts with completed work could not be rejected at the 
conventional five per cent significance level. 
 
At the microeconomic level, some particular industries may benefit from a country 
hosting the World Cup Finals. For example, the German beer industry enjoyed high 
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levels of sales during the 2006 World Cup Finals. But it is difficult to separate the 
effects of hot weather in the June and July period from the effects of the World Cup 
Finals. Also, Hagn and Maennig (2009) report that hotel occupancy rates actually fell 
during the World Cup Finals with substantial reductions in Berlin and Munich as host 
cities. Revenues held up as room rates rose. These results are very much line with the 
skeptical analyses offered by Baade (2003) and Matheson (2008). 
 
The absence of substantial direct economic benefits from hosting the World Cup has led 
several researchers to examine possible intangible or ‘feelgood’ effects. Heyne, Maen-
nig and Sussmuth (2007) conducted a before-and-after contingent valuation study to 
extract willingness to pay values for 500 people, before and after the 2006 World Cup 
Finals in Germany. The authors found that the average ex ante willingness to pay figure 
for respondents offering a positive value was $30.4. But fewer than 20 per cent of res-
pondents had a positive willingness to pay so the overall average was $5.66. After the 
event, 43 per cent of respondents reported a positive willingness to pay while the over 
the whole sample before and after the event, willingness to pay had a mean of $13.4 per 
person. Many respondents switched from zero willingness to pay to positive willingness 
to pay, particularly respondents from the eastern Germany and also the less educated. 
The authors suggest that this is indicative of the World Cup as an experience good and 
also that ex ante studies of willingness to pay might be biased downwards. 
 
As shown in the 2010 South Africa case, hosting the World Cup Finals can entail consi-
derable spending by the public sector on soccer stadia and associated infrastructure. The 
case for such spending is stronger if it can be shown that the World Cup generates a net 
increase in social welfare. But welfare is not observed, and is imperfectly correlated 
with objective measures such as Gross Domestic Product. This problem has led to use 
of self-reported happiness indicators in questionnaire studies. The question typically put 
is “Taking all things together, how would you say things are these days- would you say 
that you are happy, quite happy or nor very happy”. Responses are then coded on a 
Likert scale and applied ordinally in econometric analysis. 
 
124 
 
Kavetsos and Szymanski (forthcoming) use happiness data taken from the Euro-
barometer Survey covering 1,000 people per country over 12 countries for the period 
1974-2004. In this case there were four responses to the life satisfaction question: very, 
fairly, not very and not at all satisfied. The authors propose two hypotheses: i) better 
than expected national athletic performance raises happiness and ii) hosting major 
sporting events increases happiness. These hypotheses are tested over the World Cup 
years 1978, 1982, 1986, 1990 and 1994. Thus, they included a dummy variable for the 
only host country in the data, Italy, 1990. By comparing national team ratings just 
before and just after the World Cup Finals the authors tested the impact of team perfor-
mance on happiness using an ordinal logit model. This model had a long list of control 
variables. Macroeconomic control variables comprised GDP per capita, unemployment 
rate and inflation rate. Personal control variables included employment status, sex, age, 
age squared, marital status, household income quartiles and educational level attained. 
The results showed that hosting the World Cup Finals by Italy in 1990- who did not win 
the tournament- was positively and significantly correlated with reported happiness for 
the population as a whole and for a series of subgroups, with the notable exception of 
females. The authors also considered anticipation and legacy effects. A set of post-event 
dummies for two and four years after was jointly significant for all subgroups consi-
dered. Also, dummy variables for one year before and one year after gave positive 
effects on happiness, for the population as whole, for individuals under the age of 50, 
males, the unemployed and those who had not benefitted from higher education. 
 
8.4 Benefits of Hosting the World Cup Finals to Soccer Fans 
A criticism of public expenditure on purpose-built stadia constructed for the World Cup 
Finals is that they are under-used after the event. In the case of the 2006 Finals in Ger-
many, all 12 stadia used for the Finals reverted to use by Bundesliga clubs after the 
event. This includes the venue for the Final itself, the Olympiastadion in Berlin, 
currently occupied by Hertha Berlin. This club is a good example of how a team can 
successfully raise its attendance following a move into a new stadium. In the season 
directly after the World Cup Finals, 2006/07, Hertha Berlin’s average league attendance 
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was 25,000. But in 2008/09 average attendance had grown to 52,300 including three 
sell-out games at a capacity limit of 74, 000. 
 
The German Bundesliga is notable for the enthusiasm of its fans and it is no surprise 
that several teams which had renovated or new stadia after hosting World Cup Finals 
have experienced rising league attendances. As put in the baseball literature, the ques-
tion is ‘if you build it, will they come?’. A thorough empirical investigation of this 
question is offered, again for Germany, by Feddersen et al. (2006). Their analysis of 
‘novelty’ effects of new or renovated stadia follows the literature on baseball atten-
dances (Coates and Humphreys, 2005) and distinguishes three effects: 
 
1. Fans quickly get used to newly built or renovated stadia. This is a short-term 
immediate novelty effect confined to the first season directly after opening, with 
a dummy variable set equal to one for this period only. 
2. There may be a long-term novelty effect, as long as five years but then ending 
abruptly. Hence, a dummy variable is set equal to one for time periods t+1 to t+5 
after stadium opening. 
3. The novelty effect begins on date of stadium opening, has a maximum value 
after opening but then decays over the following years; the dummy variable is 
then D = aT where T is a five year time trend and a<0. 
 
Looking first at the 1974 Finals, Feddersen et al. (2006) find that there was an average 
increase in attendance for all clubs playing home games in new or renovated stadia of 
47 per cent one season after the Finals. This novelty effect shows some persistence: 
after five years, eight out of nine new or renovated stadia had higher fan numbers than 
in the year prior to the completion of construction. For the 2006 Finals, new stadium 
projects began as early as 1998. For these stadia, the authors find some evidence of 
novelty effects in the descriptive data. The authors combine impacts of new and reno-
vated for the 1974 and 2006 Finals in an econometric analysis of Bundesliga club atten-
dances over 1963-2003 using club and season fixed effects and controls for regional 
income and team performance. In Germany, stadium capacity is rarely binding so Tobit 
estimation is not required. Of the three novelty effects noted above, only the second is 
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significant at the five percent level. This long-term novelty effect is estimated at 2,700 
extra fans per game, for five years, or 10.7 per cent on a mean value of 25,000 fans. 
Higher novelty effects, estimated at an extra 10,300 fans per game, are found for two 
clubs, Hamburg and Schalke 04, who introduced the innovation (for Germany) of 
building new stadia without the traditional running track to separate crowd from the 
pitch. 
 
Feddersen et al point out that a large part of the revenue gains from new or renovated 
stadia comes from VIP and corporate seats, with around €8 millions accruing to Bun-
desliga clubs after the 2006 World Cup. It appears that extra revenue from new stadium 
developments comes from absorbing the purchasing power of a small group of affluent 
fans, a point that echoes the luxury box strategy of new stadium construction by Major 
League Baseball and National Football League franchises in North America. Since these 
affluent fans are willing to pay higher ticket prices then consumer surplus rises, but 
extra corporate boxes and seating may reduce the capacity available for less affluent 
fans, leading to ‘social exclusion’ from games. Supporters’ organizations often voice 
equity concerns as a result. 
 
FIFA operates two key restrictions on stadium development for World Cup Finals. First, 
there must be a minimum capacity of 40,000. The capacity minimum is designed to 
ensure sufficient revenue from ticket sales but has the consequence that smaller teams 
using a World Cup stadium for regular League games may find they often have empty 
seats. This is a particular problem for countries such as South Korea and South Africa 
whose Leagues are less mature than European Leagues. In the case of South Africa, two 
new stadia were built in Durban and Cape Town, holding 70,000 and 68,000 fans 
respectively. The two stadia in Johannesburg were renovated to reach capacities of 
94,700 (Soccer City) and 65,000 (Ellis Park). These are most unlikely to sell out save 
for a few international rugby and possibly soccer matches and certainly not for club 
fixtures. Second, FIFA prohibits the sponsorship of stadia in the form of naming rights 
unless the stadium sponsors are also official sponsors. Thus, the AOL Arena in Ham-
burg became the FIFA Football World Cup Arena for the duration of the 2006 Finals. 
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A total of seven out of 12 German stadia were affected in this way. This is another 
example of rent extraction by FIFA. 
 
Regardless of newness of stadia, hosting the World Cup Finals may lead to a boost to 
soccer attendances at League level. In his analysis of English Football League, Bird 
(1982) used a World Cup dummy to capture the combined effects of England hosting 
and winning the tournament on annual League attendances after the 1966 Finals. Con-
trolling for admission prices, travel costs and real incomes, Bird found that the World 
Cup contributed to a significant upward shift of 9.7 per cent in the 1966-67 season 
immediately following the Finals. This was in the context of long-term decline in soccer 
attendances in England over the period 1946 to 1985. However, Bird could not diffe-
rentiate between a World Cup effect and a possible uplift to attendances due to the extra 
publicity brought about by the introduction, for the first time, of a popular TV show 
Match of the Day featuring edited highlights of Saturday matches. 
 
In 1998, France repeated England’s achievement of hosting and winning the World 
Cup. Falter et al. (2008) argue that the period after France’s success was one of ‘over-
whelming joy’ which led to a positive network externality on club attendances in the 
French League. In terms of raw data, average League attendances rose from 16,600 in 
the 1997/98 season just before the Finals to 19,800 in 1998/99, just after, and again to 
22,300 in 1999/2000. Falter et al present an econometric demand model containing a 
host city dummy, home and away standings, home team payroll as a proxy for team 
quality, last score of the home team, transport costs, and dummies for seasons, matches 
involving local rivalry and sunshine all as control variables alongside year dummies 
intended to capture World Cup effects. Unlike Bird’s (1982) study, Falter et al use 
match level data. Their World Cup dummy variables show statistically significant 
increases in club League attendances of 14 per cent and 23 per cent for the two years 
following France’s World Cup success, ceteris paribus. There is also a positive and sig-
nificant host city effect. That is, the World Cup effect on club attendances is stronger 
for cities that hosted tournament games. This is apparently a combination of new sta-
dium (novelty) and advertising effects. 
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The authors make two robustness checks that do not affect their results. They deduct the 
more habitual season ticket holds from their match attendance figures and they also 
adopt tobit estimation to deal with sell-out fixtures. The authors also note that the rise in 
attendances in the French League was not matched by other Leagues such as England, 
Germany, Italy and Netherlands. But the rise in League attendances following a World 
Cup victory is also apparent in England (1966), Germany (1974, 1990) and Italy (1982). 
Hence, the authors conclude that average club League attendance tends to increase after 
a World Cup win and moreover, this effect persists for several years after the victory. 
 
8.5 Benefits to Players from Participating in the World Cup Finals 
Players, who appear in national team squads in the World Cup Finals, and in the earlier 
qualifying tournament, are selected by national associations, primarily by the national 
team head coach. These players will have employment contracts with clubs, with whom 
they play their regular soccer games in Leagues, domestic Cup competitions and in 
other competitions such as the UEFA Champions’ League. But national associations 
have the right to demand release of players from club duties for national selections. This 
right does not amount to conscription as players can ‘retire’ from international soccer. 
Also, players may be injured with their club teams and hence temporarily unavailable 
for selection for national teams. Clubs receive some compensation for release of players 
for national team games but this is nevertheless a source of complaint, especially when 
players return from national games with injuries. Conversely, national associations 
complain that players withdraw from less important national team games, especially ad 
hoc ‘friendly’ matches, with injuries that are not as serious as first appears. The inter-
national fixture calendar, including the World Cup Qualifying competition, is carefully 
set so that club fixtures are removed from weekends or midweek periods when inter-
national games are played. Also, the Finals themselves are always played in the close 
season for the vast majority of Leagues. 
 
In terms of career prestige playing in, and better still, winning the World Cup Finals 
offers a huge boost to player career incomes and also offers a high non-pecuniary 
reward. A player who appears in the winning team in the World Cup Finals can expect 
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both national adulation for a long time to come and immense off-field earnings pros-
pects in the form of endorsements and lucrative after-dinner speaking engagements. 
Hence, players typically regard the possibility of playing in the World Cup Finals as an 
important career goal. The size of direct payments to players from participating in the 
World Cup Finals has been assessed by Coupé (2007). He finds for the 2006 World Cup 
that most national associations had bonus schemes that rewarded performance but 
incentives did not rise monotonically as the tournament progressed. Table 8-2 shows the 
total and marginal (by tournament stage) team bonus in millions of Euros paid to com-
petitors in the 2006 Finals (Source: Coupé (2007)). Prior to 2006, FIFA and the national 
associations had used a fixed bonus per match regardless of the stage of the tournament, 
presumably under the assumption that prestige effects dominated pecuniary considera-
tions in terms of player effort and performance. 
 
Round  Bonuses  Marginal bonus 
Elimination round  3.79   
Reach 8th finals  5.38  1.59 
Reach quarter final  7.28  1.90 
Semi final  13.61  6.33 
Final  14.24  0.63 
Winner  15.51  1.27 
Table 8-2: Team Bonuses at the 2006 World Cup Finals 
 
Across the competitors in the 2006 Finals, Coupé finds that different bonus schemes 
were used. Croatia distributed a fixed percentage of FIFA prize money. Germany oper-
ated a fixed increase in prize for reaching the next stage together with a double bonus 
for winning the Final. Spain applied a rising bonus level at each stage and this was the 
method closest in spirit to the predictions of tournament theory. Generally though, 
Coupé finds that bonuses did not have the convex structure that tournament theory 
would predict. There was no discernable relationship between size or structure of 
bonuses and either match results or quality ratings of games played. Typically, all play-
ers in a Finals squad (fixed at 22 by FIFA) got the same bonus regardless of playing 
time.  
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There are several episodes of disputes between players and national associations over 
the size of bonuses e.g. Germany in 2002 and Ghana in 2006. In Ghana’s case, player 
pressure forced their national association to raise the level of bonuses. Bonuses can vary 
according to performance in previous World Cup Finals. The bonus paid to the French 
national team squad was €244,000 in 1998 when they won, rose to €300,000 in 2002, as 
a reflection of player bargaining power, and fell back after a poor 2002 Finals to 
€240,000 in 2006 (all values are nominal). 
 
At individual level, a number of studies have shown that soccer player basic salary 
offered by clubs (before bonuses) can be successfully modeled as a Mincer-type earn-
ings function in which experience (or age) and its square and performance assessed as 
goals scored and possibly assists to goals are regressors that deliver statistically signifi-
cant coefficients (Lucifora and Simmons, 2003; Frick, 2006). But these models lack a 
full set of performance indicators for defenders and midfield players. Lucifora and 
Simmons (2003) had a sample of 533 players in the 1993-94 season for Italy’s Series A 
and B with salary data gleaned from the players’ association. Using dummy variables to 
denote players who had recently appeared for their national teams, they find that Italian 
international players received a 52 per cent salary premium against non-internationals 
while other internationals obtained a higher premium of 75 per cent. The study predates 
the Bosman ruling of 1995 which led to enhanced player mobility within the European 
Union. Using a suitable proxy measure of player salaries and with data spanning 1995 
to 2005, therefore after the Bosman ruling, Frick (2006) shows, again using a standard 
Mincer earnings function, that sizeable nationality premia for country of birth applied in 
the German Bundesliga over the period 1995-2003. On top of these ethnicity premia are 
further salary returns for each career international appearance made. Frick enters the 
career international appearance variable in quadratic form and finds that salary is max-
imized at 50 appearances. 
 
Both Lucifora and Simmons (2003) and Frick (2006) find large salary premia accruing 
to players who represent their national teams. We suspect that much of these sizeable 
premia is a consequence of omitted variable bias since the only performance measure in 
Frick’s study is goals scored, itself mostly a product of forwards, while Lucifora and 
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Simmons consider goals and assists. Future data sets may well resolve this omitted vari-
able problem as more detailed performance statistics become publicly available, 
including those for defenders. However, we do have detailed data on player perfor-
mances in the Bundesliga top division for one season. These data include the number of 
tackles won or lost and both completed and incomplete passes made, plus several other 
performance measures. We find that the impact of these additional variables on player 
salary is statistically not significant, separately or jointly considered. 
  
Neither Lucifora nor Simmons or Frick attempt to separate international status or 
appearances into participation in World Cup Finals and other World Cup games. 
Clearly, ad hoc ‘friendly’ matches and World Cup Finals are quite different in prestige 
and are likely to have different impacts on salary. At least, this is a proposition to be 
tested. Within the soccer industry, there has been much discussion of the World Cup 
Finals as a ‘shop window’ effect for players, especially less well-known players from 
third world countries. Rather than view misleading video clips or make expensive 
scouting trips to remote countries, clubs and their agents can view and assess players in 
the highest-level competition on a world stage. 
 
At issue here is whether participation in the World Cup Finals adds to a players’ prod-
uctivity at club level, that is, augments his human capital, or whether participation in the 
Finals is a simply a signal. In the labor and education economics literatures, there is a 
long-standing debate over whether college education adds to human capital or is a sig-
nal to employers. In the sports economics literature, we know of no attempt to distin-
guish signaling from human capital explanations of player salary. In the major North 
American sports, appearances for a national team are rare. Playing for the USA national 
basketball team at the Olympic Games is a notable exception. Therefore, international 
soccer offers an excellent opportunity to discriminate empirically between human capi-
tal and signaling explanations of player salary. Arguments can be made for the conjec-
ture that participation in World Cup Finals augment a player’s productivity at club 
level. At the Finals, players must pit their wits against the best players from opposing 
national teams and their experience of competition at this highest level could well spill 
over into more successful League performance. Learning effects may also result from 
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playing with excellent peers in one’s own national team. Moreover, the World Cup 
Finals put great pressure on players due to the burden of expectations placed upon 
national teams by citizens and media alike. The experience of playing under such 
intense pressure could also aid the mental development of a player. 
 
On the other hand, the World Cup Finals could be argued to be a unique exercise in 
competition between nations that is unlikely to be replicated at League level, where 
teams play each other repeatedly, save for entry and exit occasioned by promotion and 
relegation. It is quite possible that participation in the World Cup Finals adds little or 
nothing to a player’s productivity at club level, yet has the effect of raising a player’s 
salary. This would be consistent with the signaling hypothesis. Indeed, Szymanski and 
Kuper (2009), in their entertaining account of world soccer, argue that clubs tend to 
overpay for players who have recently appeared in World Cup Finals. 
 
To properly discriminate between human capital and signaling explanations of soccer 
player salary one would require more detailed performance measures than current pub-
licly available data sources permit. As an interim step, we can simply assess whether 
salary premia for World Cup appearances are larger than for other appearances. 
 
We have data on salaries for all players with positive appearances in the German Bun-
desliga top division from 1995/06 to 2007/08. The salary measure is a market value 
measure collected by Kicker magazine that is known to be a good proxy (in the sense of 
well correlated) with a subsample of actual salaries released by the German Football 
Association (Frick, 2006; Torgler and Schmidt, 2007). This sample comprises 1,993 
players for a total number of 6,147 observations. We regress log salary against the fol-
lowing control variables: age and its square, number of appearances in the Bundesliga 
in the previous season, goals scored last season in the Bundesliga, career appearances in 
Bundesliga and its square, career goals scored in the Bundesliga and its square and 
dummy variables for position played in the club team, seasons and region of birth. Over 
and above these controls we add our focus variables which are number of World Cup 
Finals games played in the previous season, number of non-World Cup Finals games 
played in the previous season, career World Cup Finals appearances up to the previous 
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season and career non-World Cup appearances up to the previous season. Non-World 
Cup games include World Cup qualifying matches, European Championship qualifying 
and Finals games and friendly matches. Table 8-3 shows OLS and fixed effects (for 
players) results of our focus variable log salary. 
 
Focus variable 
OLS coefficient 
(t statistic) 
Fixed effects coeffi‐
cient (t statistic) 
World Cup appearances  0.087 (6.16)  0.072 (5.58) 
Other international appearances  0.033 (9.52)  0.015 (4.02) 
Career World Cup appearances  0.029 (2.70)  0.004 (0.20) 
Career other international appearances  0.007 (4.33)  ‐0.005 (1.32) 
Career other international appearances squared  ‐0.0001 (4.02)  0.000 (1.05) 
Table 8-3: OLS and Fixed Effects Results for the German Bundesliga 
 
The results clearly show that one extra appearance in World Cup Finals games delivers 
a greater salary benefit compared to one extra appearance in other international games. 
This result applies to both ordinary least squares and fixed effects estimates, although 
the latter may not be reliable due to the small of number of observations per player 
(three on average). Also, an extra career appearance in World Cup Finals games up to 
the previous season delivers a greater salary increment than an extra game played in 
non-World Cup Finals matches. Hence, we have support for a World Cup shop window 
effect on player salaries. 
 
The ordinary least squares results show impacts of international appearances at the 
means of variables. But the salary distribution for soccer players is highly skewed, even 
more so than in standard occupations. Evaluating impacts at the mean may then be 
misleading and it is useful to consider impacts over the whole salary distribution. 
Recently, a number of studies have looked at determinants of player salaries in various 
sports using quantile regression (for example, see Berri and Simmons, 2009 on National 
Football League quarterbacks and Vincent and Eastman, 2009 on the National Hockey 
League). This method allows us to estimate differing salary impacts of covariates 
through the salary distribution. Our own quantile regression results for soccer player in 
the Bundesliga are shown in Table 8-4. 
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Focus vari‐
able 
0.1 quantile  0.25 quantile  0.5 quantile  0.75 quantile  0.9 quantile 
World  
Cup appear‐
ances 
0.107***  0.102***  0.079***  0.069***  0.062** 
Other inter‐
national 
appearances 
0.029***  0.022***  0.031***  0.037***  0.044*** 
Career World 
Cup appear‐
ances 
0.029*  0.039**  0.030**  0.039**  0.035** 
Career other 
international 
appearances  
0.004+  0.005**  0.007***  0.008***  0.009*** 
Career other 
international 
appearances 
squared 
0.000+  ‐0.0001**  ‐0.0001***  ‐0.0001***  ‐0.0001*** 
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 level, + denotes insignificance (z-values in brackets). 
Table 8-4: Quantile Regression Results for log Salary 
 
The results of the quantile regression broadly support those of OLS. At the median sal-
ary, it is clear that salary returns to an extra World Cup Finals match exceed returns to 
other international matches. However, above the median the gap in returns is not sig-
nificantly different at five per cent level, despite the apparent gap in point estimates. 
The results point to diminishing returns of salary to recent World Cup Finals appear-
ances through the salary distribution. For career appearances, the results are more clear-
cut with salary returns to career World Cup Finals games being always greater than 
returns to other international games, at all quantiles. 
 
At club level it is apparent that some national Leagues are more prestigious and gen-
erate more revenues than others. Hence, one would expect the best players to gravitate 
towards those Leagues where these players’ marginal revenue product would be at their 
highest. The Leagues where revenues and average player salaries are highest at present 
are the English Premier League and Spain’s La Liga. UEFA gives each European team 
a score, based on standings in national Leagues and progress in European competitions, 
essentially the UEFA Champions’ League and the European Cup (previously UEFA). 
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The score variable ranges from one to 31. We create a variable, mover, which states if 
players switch from lower ranked teams to higher ranked teams or the other way 
around. Positive numbers suggest a change to a higher ranked team. We then estimate a 
probit regression for this variable using the same control variables as for the salary 
model above. This model is estimated for all players who switch teams within Europe, 
giving us 1,638 observations. Using our World Cup dummy variables already created, 
we can determine whether participation in World Cup games raises the probability of 
movement to a more highly ranked team. The estimated coefficients from our probit 
model are shown in Table 8-5 below. 
 
Focus variable  coefficient (t statistic) 
World Cup appearances  0.335 (3.00) 
Other international appearances  0.026 (1.57) 
Career World Cup appearances  0.045 (0.81) 
Career other international appearances  0.026 (2.92) 
Career other international appearances squared  ‐0.0004 (3.38) 
Table 8-5: Probit Estimates of Movement to a more Highly-Ranked Team 
 
It is clear that an extra recent appearance in a World Cup Finals match raises the proba-
bility of a move to a more highly ranked team, conditional on moving at all. In contrast, 
an extra recent appearance in other internationals has no statistically significant effect 
on a move to a better team. Looking at the career variables, however, the results switch 
so that an extra career World Cup Finals appearance has no effect on probability of a 
move to a more highly ranked team while an extra career appearance in other inter-
national matches does have a significant and positive effect on transition to a better 
team. Nevertheless, the marginal effect is smaller than for recent appearances in World 
Cup Finals matches. 
 
To summarize, recent appearances in World Cup Finals matches do appear to have shop 
window effects, both by raising player salaries paid by clubs and by helping players 
secure transitions to more highly ranked teams. This still leaves open the intriguing 
research question as to whether participation in World Cup Finals matches genuinely 
136 
 
raises player productivity or whether it is just a signal that need not necessarily 
represent player ability. 
 
8.6 Club versus Country?: The Domestic Player Quota Debate 
Up to the Bosman ruling of 1995, it was possible to restrict the number of foreign-born 
players in a national League by means of various rules. In the English Football League 
in the 1950s and 1960s, ‘foreigner’ meant a player from Scotland or Wales and not 
someone from Africa or South America. Many European Leagues, such as England and 
Italy, operated a rule such that a club team could consist of a maximum of three foreign-
born players plus two ‘assimilated’ players who were foreign-born but had played at 
club level in their adopted country for at least two years. 
 
After the Bosman ruling, such restrictions were deemed to be counter to principle of 
free movement of labor, at least as far as European Union countries were concerned. 
Restrictions remained in place for players attempting to move into European Union 
Leagues from outside the European Union. But the increasing demands by clubs for 
quality players from outside the European Union grew, and restrictions became more 
relaxed over time. We now have a situation where each major soccer League in Europe 
(England, France, Germany, Italy and Spain) has a cosmopolitan mix of players from all 
continents. Indeed, it is quite possible for a team to field a starting eleven consisting 
entirely of non-domestic players, as practiced in recent years by Arsenal and Chelsea in 
the English Premier League. 
 
Increased immigration of player talent has led to concerns that the displacement of 
domestic talent by foreign-born talent, a form of import substitution, might undermine 
the prospects for the national team. In England, these concerns were documented in a 
set of proceedings from the ‘feet drain’ conference held at Birkbeck College, London in 
April 2008. These proceedings feature an address by Gordon Taylor, Chief Executive of 
the Professional Footballers’ Association which summarizes the arguments in favor of 
quotas of domestic nationals in team squads, using the term ‘meltdown’ to describe the 
internationalization of playing talent in the English Premier League in particular 
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(Taylor, 2009). Recently, UEFA has implemented a ruling whereby the squads of teams 
playing in its Champions’ League football competition should comprise 25 players, 8 of 
which should be ‘home grown’, meaning having trained for three seasons at a domestic 
club between the ages of 15 and 21, and of these at least half should have been trained 
at the club itself for the same period. Similar rules will be applied by the English Prem-
ier League from the 2010/11 season. One of the arguments in favor of such quotas is 
that they encourage the development of promising young ‘home grown’ players who 
may eventually be selected for their national teams. Conversely, the present arrange-
ments in several European Leagues, where starting teams in England, in particular, fea-
ture relatively few English players and youth academies also feature a high proportion 
of ‘imported’ foreign players, are alleged to stifle the development of the national team. 
In England, this translates into the notion of reduced prospects of winning the World 
Cup. 
 
Looking at the general arguments surrounding fixed quotas for playing rosters at club 
level, we make several predictions drawing on simple economic theory: 
• The supply curve for talent gets steeper as there is more competition for stars, 
giving richer clubs an advantage; 
• There will be rising salaries for domestic stars; 
• There will be less competition for international players means owners get more 
profits; 
• Playing quality falls as some stars leave for Leagues that do not operate restric-
tions; 
• Broadcasting deals become less attractive as the total pool of talent is less; 
• Big clubs will be less able to win the UEFA Champions’ League; 
• Small countries will be less successful in national competitions such as the 
World Cup. 
 
In a literature that is analogous to that on Olympic medal success, a number of papers 
have empirically modeled World Cup success using World Cup Finals rankings or 
something similar as a dependent variable in a regression analysis. Monks and Husch 
(2009) present a panel data analysis of World Cup success, over 1982 to 2006, using 
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tournament Finals standings as their dependent variable. They find that playing on one’s 
own continent and being seeded are each significant determinants of World Cup suc-
cess. In purely practical terms, of course, the strong records of Brazil and Germany 
(previously West Germany) at the World Cup Finals, as noted in Table 8-1, means that 
a national team aspiring to win the tournament has to be capable of beating one or both 
of these teams, or hope that some other team does so. 
 
Leeds and Leeds (2009) adopt a cross-country (not panel) analysis with FIFA points 
assessed at 2006 as their dependent variable. They find a statistically significant positive 
effect of the international success of a country’s club teams on national team success. A 
specific example supporting this result is France in 1998, who managed to win the 
World Cup with a majority of players in the national team being attached to clubs out-
side France, many of which had made successful progress in the Champions’ League. 
As we showed earlier, in section three on impacts of World Cup Finals on fans, Falter et 
al (2008) report positive externalities from French national team success on club atten-
dances and revenues. Szymanski and Kuper (2009) take the club versus country argu-
ments a stage further by suggesting that England’s prospects for World Cup success 
would be enhanced if more of the higher-quality English players actually played abroad, 
a suggestion that is directly counter to the arguments noted above in favor of domestic 
quotas. However, Szymanski and Kuper also suggest that the natural Finals standing for 
an England team at the World Cup is the quarter-finals stage and it is somewhat opti-
mistic, based on historical data, to expect anything better. 
 
Overall, the attempt to re-introduce domestic quotas in European League soccer appears 
to be a protectionist device with little merit. The case for such quotas to actually contri-
bute to enhanced World Cup performance has yet to be made, and does not come with 
any supporting empirical observation. It is notable that the ‘internationalization’ of 
teams in European soccer Leagues has been accompanied by rising attendances in four 
out of five major European Leagues since the mid 1990s (Italy being the exception, 
which can be explained by a host of specific circumstances relating to hooliganism and 
corruption scandals). Thus fans, and also television viewers, appear to like the increa-
singly cosmopolitan make-up of their club sides. 
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8.7 Conclusions 
The FIFA World Cup can make a legitimate claim to be the world’s largest sporting 
tournament, even bigger than the Olympic Games in terms of broadcast audience and 
worldwide interest. The rights to hold this lucrative and prestigious tournament reside 
with FIFA and it is no surprise to find that FIFA succeeds in rent extraction, even 
though FIFA does not take a direct payment from local organizing committees. FIFA 
does earn substantial revenues from sponsors and advertisers and employs restrictions to 
ensure that official FIFA partners receive favorable treatment on access to advertising 
space e.g. on billboards. 
 
The consensus of the sports economics literature is that the World Cup, in common with 
other large-scale sports events, does not generate substantial benefits in terms of local 
real income and employment growth and unemployment reductions. In contrast, non-
pecuniary benefits, in terms of enhanced satisfaction and happiness, have been identi-
fied by some recent research. Further research is needed to corroborate these findings. 
There is little doubt that hosting the World Cup Finals is costly in terms of stadium 
development, infrastructure and security. Where public spending is involved in hosting 
the Finals, more cost-benefit studies on the net benefits to the host country would be 
welcome. 
 
There are two impacts on soccer fans worth noting. First, there are novelty effects of 
new stadia that persist for some time after new stadia are constructed, at least as far as 
Germany 2006 was concerned. Second, hosting and winning the World Cup can lead to 
a boost to club attendances through a ‘warm glow’ effect. 
 
Players who appear in the World Cup Finals appear to benefit in terms of enhanced sal-
ary, although whether this is due to a signaling effect or to genuine improvement in 
productivity is a matter for future research to resolve. Finals participants also benefit 
from increased probability of a transfer to a better club, as measured by UEFA rankings 
for European clubs. 
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The FIFA World Cup Finals is no doubt here to stay as a vital component of the sport-
ing calendar. Avoiding excessive and wasteful expenditures is difficult to achieve, given 
the emotion and sentiment that surrounds the event. But the World Cup does offer 
excellent opportunities for economists to make substantial contributions to the various 
public choice and policy issues surrounding the World Cup, including a more sober 
assessment of employment and income effects that is present in consultancy and booster 
studies. 
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9 Outlook 
 
To address the main question stated in the introduction, the present work analyzes the 
influence of personality traits on individuals’ income. As I relate leadership ability to 
the personality trait “extraversion”, I find clear support for the claim that leadership 
ability is indeed rewarded monetarily. Research for the German Bundesliga as well as 
the National Hockey League reveals that team captains in professional sports receive a 
considerable wage premium. Controlling for individual player characteristics and per-
formance indicators it shows that team captains in soccer earn a wage premium between 
25 and 67 percent, while team captains in hockey receive a wage premium between 21 
and 35 percent. To evaluate these results, comparable research concerning other sports, 
possibly with different team sizes and varied numbers of team captains, would be of 
great interest. Theory of organization would lead us to the expectations of rising bene-
fits of leadership ability as team size increases and as the number of team captain 
decreases. 
 
The following two chapters address the influence of pressure on individuals’ 
performance. Relating to the personality trait of emotional stability, we show that 
professional basketball players who are able to maintain their performance level during 
pressure situations are rewarded monetarily. Furthermore, I present an empirical work 
about the effect of performing in front of friendly and hostile audiences, focusing on the 
effect of changing teams and therefore supportive audiences between two seasons. 
Research shows that players’ performance suffers during home games after they sign 
with a new team as they feel additional social pressure. This is most notably true for 
players who display comparably bad performances. Consentaneously, both studies show 
that emotional stability does not increase with age and therefore appears to be innate. 
This finding clearly goes in line with the literature presented in the introduction which 
states that personality traits rather not change over time. Future research might combine 
both studies to analyze the influence of supportive or hostile audiences on performance 
during pressure situations. 
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For my research on the relative age effect in the German Bundesliga, I summarize 
results as follows: Grouping children according to their age leads to labeling older 
children of the cohort as being more talented which leads to more support during their 
early playing years. My data set on professional soccer supports the claim that this 
selection improves the probability of the oldest members of the cohort to become pro-
fessional soccer players in the Bundesliga. Along with my thesis that the birth date itself 
should not affect playing performance, I find no proof for a monetary reward of reach-
ing the professional level despite an age disadvantage. Providing hazard rates this 
statement is supported as the length of stay in the Bundesliga proves to be independent 
of the date of birth. A similar research for the German second division would provide 
the possibility to compare career tracks dependent on the date of birth. 
 
Concerning the sabotage behavior of heterogeneous contestants, our theoretical model 
and empirical work offer concurrent results. Our formal model suggests that the favorite 
in a tournament chooses legal activities, while the underdog is tempted to engage in 
illegal activities. The reasoning is that the favorite is more productive with respect to 
legal activities and that both types of activities are substitutes. In our empirical section, 
we demonstrate the plausibility of the theoretical model by using match-level data from 
the German Bundesliga. We find that teams that are more likely to win a match, win 
significantly more tackles in a fair way while they commit significantly fewer fouls. As 
betting odds, which enable us to compute the implicit winning percentages, are 
available for many other professional team sports a similar research for another league 
would be of great interest. 
 
Summarizing previous research on the economics of the FIFA World Cup we conclude 
that the FIFA itself earns considerable revenues from sponsors as well as advertisers. 
For the host country research does not find substantial benefits for the local economy as 
real income and employment rates are not affected positively. In contrast, players bene-
fit monetarily from participating in the World Cup as our work supports the thesis of a 
shop window effect. In addition, we show that players from the German Bundesliga 
who participate in the World Cup exhibit an increased probability of a transfer to a bet-
ter club, as measured by UEFA rankings for European clubs. Future research might try 
143 
 
to find a shop window effect for the European Championship, which we expect to be 
significantly lower than the shop window effect for the FIFA World Cup. 
 
After providing implications and ideas for future analysis separately, I conclude by pre-
senting an outlook for ulterior research. Data used for research in the present work pro-
vides the basis for some yet unanswered questions in the field of sport economics. One 
work soon to follow concerns nomination contests in professional sports, especially for 
German soccer players in the German Bundesliga and relates to Spence (1973). Players 
signal their abilities during games in the Bundesliga to be nominated for international 
caps. As previously shown, being nominated to the national team has a significantly 
positive impact on the players’ salary. The question arises which performance indicators 
influence the chances of being nominated to the national team. Preliminary results show 
that players’ age, experience in national and international competition as well as most 
recent performance in the Bundesliga have a significant impact on the chances of being 
nominated. 
 
Also to follow soon is a joint work with Arne Büschemann concerning the efficiency of 
teams in the four major league sports in the United States. We have information con-
cerning the economic performance of all teams such as the value of teams, revenues and 
operating income. In addition, we have specific information for all teams concerning 
average attendance, market size, sporting achievements of the team, the fan cost index 
and the tradition of a club. By performing frontier analysis we are going to test whether 
teams in bigger markets, which face competition by other teams nearby, exhibit higher 
efficiencies due to competition. In addition, we would like to reveal if the lockout in the 
National Hockey League in 2004/05 and the following new collective bargaining 
agreement led to higher efficiencies of the teams in the National Hockey League. 
 
A third subsequent work will concern violence in professional hockey. It follows a work 
by Dennis Coates and Andrew Grillo (2009) who relate the influence of fighting, 
violence and penalties to team and league success in the National Hockey League. In a 
joint work with Marcel Battré and Dennis Coates we transfer this approach to European 
professional hockey leagues to test whether the influence of the aforementioned factors 
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are the same. We possess comparable data from the German and the Finish professional 
hockey league and are able to relate rule changes, which occurred during the observa-
tion period, to the impact of violence on aforementioned measurements of team and 
league success. 
 
To summarize: Even though the present work sheds light on different parts of personal 
economics there is still a lot of work to be done. Sports data offers the basis to answer 
aplenty of research questions, waiting to be worked on. 
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